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ABSTRACT
One of the leading concerns animating current philosophy of mind is that, no
matter how good a scientific account is, it will leave out “what it’s like” to be
conscious. The challenge has thus been to study or at least explain away that
qualitative dimension. Pursuant with that aim, I investigate how philosophy of
signs  in  the  Peircean  tradition  can  positively  reshape  ongoing  debates.
Specifically, I think the account of iconic or similarity-based reference we find
in semiotic theory offers a more promising variant of the “phenomenal concept
strategy.” Philosophers who endorse this strategy think that the difficulties we
have fitting conscious “qualia” into a scientific picture may owe to the peculiar
nature of indexical concepts. They point to the fact that, when we try to convey
the  feel  of  our  experiences,  we  employ  context-dependent  gestures  and/or
utterances that are “indexed” to perspectives unique to each person. However,
according to the theory I defend, there are three ways signs can refer, namely by
convention, causal contact, and similarity. Since similarity is not reducible to
proximity,  I argue that a theory of reference that turns on shared quality can
bypass some of the implausible consequences that plague indexical accounts. In
the first chapter, I describe the apparatus needed to make sense of this claim. In
the  second  chapter,  I  present  my account  of  iconic  reference.  In  the  third
chapter, I justify my reliance on a distinction that is less than real yet more than
nominal. In the fourth chapter, I sketch a “trinitarian” metaphysics well-suited
to house the foregoing account of qualia.
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FOREWORD
The title of my dissertation is a nod to David Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind:
In Search of a Fundamental Theory (1996).  I  want  to say that  semiotics is
exactly  the  sort  of  theory  Chalmers  has  been  searching  for.  As  such,  my
dissertation  could  also  have  been  titled  “Semiotics  and  the  Philosophy  of
Mind,” as a nod to Umberto Eco’s Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language.
In that widely-read work, Eco motivated an inquiry that, in contrast with the
mainstream philosophy of  language  of  the time,  places  a  distinct  value and
importance on  synthesis.  Specifically,  Eco (1986b, p.  8) aimed to show that
conventional meaning (e.g., words), inference from evidence (e.g., symptoms),
and  pictorial  representation  (e.g.,  maps)  all  “concern  a  unique  theoretical
object,”  namely  the  “sign”  writ  large.  This  perspective  involves  the  idea—
originating in the Medieval period (Eco and Marmo 1989) and later articulated
by  Charles  Sanders  Peirce  (1992;  1998)—that  all  varieties  of  sign-action
exhibit a common (triadic) structure which can and ought to be studied in its
own right. This is the approach I take in this dissertation.
What  has  been  said  of  cognitive  science  can  also  be  said  of  semiotics,
namely that  it  has “a very long past but a relatively short history”  (Gardner
1985,  p.  9).  John  Locke  introduced  the  word  semiotics  in  the  penultimate
paragraph of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where he surmised
that  semiotic  inquiry  “might  present  us  with  a  sort  of  logic  and  criticism
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different from what we have encountered up to now”  ([1690] 2007, book 4,
chap.  21,  para.  4;  see Deely 2003b).  Indeed,  as Paul Bouissac writes in  his
introduction to Oxford’s Encyclopedia of Semiotics:
Semiotics represents one of the main attempts—perhaps the most enduring
one—at conceiving a transdisciplinary framework through which interfaces
can be constructed between distinct domains of inquiry. Other endeavors,
such as the unified science movement of the 1930s or  cybernetics and
general systems theory in  the 1950s and 1960s,  met with only limited
success. By contrast, semiotics remains a credible blueprint for bridging the
gaps between disciplines and across cultures. (1998, p. ix)
In the estimate of many, Eco included, no one has done more to evince that
blueprint  than Peirce.  Hence,  like many semioticians, I  hold that, at present,
“[t]here is no such thing as non-Peircean (or non-Sebeokian) semiotics, just as
there  are  no  non-Einsteinian  physics  or  non-Darwinian  biology” (Kilpinen
2008, p. 217). Semiotics, however, is bigger than Peirce, and Peirce—with his
lifelong emphasis on the communal nature of inquiry—would not have had it
any  other  way.  Peirce  saw  himself  merely  as  “a  pioneer,  or  rather  a
backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semiotic,
that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible
semiosis”—a field he  considered  “too  vast,  the  labor  too  great,  for  a  first-
comer” (Peirce 1931–58, vol. 5, para. 488). As such, he would undoubtedly be
delighted to witness the disciplinary vitality currently on display in the semiotic
literature.
viii
There is a belief—expressed by the Russian cultural theorist Juri Lotman
and subsequently  defended  by Thomas  Sebeok  (Deely 2009c,  p.  484)—that
“semiotics is a field that one should not begin with” (Kull, Salupere, and Torop
2009,  p.  xi).  Thus,  for  better  or  worse,  academic  degrees  in  semiotics  are
awarded  mainly at  the  graduate  level.  The  Ph.D.  program at  UQÀM, from
which I graduated in 2008, was established in 1979. Charles W. Morris was in
all  likelihood the first  to explicitly teach a university course in semiotics in
Chicago in the 1930s (Sebeok 1991a, pp. 75, 123).  The inquiry gained further
institutional form at a 1964 conference in Bloomington, Indiana, where scholars
from varied fields rallied under a common semiotic banner (Rey 1984, p. 92).
The  International Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS) held its first world
congress in 1974, publishing its proceedings ever since. Although one has to
select them wisely,  reliable encyclopedias (Cobley 2010; Sebeok and Danesi
2010) and textbooks (Deely 1990; Savan 1987) in semiotics are now available,
and  the  inquiry  attracts  a  growing  number  of  scholars  who  publish  in
established  peer-reviewed  journals  like  Semiotica,  Sign  Systems  Studies,
Semiotic Inquiry, and The American Journal of Semiotics.
So, when Eco wrote Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, he did not
have to fabricate his theoretical resources whole cloth, but could instead help
himself  to  a  rich  semiotic  literature  which,  in  spite  of  its  international  and
multidisciplinary  character,  was  increasingly  consolidating  its  many streams
into a common Peircean paradigm. If this was true for Eco’s work, it is all the
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more  so  for  mine,  as  in  the  intervening  decades  semiotic  inquiry  has  kept
progressing  (the  contribution  of  Thomas  Sebeok  to  this  growth  cannot  be
overstated; see Cobley et al. 2011). For a reliable cartography of the field, one
can consult the annotated bibliography of 80 entries I have prepared for Oxford
University Press’ online Bibliographies in Philosophy series.
Another  advantage  that  benefited  Eco’s  book  was  that  it  took  one  of
analytic  philosophy’s  dearest  topics—language—as  its  starting  point.  In
arguing that language is sign-use and that sign-use has features besides those
than  can  be  found  in  a  system  of  conventions,  he  was  essentially  saying
something genial to those who had read the work of Austin or Wittgenstein. If
we  follow Richard  Rorty  (1980)  and  Robert  Brandom  (1994)  and  construe
“pragmatism”  narrowly,  as  an  account  of  how linguistic  communities  “do”
things  with  language,  then  absorbing  the  ideas  of  Peirce  in  the  canon  of
philosophy of language seems a natural move. Unfortunately, such absorption
would obscure more than it would reveal. Peirce did not belittle language, but
he was emphatic that symbols are but one sort of sign among others. There may
be legitimate methodological reasons to limit a given empirical or philosophical
inquiry to language. But, as Thomas Sebeok (1991b) brought out with sustained
ferocity, one has to neglect all those other signs which aren’t symbols (and all
those  sign  users  which  aren’t  human)  in  order  to  claim  the  prediction  for
language somehow marks a metaphysical boundary.
x
Somewhere along the way, a lot of twentieth century thinking fell prey to a
pair of alarmingly fallacious inferences  (see Austin 2001, pp.  30–31): words
need not resemble their objects, therefore words  never resemble their objects;
and words (the species) never resemble their objects, therefore signs (the genus)
never resemble their objects.  Consider, for example, Ferdinand de Saussure’s
claim  that  conventional  imputations  are  the  paradigmatic  exemplars  of
semiosis: “Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal
of the semiological processes [...]” [1916] 2011, p. 68). This is a dogma, pure
and simple. Although a study of linguistic symbols can definitely yield insights
(Holdcroft  1991),  such  conventional  signs  are  a  proper  subset  of  a  much
broader  class  of  signs,  and  failure  to  recognize  this  leads  to  a  fallacy  of
composition, wrongly assuming that a property of one or more of the parts of a
whole is also true of that whole (Deely,  Williams, and Kruse 1986; Sebeok
1988; Deledalle 2000, pp. 100–113; Deely 2001a, pp. 669–688). 
Because Saussure ([1916] 2011, p. 16)  saw the study of signs as a part of
social psychology, semiology had little or nothing to say about signs outside of
culture. Louis Hjelmslev had published his formal development of Saussure in
1943 (Hjelmslev [1943] 1969). When Roland Barthes met with the linguist A.
J. Greimas in Egypt in 1949, Greimas informed him of (or created?) trends to
come by telling him how “one cannot not know Saussure” (see Dosse 1997a, p.
68).  Barthes later drew on the ideas of Saussure and  Hjelmslev in his short
“Éléments  de sémiologie” ([1964] 1977),  which was widely used in literary
xi
circles.  However, it  was  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty who,  in  a  prominent  1951
lecture (reprinted his 1964, pp. 84–97),  introduced Saussurean ideas into the
philosophical mainstream. Paradoxically, Merleau-Ponty’s pioneering work in
embodied cognition ensured that arbitrariness and convention would never be
the last word on meaning. Under the force of philosophical critiques, French
semiologists like Greimas have reluctantly had to acknowledge the presence of
non-symbolic  meaning (see the anecdote in Broden 2009, pp. 577–578),  but
they have tended to relegate such events to phenomenologists (Ablali 2004).
In comparison with semiology, the semiotic tradition has travelled down a
very different path. Instead of limiting signs to language and human customs,
Thomas  Sebeok  (2001a,  p.  10)  held  that  “The  criterial  mark  of  all  life  is
semiosis” and that “Semiosis presupposes life,” so he allowed animals, plants,
and even single cells to use signs (see El-Hani, Queiroz, and Emmeche 2006).
Looking at the literature, “[t]he lowering of the semiotic threshold in semiotics
during the last decades [...] went parallel with the rediscovery of Peirce’s broad
concept of semiosis” (Nöth 2001, p. 15). Peirce (1998, p. 394) held that reality
itself is, in some fundamental way, made of signs. I was present at the first ever
session  of  the  Semiotic  Society  of  America  (in  October  2008)  devoted  to
discussing the possible existence of semiosis in the inorganic realm. In much
the same spirit as the yearly “Toward a Science of Consciousness” conferences
(often held in Tuscon), semioticians are currently trying to craft a worldview in
which the human use of signs does not seem out of place. For reasons I outline
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in Champagne (2013b), I do not think the project has yet succeeded, but I can at
least see why it is being pursued.
Many  who  admire  the  work  of  Peirce  feel  ambivalent  about  his
metaphysical views (for a recent survey of the camps, see  Johnston 2012, p.
1fn1). Philosophers like John Deely (1994b; 2001b) and Lucia Santaella (2009)
are currently working to make the Peircean ontology tenable, but most follow
Sebeok  in  holding  that  semiosis  begins  with  life.  Clearly,  we have  moved
beyond  Saussure’s narrow fascination  with  conventional  signs.  A biological
turn may be under way in philosophy of mind (e.g.,  Thompson 2007), but in
semiotics the Sebeokian idea that life and semiosis are co-extensive has been
discussed for four decades now (see Favareau 2010). In a way, semiotic inquiry
has returned to its roots, since, as Sebeok was fond of pointing out, the first
signs  ever  to  receive  theoretical  attention  were  medical  symptoms  (see  the
remarks by Marcel Danesi in Sebeok 2001b, pp. xi–xvi).
A telling—if admittedly imperfect—parallel can help to give a preliminary
sense of the proper scope of semiotic inquiry. In an attempt to iron out what he
took to be an ambiguity in the common usage of the word “mean,” H. P. Grice
(1957) called attention to the difference between sentences like “Those spots
mean (meant) measles” and “Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean
that the ‘bus is full’” (1957, p. 377). Clearly, we notice a dissimilarity between
these two claims. Considering the first statement, one cannot say “Those spots
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meant measles, but he hadn’t got measles,” whereas for the second statement, it
would make more sense for one to say “But it isn’t in fact full—the conductor
has  made a mistake”  (Grice  1957,  pp.  377–378).  Both  sentences  are  in  the
business of relating: the first binds spots and measles, the second ringing bells
and filled buses. Yet, the latter relation is liable of being mistaken in a manner
that the second is not, insofar as the effect that ringing bells have on people’s
conduct “must be something within the control of the audience, or at least the
sort of thing which is within its control” (Grice 1957, p. 386). This led Grice to
distinguish  between  what  he  called  “natural  meaning”  and  “nonnatural
meaning.”
Grice’s  work  spawned  a  better  understanding  of  the  many  nuances  of
language. His distinction also reflected lay usage. Indeed, Grice remarked, quite
rightly,  that  “[t]his  question  about  the  distinction  between  natural  and
nonnatural meaning is, I think, what people are getting at when they display an
interest in a distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘conventional’ signs” (1957, p.
379). Grice’s work nevertheless left unanswered—or rather, unasked—a crucial
question: why do we speak of “meaning” in both natural and nonnatural cases?
The stock assumption seems to be that this plurality is an artifact of linguistic
confusion, which a more rigorous analysis could in principle redress. That is
certainly one hypothesis. Still, there is another way of viewing the situation:
What if the kinship at hand is not a conflation but rather has a basis in fact?
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Without diminishing the differentia  that  separates bells and measles,  what if
natural and nonnatural meanings are species of a common genus?
What we have in twentieth century philosophy of language are two sorts of
significant  relations,  both  placed  under  a  single  super-ordinate  class  of
“meaning”—but the revolutionary implications of recognizing this kinship are
not reaped but dismissed (see for example Harman 1977). Philosophy of signs,
by contrast, strives to systematically unpack that crucial kinship and explore all
it implies (Jakobson 1988, p. 436; Eco 1986b, pp. 7–13, 15–20; Sebeok 2000).
To what extent  Grice’s  ideas can fit  into this unified inquiry is  an open
question (see Pietarinen 2006, p. 66). In any event, semiotic theory augments
the Gricean division in two respects.  It  adds something “above” the Gricean
division, since it regards natural meaning and nonnatural meaning as species of
the genus “sign.” Second, it also adds something “below” the Gricean division,
since it  regards  “natural  meaning” as a genus  with  two sub-species,  namely
indices and icons. Indices are “natural” in virtue of a mind-independent link of
causality, whereas icons are “natural” in virtue of a mind-independent link of
similarity. Part of what I will do in this dissertation is unpack the ramifications
of this finer-grained taxonomy.
Iconicity in particular remains poorly understood. In  philosophy of mind
and cognitive science, icons are often viewed with suspicion. It might be worth
remembering,  though,  that  even a critic like Zenon  Pylyshyn was careful to
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stress that  “the existence  of the experience  of images  cannot  be questioned.
Imagery is a pervasive form of experience and is clearly of utmost importance
to  humans.  We  cannot  speak  of  consciousness  without,  at  the  same  time,
implicating the existence of images. Such experiences are not in question here”
(1973, p. 2).
A  colleague,  Gabriel  Greenberg,  recently  devoted  his  entire  doctoral
dissertation  at  Rutgers  to  proving  that  iconicity  is  a  worthwhile  topic  of
philosophic  study,  and  that  “the  traditional,  language-centric  conception  of
semantics must be overhauled to allow for a more general semantic theory, one
which countenances  the wide  variety of  interpretive  mechanisms actually at
work in human communication” (2011, p. ii). I basically pick up where he left
off.  I  nevertheless  try  to  steer  the  dialectic  in  a  slightly  different  direction.
Greenberg  (ibid.,  p.  8)  does  some  perfunctory  name-dropping,  but  his
arguments show little demonstrable mastery of the relevant semiotic literature.
Due to my familiarity with work done outside the analytic tradition, I am far
less  certain  that  the  “overhaul”  he  calls  for  will  leave  intact  reigning
assumptions about meaning and its place in the world.
The analytic tradition has, from logical positivism onward, privileged the
study  of  “semantics”  and  “syntactics”  over  “pragmatics,”  and  in  so  doing
ignored Charles Morris’ warning (in 1938) that “semiotic, in so far as it is more
than these disciplines, is mainly concerned with their interrelations, and so with
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the unitary character of semiosis which these disciplines individually ignore”
(1971, p. 63). The foundational assumption of semiotics is that all signs involve
a shared (triadic) structure which it  behoves us to recognize and understand
(Fisch  1983).  Sebeok  (1979,  p.  64)  called ecumenicalism  the  “distinctive
burden”  of  semiotics.  Elimination  is  the  cardinal  sin  of  such  a  research
program. Indeed, “if semiotics is the science of signs, as the etymology of the
word  suggests,  then  it  does  not  exclude  any  sign.  If,  in  the  variety  of  the
systems of signs, one discovers systems that differ from others by their specific
properties, one can place them in a special class without removing them from
the general science of signs” (Jakobson and Pomorska 1983; quoted in Sebeok
1991a, p. 77, emphasis added).  One is of course free to return to the study of
language  (or  other  codified  sign  system)  after  having  adopted  such  a  wide
vantage, but one will then do so with a renewed understanding that renders less
mysterious where the human mind and its products fit in the grander scheme of
things. Here, my goal is to see where phenomenal consciousness fits.
Would a semiotic account of consciousness have to limit itself to observable
symptoms, or could it give some insight into what is experienced from a first-
person vantage? Most philosophers of mind hold that the qualitative contents of
conscious  episodes  fall  outside  the  ambit  of  testability  and  inter-subjective
verification. Bertrand Russell, for example, held that, when different organisms
react in the same way to the same inputs, “the only difference must lie in just
that essence of individuality which always eludes words and baffles description,
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but which, for that very reason, is irrelevant to science” ([1919] 1950, p. 61).
Casting out qualities is certainly less problematic when one is asking whether
the practice of physics will be affected. However, once Nagel (1974) switched
to the biological sciences, this dismissal became harder to sustain.
Like Russell, Peirce was impressed by the explanatory power of scientific
inquiry:  “I was thoroughly grounded not only in all that was then known of
physics  and  chemistry,  but  also  in  the  way  in  which  those  who  were
successfully advancing knowledge proceeded. [...] I am saturated, through and
through, with the spirit of the physical sciences” (Peirce 1931–58, vol. 1, para.
3).  Pursuant  with  this  naturalistic  orientation  avant  la  lettre,  Peirce  never
anchored  his  claims  on  the  private  data  of  introspection.  Hence,  there  is
definitely a healthy dose of functionalist  sobriety in Peirce,  who insists  that
“[e]very form of thinking must betray itself in some form of expression or go
undiscovered” (1998, p. 18). Yet, Peirce found reason to cling to the reality of
qualities throughout  his investigations.  Owing in part  to his familiarity with
scholastic traditions, Peirce never viewed the world solely in terms of efficient
causes. In this respect, he departed from Occam and Descartes, two villains of
Peirce’s narrative who made the rejection of “formal causes” a centerpiece of
their  mechanistic  metaphysics.  Understandably,  Peirce’s  anachronistic
commitments did not fit well with the philosophizing of his time. The flip side
is  that  his  anachronism spared his  semiotic  theory from viewing  everything
exclusively in terms of functional descriptions.
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For  decades,  few philosophers  knew what  to  make  of  Peirce’s  semiotic
theory.  As  Ahti-Veikko  Pietarinen  writes,  “Harvard  University  to  which
Peirce’s  literary  remains  were  eventually  deposited,  had  in  its  possession  a
monster  easier  to  lock  up  than  harness”  (2006,  p.  46n22).  Whereas  some
scholars still try hard to study Peircean pragmatism without studying Peircean
semiotics, I think this is an untenable approach, since “[h]is pragmatism is a
theorem of his theory of signs” (Fisch 1986, p. 435). My dissertation is thus
part of an ongoing re-evaluation of Peirce and his place in the canon.
As it turns out, Peirce wasn’t nitpicking when he insisted that his stance
differed crucially from the pragmatisms of James, Dewey, and others. As work
on the Peirce manuscripts proceeds, the full extent of this difference is dawning
on scholars. A lot of the received wisdom about Peirce one finds in mainstream
venues like textbooks is just plain wrong. Specifically, Peirce was not a crude
“verificationist.”  On the  contrary,  he endorsed  a sophisticated  ontology  that
countenanced  potential signification.  This  commitment  has  far  ranging
ramifications that are only now beginning to be appreciated. 
Having read the Peirce manuscripts housed at Harvard,  Roman Jakobson
(1979; reprinted in Jakobson 1988) told participants at the first congress of the
International  Association  for  Semiotic  Studies  in  Milan  (June  1974)  that
engaging with the ideas of Peirce would bear dividends. Eco, who was at that
congress, took Jakobson’s advice seriously.  Prompted by his study of Peirce,
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Eco was one of the first philosophers of signs to work into his theory the idea
that some modes of signification are neither symbolic nor indexical. Moving
away  from  a  purely  conventional  interpretation  of  interpretation  helped  to
cement  Eco’s  (1990)  growing  impatience  with  the  implausible  social
constructivist stances inadvertently supported by his earlier work (Eco 1976).
Given Eco’s prominence in the semiotic community, his change of mind on the
controversial topic of images (Eco 2000) invigorated Peircean scholarship. In
fact, European scholars were (and arguably remain) the go-to people for insight
into this American thinker (owing to the influence of Jaakko Hintikka, Finland
has a particularly vibrant community, which I will join in the coming months).
By  looking  at  the  qualitative  dimension  of  consciousness  from  a  semiotic
vantage, my dissertation continues that project of applying Peirce.
Peircean semiotics has informed cognitive science (see Steiner 2013), but
some of the technical notions developed by Peirce remain poorly known in
mainstream debates. For instance, “[a] third kind of signification exists which
does  not  consist  in  brute  denotation  or  in  arbitrary  convention,  but  which
presents structure directly to the mind’s eye. It is barely glimpsed in formal
semantics today” (Legg 2013, p. 17). My dissertation is the first systematic
attempt  to  apply  Peirce’s  semiotic  theories  to  philosophical  debates  about
consciousness. If, as I suspect, some of the more established distinctions are
insufficient,  then  it  is  predictable  that  conscious  experience  should  appear
puzzling. How do we explain this qualitative dimension? If it escapes functional
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description, how could we ever refer to such a thing? What sort of place, if any,
should we assign qualities in the world? In these pages, I test the hypothesis that
adding the toolbox of Peircean philosophy of signs might help to answer some
of these questions.
More is currently being written on consciousness than at any other time in
history (see Katz 2013). I hope, though, that I have managed to craft something
genuinely different that is well-argued and provokes thought. The results of my
efforts are not perfect—I sometimes wish I had an extra decade or two to further
study the matter—so what I present is a fallible inference to the best dissertation.
In  September  2001,  I  decided  to  do  two  doctorates.  In  August  2007,
accompanied by a heavy cardboard box, I turned in the paper copies of my
semiotics dissertation at UQÀM. The next day, I created a new file on my
computer desktop and named it “Second Dissertation.” A week later, I started
my studies at York. The journey from there to here required a lot of honest (and
enjoyable) toil. Fortunately, I have been able to share some of my results along
the way. Parts of chapter one appeared in Dialogue, vol. 48 (2009), pp. 145–183.
Parts of chapter two appeared in Dialogue, vol. 53 (2014), pp. 135–182. Parts of
chapter three were presented at the Second International Conference on Charles
S. Peirce’s Thought and Its Applications in Tallinn, Estonia, on April 21, 2014.
Parts of chapter four appeared in Analysis and Metaphysics, vol. 11 (2012), pp.
65–74; and Philosophical Psychology, vol. 26 (2013), pp. 129–138.
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Introduction
The elements  of  every concept  enter  into  logical  thought  at  the  gate  of
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever
cannot  show its  passports  at  both  those  two  gates  is  to  be  arrested  as
unauthorized by reason.
Charles Sanders Peirce, “Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction”
Lecture delivered at Harvard on May 14, 1903
(Reprinted in Peirce 1998, p. 241)
Each quale is in itself what it is for itself, without reference to any other. It
is absurd to say that one quale in itself considered is like or unlike another.
Nevertheless, comparing consciousness does pronounce them to be alike.
Charles Sanders Peirce, “Quale-Consciousness”
Unpublished notes, circa 1898
(Reprinted in Peirce 1931–58, vol. 6, para. 224)
This  dissertation  engages  with  a  philosophical  worry  that  the  qualitative  or
“phenomenal”  dimension  of  consciousness  may not  be  captured  by  regular
scientific explanation, that is, by the sort of inquiry which can be verified from
a third-person vantage.  There is  a sense  in  which I  agree  and  disagree  that
consciousness poses such a problem, so I draw on the semiotic ideas of Charles
Sanders Peirce to articulate in what respects I think the worry ought and ought
not to be taken seriously. If  we can come to see how this introduction’s two
epigraphs are consistent, then I think we will make progress in philosophy of
mind.
Philosophers like David Chalmers (1996), Ned Block (1995a), and Thomas
Nagel  (1974)  have  argued  (from different  angles)  that  even  if  one  were  to
describe in a rigorous way how a creature responds to various stimuli, those
functional input-output responses would still leave out “what it’s like” for the
creature in question to undergo those experiences. Before one can assess this
claim of incompleteness, one has to get clear on what aspect is supposedly left-
out.  In  order  to  make  their  grievance  against  functionalist  explanation
persuasive,  these  philosophers  have  had  to  introduce  a  distinction  between
“phenomenality”  and  “accessibility”  (Block  1995a).  Access-consciousness  is
within the reach of cognitive scientific explanation, but phenomenal-conscious
lies outside that reach, and can presumably be gleaned only by introspection—
provided, that is, that one does not report the experience or act on its basis,
otherwise that would become access-conscious.
The concept of phenomenality is meant to track how a conscious episode
feels, whereas accessibility tracks what it does. It seems that, if one accepts this
quality/function distinction, one needs a further step to say that an account of
doing supplies one with an account of feeling. Since, at present, there is no such
step, we are left with an “explanatory gap” (Levine 1983) between first-person
and third-person accounts. In fact, one might argue that “the word quale and its
plural  qualia were introduced into philosophy as technical terms precisely in
order to capture that aspect of an experience that escapes the scrutiny of any
natural  science”  (Hattiangadi  2005,  p.  342).  In  this  dissertation,  I  am more
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interested in this conceptual distinction than in the arguments for dualism that
usually come afterwards.
Since only access-consciousness is detectable,  the presence or absence of
phenomenal-consciousness should make no detectable difference. As a result,
one might have expected a pragmatist to be the first to dismiss the whole issue
as  a  non-issue.  Indeed,  if  all  one  knew  about  the  father  of  American
Pragmatism was  that  he  wrote  this  introduction’s  first  epigraph,  one  would
assume  that  Peirce  was  a  functionalist.  However,  it  turns  out  that  Peirce
advanced ideas in his theory of signs that vindicate the current suggestion that
qualities  can  be  divorced  from  all  functional  involvement.  It  is  true,  as
Hattiangadi notes, that the idea of qualia was introduced to capture an aspect
that escapes the scrutiny of science.  It  was introduced by Peirce (Livingston
2004, p. 6). He called them qualisigns.
“A  Qualisign is a quality which is a sign. It  cannot actually act as a sign
until it is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as
a sign” (Peirce 1998, p. 291). This entire dissertation is devoted to unpacking
what that statement means.
How to approach the controversial  idea of qualia is itself a controversial
matter. Thomas Nagel thinks that “almost everyone in our secular culture has
been browbeaten into regarding the reductive research program as sacrosanct,
on the ground that anything else would not be science” (2012, p. 7). Don Ross
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(2005,  p.  166),  for example,  says  that  the dualist  stance espoused by David
Chalmers  is  a  “heretical  position.”  For  an  issue  that  supposedly  makes  no
difference, siding with the wrong camp certainly seems to irk some. The idea
that commitment to science requires one to ward off “heresies” departs from the
Peircean spirit I espouse (contrast my view with the comments by Short 2007,
p. ix). Peirce was confident that science is the most truth-conducive method
ever devised, but he never elevated that confidence above the status of a well-
confirmed hypothesis:
There  are  real  things,  whose  characters  are  entirely  independent  of  our
opinions about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular
laws, and, though our sensations are as different as are our relations to the
objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain
by  reasoning  how things  really  and  truly  are,  and  any man,  if  he  have
sufficient experience and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one
true conclusion. (Peirce 1992, p. 120)
In  contrast  with  Ross,  who  penned  a  provocative  “Defence  of  Scientism”
(Ladyman et  al.  2007, pp.  1–65;  John Collier abstained), Peirce stressed the
need never to “block the way of inquiry” (1998, p. 48). As someone who made
prescient  advances  in logic and mathematics that  were routinely rejected by
editors  (see  Brent  1998),  Peirce  was  familiar  with  what  happens  when
prevailing wisdom does not make allowance for the possibility that it may be
mistaken.
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I  do  not  aim  to  present  any  kind  of  “scientific”  resolution  to  the  hard
problem of consciousness in this dissertation. Signs can be studied, but I doubt
they can be studied scientifically. This is because,  while sign-vehicles can be
seen, “signs in their constitutive being as relations are invisible to sense [...]”
(Deely 2009a, p. 236). Now, William James once suggested that “the relations
between things  [...]  are  just  as much matters of direct  particular  experience,
neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves” (1977, p. 136). I follow
James  in  accepting  the  reality  of  relations,  but  I  think  bluntly relying  on
observation would  be  a  non-starter.  Peirce  was  conversant  with  (and
contributed to) early advances in neuroscience (see Pietarinen 2006, pp. 71–76),
but he too realized that a study of signs must employ methods closer to those
used in logic.
As  to  the  important  experimental  research  of  semiotics,  by  means  of
questionnaires,  tests,  eye-tracking,  brain-imaging  and  so  on,  all  such
procedures  importantly  add  to  our  general  understanding  of  how signs,
meanings, and references are processed by human beings and their brains
and minds, in some cases by different groups of human beings. But such
results can never hope to reduce the generality of signs to any mere sum of
such individual processing. (Stjernfelt 2013, p. 106)
One is of course free to dismiss or belittle all non-naturalist philosophies (e.g.,
Ross and Spurrett 2004). However, there is no inference from “all [t]heories of
consciousness  that  are  not  based  on functions  and  access  are  not  scientific
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theories” (Cohen and Dennett 2011, p. 361; emphasis added) to “all theories of
consciousness not based on functions and access are untrue.”
Ross argues that we should not place “too much weight on intuitions and
questions  of  conceivability”  (2005,  p.  167).  I  agree  that  intuitions are  often
unreliable  trackers  of  truth.  However,  I  do  not  think  posits  supported  by
considerations  of  conceivability  should  be  dismissed.  Fields  like  logic  and
mathematics draw considerable normative force from what can and cannot be
conceived. Some present-day naturalists think a priori data carry no evidential
weight whatsoever (see Cockram 2014). Peirce was not that kind of naturalist.
He regarded semiotics as a “formal science” (Liszka 1996, pp. 1–17) governed
at its core by an insight akin to the serial axiom of modal logic: if it is actual-
that-P, then it is possible-that-P. Like all conditional statements, this is a one-
way passage, since one cannot infer the antecedent from the consequent. As we
shall see, Peirce’s semiotic categories are organized along the same modal lines
(interestingly,  one of the founders of modal logic,  C. I.  Lewis,  was charged
with cataloguing the Peirce papers while at Harvard).
Central to the account I develop is the idea that humans can take anything,
internal or external, and focus on its qualitative character to the exclusion of all
else. In keeping with the idea that a quality “cannot actually act as a sign until it
is embodied; but the embodiment has nothing to do with its character as a sign”
(Peirce 1998, p. 291), I will argue that while we always begin with actual states,
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we can  nevertheless  contemplate  “what”  those  states  subsume.  This  sort  of
deliberate  myopia,  which  Peirce  and  medieval  logicians  called  prescissive
abstraction,  leaves  the starting point  untouched,  but  I  believe  it  manages  to
make sense of the intuition that the relations captured by scientific descriptions
do not address the qualitative content of their relata.
Many  aspects  of  cognition  are  answerable  to  the  techniques  of  inquiry
typically brought to bear on that material world. Response times, skin moisture
levels,  eye  movements,  verbal  reports,  brain  scans,  blood flows—all  can be
tracked in controlled experiments that give a robust indication of what a subject
thinks. It is not evident that all of this is insufficient. Hence, before one can say
that functionalism fails to supply a complete account of consciousness, one has
to explain what sort of residue might possibly escape functional description. In
The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers zeroes in on a very specific dimension of
conscious life:
What is central to consciousness, at least in the most interesting sense, is
experience.  [...]  The subject  matter  is  perhaps best  characterized  as “the
subjective quality of experience.” When we perceive, think, and act, there is
a whir of causation and information processing, but this processing does not
usually  go  on  in  the  dark.  There  is  also  an  internal  aspect;  there  is
something it feels like to be a cognitive agent. [...] To put it another way,
we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a  qualitative feel—an
associated  quality  of  experience.  […]  According  to  the  psychological
concept, it matters little whether a mental state has a conscious quality or
not.  What  matters  is  the  role  it  plays  in  a  cognitive  economy.  On  the
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phenomenal  concept,  mind  is  characterized  by  the  way  it  feels;  on  the
psychological  concept,  mind is  characterized by what  it  does.  (Chalmers
1996, pp. 3–4, 11)
According  to  Chalmers,  cognitive  science  has  a  lot  to  say  about  the
psychological concept, but it has “almost nothing” to say about the phenomenal
concept. Looking at the vast literature on consciousness,  this  is perhaps less
true  today.  In  any  event,  Chalmers  claims  that  while  there  is  “no  deep
philosophical mystery” about the psychological concept, the phenomenal side
is,  from  a  scientific  perspective,  “surprising”  (1996,  pp.  4–5).  Like  Nagel
(1974, p. 449), Chalmers thinks it is presently “hard to see” what a theory of the
phenomenal concept would look like (1996, p. 5).
In order to avoid begging the question, Chalmers never calls on zombies to
justify the concepts teased apart in his opening chapter on “Two Concepts of
Mind” (1996, pp. 3–31). Indeed, if we read Chalmers closely, we notice that he
first pinpoints a very narrow sense of “experience” and then asks us to conceive
experience-free zombies.  This means that,  whatever  stance one takes  on the
traditional issue of dualism versus (materialist) monism, the distinction can be
made intelligible on its own grounds. Chalmers and his commentators seem to
consider the distinction between two concepts mere table setting, but I think it
is where all the major action transpires. As such, I will devote myself solely to
the preamble, since I think the function/quality distinction that Chalmers and
others appeal to is underwritten by our generalized ability to prescind semiosis.
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Cohen  and  Dennett  (2011)  have  recently  claimed  with  unmistakable
boldness that consciousness cannot be separated from function. One immediate
reaction upon hearing this is: of course it can. Naturally, a lot turns on what sort
of “separation” we are talking about. An idea floating around since at least Hirst
(1959) is that there may be respectable ways of granting that mind and brain are
the same yet different. Unless one dismisses this suggestion altogether, one is
burdened with at least explaining why philosophers constantly return (under
different guises) to this “intuition of mind-brain distinctness” (Papineau 2002).
Current debates about consciousness are driven in large part by an intuition
of  quality-function  distinctness.  According  to  Chalmers,  the  “phenomenal”
dimension of mind is different enough from the “psychological” dimension to
merit  a  distinct  concept.  He  insists  that  “[t]here  should  be  no  question  of
competition between these two notions of mind” (Chalmers 1996, p. 11). Call
this  the  non-overlap  thesis.  He  also  insists  that  “[t]hey  cover  different
phenomena, both of which are quite real” (Chalmers 1996, p. 11). Call this the
dual commitment thesis. Taken together, these theses yield dualism. Chalmers
and Block have advanced arguments in support of both theses. Whereas Block
(1995a) is chiefly preoccupied with defending the non-overlap thesis, Chalmers
(1996) is  more concerned with defending the dual  commitment thesis.  The
semiotic account of consciousness I develop in this dissertation accepts the dual
commitment thesis but rejects the non-overlap thesis.
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As I see it, quality-function distinctness is appealing because it rests on a
truth which Peirce’s ordinal categories make clear: the idea of a relatum without
a relation makes sense, but the idea of a relation without relata does not. This,
in turn, permits an asymmetrical deletion. In developing my semiotic account of
consciousness, I will make a host of adjustments, but I will never stray from this
core insight.
Zombies are often said to be “behaviourally indistinguishable” (see Tanney
2004). Such a characterization is true but incomplete since,  according to the
construal  of  phenomenality  endorsed  by  Chalmers  (1996,  p.  95),  zombies
would be  psychologically indistinguishable as well. It is not just that one can
imagine a creature whose sensory input and behavioural output functions map
onto  ours  despite  having  a  different  physical  realization.  A  sufficiently
sophisticated robot passing the Turing test would qualify in that regard. Rather,
the  claim  is  stronger,  and  pertains  to  the  very  information  processing
sandwiched between inputs and outputs. A genuine zombie would think just
like us, only it wouldn’t feel like us. This entails that “[m]y zombie twin, for
instance, has his eyes water just as I do when he eats too much Wasabi. Unlike
me, however, my zombie twin lacks any phenomenal consciousness. There is
nothing it-is-like for him to taste Wasabi” (Majeed 2013, p. 252). This is well
known. But the broad notion of function also entails that, if you silently ponder
xyz before doing P, your zombie twin would, under the same circumstances,
also silently ponder xyz before doing P. The only difference would be that there
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is  nothing  “it  is  like”  for  that  zombie  twin  to  undergo  this  psychological
episode. Given that computational prowess would be achieved in a zombie by
the same algorithmic methods as us, an eternity spent on the psychoanalyst’s
couch would not allow an examiner to determine whether or not a subject was a
zombie (Freud would be as impotent here as Skinner).
To  highlight  the  peculiar  challenges  posed  by  the  function/quality
distinction, Ray Jackendoff (1987, p. 20) calls this the “mind-mind problem.”
This  is  more  subtle  and  insidious  than  the  traditional  mind-body  problem,
because it asks: what is the relation between functional states and qualitative
experiences?  John Searle  (1980)  argued  that  perfect  computational  mimicry
does  not  suffice  to  duplicate  a  human mind.  Even  if  what  happens  on  the
behavioural  outside matches  what  we do,  we cannot  be  confident  that  what
happens inside matches us too. Now, decades later, David Chalmers is arguing
that  perfect  algorithmic mimicry also does not suffice  to  duplicate  a human
mind. Even if what happens on the inside matches how we think, we cannot be
confident that this cognitive processing is accompanied by feelings like ours.
Zombies  are  more  than  behavioural  indistinguishable;  they  are
indistinguishable  tout  court.  Framed this way,  the presence  or absence  of  a
qualitative dimension would, ex hypothesi, be unverifiable.
Now, Paul Churchland has argued that, if we want to charge a scientific
account with coming up short, “then let us endeavor to find in it  some real
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empirical failing.  Imaginary  failings  simply  don’t  matter”  (2005,  p.  558).
Although  one  might  have  expected  a  pragmatist  to  agree,  Peirce  actually
developed a set of distinctions (inspired by Duns Scotus) that lend some support
to current contentions about qualia. Drawing on this Peircean semiotic analysis,
I think a weaker distinction can be made which lends some credence to the idea
of an un-interpreted quality.
Peirce came to his conclusions, not to promote any pre-set philosophy of
mind, but to evince the semiotic relations on which logical inferences depend.
The main findings first reported in his “New List of Categories” (Peirce 1992,
pp. 1–10), though eventually couched in a different terminology, never really
changed: one can suppose a sign-vehicle without an object, or a sign-vehicle
linked to an object without that link being interpreted; yet  the reverse is not
possible.  Progressively trimming away the triadic sign’s  layers  by means of
abstract  thought  allows us  to  discern  three  ways  sign-vehicles  can  exist (as
qualities, occurrences, and regularities) and three ways such sign-vehicles can
be related to objects (by imputation, causality, and similarity).  I will go over
these  distinctions  in  detail.  The  important  thing is  that  the semiotic  tool  of
prescission I  will  call  on shows  that  the idea  of  a  quality isolated  from all
functional involvement has some warrant.
While I agree that one ought to countenance phenomenal-consciousness and
access-consciousness,  my prescissive  analysis  leads  me  to  conclude  that  p-
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consciousness  is  always  subsumed  in a-consciousness  (see  section I.VII).  If
phenomenal qualities are always found in the midst of functions, there is no
reason why cognitive science should do things differently (although keeping
dogmatism in check is always salutary).  All philosophy can do is soothe the
worry that the “intrinsic quality of experience” (Harman 1990) has been “left-
out” (Levine 1997). Much comfort can come, I think, from demonstrating that
the intuition of quality-function distinctness is not unfounded.
Peirce,  a  hard-nosed  scientist,  is  often  credited  as  a  forerunner  of
verificationism. In keeping with his pragmatist maxim, I accept that  if  “the
object of our conception” does not “conceivably have practical bearings” (Peirce
1992, p. 132), then we have no basis to credit our concept with having an object.
However, what commentators eager to invoke verficationism often miss is that
Peirce did not shave-off qualia. On the contrary, he put qualia at the core of his
philosophic system. Peirce was adamant that,  even when considered in total
isolation, a lone quality always retains the power to generate practical effects,
because  any  quality  harbours  a  latent  similarity-relation.  As  a  logician
disinclined to rely on introspection, Peirce sought to prove this with the rigour of
a Venn diagram. I will examine Peirce’s demonstrations carefully (especially in
section II.III). I will also look at historical evidence that those demonstrations
effectively introduced the notion of qualia—and that subsequent philosophers
misunderstood what Peirce had tried to say (going back to the source is one way
to set things right).
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My first chapter will look at the (perfectly sensible) idea that, in order to
describe a thing, we have to describe its relations to other things. In order to
avoid the charge that such a description would fail to capture qualities as they
are “intrinsically” (i.e., irrespective of anything else), I will enlist the help of
Peirce to vindicate the idea of a qualitative relatum not involved in any relation:
“In quale-consciousness there is but one quality, but one element. It is entirely
simple” (Peirce 1931–58, vol. 6, para. 231). Using the notion of a “prescissive”
distinction that is less than real yet more than nominal, I will argue that while
no quality  can  exist  in  isolation,  the  idea  is  sensible enough to  prompt  the
phenomenal/access distinction championed by Block. At the heart of my first
chapter will be a call to migrate from the incomplete type/token distinction to
the complete type/token/tone distinction as first conceived by Peirce.
My second chapter will look at the only mode of reference afforded by a
tone, namely iconicity. If qualia are so simple that they are prior to any relational
involvement with other things, as I argue in the first chapter, how could we ever
refer to them? Working from the (Russellian) assumption that knowledge comes
either from description or acquaintance and the (Russellian) assumption that
acquaintance is  always causal  in  nature,  philosophers  like John Perry have
maintained that reference to qualia would require that one use an index. While
appealing to such context-dependent signs is relevant, I believe it does not get
the referential relation quite right. Since similarity is not reducible to causal
proximity, I will argue that a theory of reference that allows some cases to turn
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on shared quality can bypass many of the implausible consequences that plague
indexical accounts. My goal, in sum, will be to deploy the Peircean notion of
icon so as to articulate in a more plausible manner David Papineau’s suggestion
that phenomenal concepts use the very quality they refer to.
My third chapter will deal with prescission. If phenomenal qualia are non-
relational, as I argue in the previous two chapters, then qualia are idle. Yet, as
William James noted, consciousness is constantly streaming. Is there any way
to stop or at least  artificially pause this process? In  my third chapter,  I  will
answer  yes. To  motivate  his  claim  that consciousness  includes  more  than
cognitive  access,  Ned  Block  reinterprets  experiments  conducted  by  the
psychologist  George  Sperling.  I  will  argue  that,  for  the  Sperling  results  to
support the existence of phenomenal consciousness, the functional prowess that
makes the experiences detectable has to be supposed absent. I will characterize
this supposition of absence as meta-representation in reverse: when we think
about our thinking, we are not pushed into a regress, because we can “undo”
what we have done. I will argue that un-accessed experiences are gleaned by
the same benign means.
My fourth and final chapter will present an ontology that fits nicely with the
previous three chapters. If  we take extended matter as our starting point, the
qualitative dimension of consciousness has to be spooky. Panpsychists react to
this by spreading consciousness everywhere, which is arguably even spookier.
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Now,  David  Skrbina  points  out  that  “many  of  our  greatest  thinkers  and
philosophers have held to some version of panpsychism” (2006, p. 152). One of
the luminaries listed by Skrbina is Peirce. Actually, Peirce defended  the view
that reality is made of triadic signs and all that such triads presuppose. I believe
this “trinitarian” ontology is more promising than panpsychism. Some parts of
my trinitarian  worldview  have  been  argued  for  by other  philosophers.  Don
Ross, for instance, has suggested that psychological and physical patterns are
both  genuine  parts  of  the  world.  I  will  help  myself  to  his  “structuralist”
ontology and add to it  the idea,  developed in my third chapter,  that pattern-
discerning  creatures  like  ourselves  are  capable  of  entertaining  a  relatum
divorced from all relations. While this ability can lead rational animals to worry
that  their  experiential  feelings  have  escaped  their  best  method,  it  can  also
comfort them with a story for why that worry is not totally unfounded.
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Chapter I
Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness:
Prescission Instead of Reification
It’s not hard to see how philosophers have tied themselves into such knots
over qualia. They started where anyone with any sense would start:  with
their  strongest  and  clearest  intuitions  about  their  own  minds.  Those
intuitions, alas, form a mutually self-supporting closed circle of doctrines,
imprisoning their imaginations in the Cartesian Theater.
Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991a, pp. 369–370)
[I]f we ask what has been the impact of semiotics upon philosophy over the
course of the 20th century, to answer anything beyond “marginal” would be
an exaggeration. This situation, as I read it, is about to change dramatically.
John N. Deely, “The Impact of Semiotics on Philosophy”
Paper delivered at the University of Helsinki (December 1, 2000)
I.I Chapter Introduction
Apparently,  it  is a little-known fact  that the type/token distinction should be
threefold; the notion left-out being the tone. Although one could seek to redress
this omission purely in the name of exegetic fidelity,  heeding C. S. Peirce’s
complete type/token/tone trichotomy can actually help current philosophy out
of  many  quagmires.  Specifically,  the  notion  of  tone  seems  tailor-made  to
explain the qualitative aspect  of consciousness.  One of the leading concerns
animating  contemporary  philosophy of  mind  is  that  no  matter  how good  a
scientific  account  is,  it  will  leave  out  the  feeling  of  “what  it’s  like”  to  be
conscious. The topic has grown into an industry of industrious arguments for
and against. But, if the thesis I recommend in this chapter is correct, much of
this effort is misplaced.
I will argue that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the
“explanatory  gap”  that  has  beset  the  study  of  consciousness  since  Thomas
Nagel’s revival  of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that
we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own
right, I will show that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to
without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. My goal will
not be to corner  the reader  into some “clincher” aggressively forcing her to
adopt a given thesis, but rather to lay out an alternative way of “picturing” a
particularly troublesome aspect of the cognitive situation. By renewing with the
full  type/token/tone trichotomy developed by Peirce,  I  think the distinctness
Block (rightly) calls attention to stems, not from any separate module lurking
within  the  mind,  but  rather  from  of  our  ability  to  prescind qualities  from
occurrences.
I will begin by recapping in generic form a common contemporary take on
the mind-body problem. In an effort to recover some lost insights that might
have important repercussions for that debate, I will outline the historical thrust
18
animating Peirce’s work and present in an abstract fashion the categories which
undergird  his  type/token/tone  distinction.  With  this  two-pronged  diachronic-
synchronic retrieval  in place,  I  will stake out how prescission might  offer  a
better  way  to  account  for  qualia.  As  a  case  study  on  the  benefits  of  this
conception,  I  will  analyze  Block’s  controversial  ideas  about  “phenomenal-
consciousness,” and see whether they might profit from being reformulated in
terms of the complete trichotomy previously canvassed. Although I intend my
contribution mainly to intersect philosophy of signs and philosophy of mind, I
will end by addressing some likely metaphysical concerns.
I.II What It’s Like
In spite of the fact that the mind-body problem as we know it essentially begins
with the reflections of Descartes, few theorists actually consider the question
from such a wide historical angle. As we shall see, this lack of familiarity with
the  past  can  have  unfortunate  consequences.  Be  that  as  it  may,  most
contemporary accounts of the debate over the nature of consciousness tend to
adopt a more proximate starting point. So that’s where I will start too.
A fitting moment in this regard (to choose but one notable landmark)  is
Nagel’s 1974 essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” As Paul Churchland writes,
“Nagel’s  compact  argument  is  a  prominent  flag  around  which  much
antireductive opinion has rallied” (1996, p. 196). Indeed,  the paper deserves
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mention  for  the  manner  in  which  it  defiantly  challenged  the  then-prevalent
“wave of reductionist euphoria” (Nagel 1974, p. 435).
Nagel’s  polemic  was  no  mere  curiosity,  and  went  on  to  find  a  wider
audience (and contribute to a weakening of its opponents) precisely because it
gave  voice  to  a  compelling  intuition  most  feel  should  be  binding  for
explanations  of  consciousness  generally.  Nagel’s  work  thus  heralded  a
resurgence of interest in the topic. Two decades later, Francisco Varela would
speak of an “outburst” of research standing in sharp contrast with “all the years
of  silence,  during  which  consciousness  was  an  impolite  topic  even  within
cognitive science” (1996, p. 331). Such a return was in all likelihood inevitable,
and the central merit of Nagel’s paper is that it goaded that all-too-human trait,
curiosity. As Gary Gutting remarks: “Those with strong naturalist inclinations
are free to give up thinking about issues that do not admit of rigorous empirical
treatment.  But  doing  so  will  not  eliminate  the  body  of  traditionally
philosophical issues that cannot be so treated, nor the general human need to
engage such issues” (1998, p. 11).
Although the  vocabulary itself  was (and  remains)  rather  coarse,  Nagel’s
original idea of an elusive “what it’s like” dimension proper to conscious life
captured  an  important  aspect  that  is  seemingly  left  out  by  most  theoretical
accounts.  By  its  very  nature,  the  idea  Nagel  gestured  at  makes  for  a  very
slippery object of discourse. Colin McGinn, for instance, borrows the biological
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perspective adopted by Nagel and turns it on its head. We shall never know
what it’s like to be a bat, Nagel argued, because as life forms we simply shall
never  be  bats.  McGinn basically  accepts  this  argument,  but  then  gives  it  a
reflexive twist. On this view, our humanity may give us enough insight into
ourselves to have an intuitive sense that there is something “it is like” for us to
be the conscious  beings  we are;  however,  that  same humanity prevents  our
inquiries from attaining a robust theoretical comprehension of this qualitative
facet. As a result, McGinn suggests that just “as traditional theologians found
themselves conceding cognitive closure with respect to certain of the properties
of God, so we should look seriously at the idea that the mind-body problem
brings us bang up against the limits of our capacity to understand the world”
(1989, p. 354). If this turns out to be correct and the worries which are typically
brought on by the study of consciousness are fundamentally the product of an
insurmountable impediment, then it is difficult to see what theorists could do
about  that  fact—save  commit  themselves  to  some  sort  of  methodological
embargo on all things subjective.
That would of course reprise the general leitmotif of most twentieth-century
Anglo-American  philosophizing  about  consciousness,  human  or  otherwise.
Such resignation notwithstanding, it seems right to acknowledge that, despite
its  relative  remoteness  from  the  standpoint  of  theory,  each  of  us  knows
intimately what it’s like to enjoy conscious experience. As Nagel points out, “in
discovering sound to be, in reality, a wave phenomenon in air or other media,
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we leave behind one viewpoint to take up another, and the auditory, human, or
animal viewpoint that we leave behind remains unreduced” (1974, p. 445). Or,
to  put  the  same  point  in  another  way,  we  can  say  that  “[t]o  analyze
consciousness in terms of some functional notion is either to change the subject
or to define away the problem. One might as well define ‘world peace’ as ‘a
ham sandwich.’ Achieving world peace becomes much easier, but it is a hollow
achievement” (Chalmers 1996, p. 105).
Fully aware of how much explanation-worthy material is left behind when
we refuse to tackle the issue of “what it’s like” for us to be the sorts of beings
we are, Nagel’s essay made it a point to push for a more hopeful gloss of the
situation, spurring the troops to action, as it were. For it could very well be that
the  difficulties  which  accompany inquiries  into  the  “what  it’s  like”  side  of
consciousness are epistemological. If this is so, then it seems more reasonable
to  hope  that  the  difficulties  can  indeed  be  overcome—if  only  through  an
arduous re-conceptualization of our basic assumptions.
As Nagel  cleverly points out,  we would likely scoff  at  a Martian race’s
contention  that  their  (supposedly  exhaustive)  reductionist  account  of  our
species shows our conscious experiences to be illusory: “We know they would
be wrong to draw such a skeptical conclusion because we know what it is like
to be us” (1974, p. 440). Truth be told, we generally scoff at humans too when
they  make  that  remarkable  claim  (see  Baker  1987).  In  any  event,  such  a
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privileged insight provides the theorist with a point of entry to exploit; thereby
reviving hopes that a rigorous solution to the difficulties at hand, no matter how
elusive,  might  be  in  the  offing.  In  fact,  Nagel  underscored  that  while  this
qualitative  aspect  of  our  cognitive  lives  “includes  an  enormous  amount  of
variation  and  complexity,  and  while  we  do  not  possess  the  vocabulary  to
describe it adequately, its subjective character is  highly specific, and in some
respects describable in terms that can be understood only by creatures like us”
(1974, p. 440; emphasis added).
Nagel’s  work  thus  left  subsequent  Anglo-American  philosophizing  in  a
peculiar situation. On the one hand, it contributed to a revival of interest in the
question of “what it’s like” to be conscious, adding enough of a biological-cum-
cognitive twist to the standard mind-body problem to make it palatable again.
But,  while  Nagel  refused  to  neatly  segregate  the  two  aspects  into
incommensurate domains, he underscored the epistemological difficulties that
await  any  attempt  at  bridging  the  apparent  divide,  stressing  that  while
“[p]erhaps  a  theoretical  form  can  be  devised  for  the  purpose,  [...]  such  a
solution, if it exists, lies in the distant intellectual future” (Nagel 1974, p. 436).
This prompts McGinn to remark that “[d]espite his reputation for pessimism
over the mind-body problem, a careful reading of Nagel reveals an optimistic
strain in his thought” (1989, p. 354fn9). While Nagel himself was reticent to
speculate about what an adequate account of consciousness would look like,
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there  was  indeed  something  prophetic  in  the  way he  chose  to  conclude  his
classic paper: 
At  present  we  are  completely  unequipped  to  think  about  the  subjective
character of experience without relying on the imagination—without taking
up the point of view of the experiential subject. This should be regarded as
a challenge to form new concepts and devise a new method—an objective
phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination. (Nagel 1974,
p. 449; emphasis added)
Chalmers has made this a mainstream project by arguing that while “[c]urrently
it may be hard to see what such a theory would be like, but without such a
theory we could not be said to fully understand consciousness” (1996, p. 5).
Part of what I want to do in this dissertation is show that one need not look to
the “distant intellectual future” to find the “objective phenomenology” Nagel
called for. Specifically, I believe the materials needed to assemble such a robust
perspective already exist in semiotics.
Peirce saw clearly that “if the sign does not consist in a true relation, it is
difficult or impossible to see how it can serve as the medium of communication
between two individuals of whatever species or type” (Deely 2001a, p. 429; for
more  on  this  rejection  of  psychologism,  see  Stjernfelt 2013).  Locke,  who
coined the world semiotics, also thought that if “men really had different ideas,
I don’t see how they could converse or argue one with another” ([1690] 2007,
book 2, chap. 13, para. 28). Yet, in spite of this, Locke still regarded the first-
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person vantage as proper starting point. However, I agree with Deely that the
moment Peirce and other semioticians began “to think that their experience of
communication was real, the moment they began to think of that experience as
a proper starting point of philosophy, the remaining days of classical modern
thought were numbered” (2001a, p. 539).
As we shall see, not only does the semiotic tradition draw on theoretical
foundations  that  pre-date the  quagmire  Descartes  bequeathed  philosophical
modernity,  I  believe  its  quasi-logical  organon  is  perfectly  suited  to  answer
Nagel’s central desideratum, namely to “think about the subjective character of
experience [...] without taking up the point of view of the experiential subject”
(1974, p. 449). Granted, one must guard against a facile nostalgia which “holds
that all major problems have already been solved—or, at least, that a framework
for  the solution has been provided—by some great  philosopher  of  the past”
(Gutting 1998, p. 12n5). But, when the facts indeed speak to the availability of
pre-existing  materials,  one  must  be  careful  not  to  turn  a  blind  eye  to  such
resources. Let us then go  back further in time than the contemporary starting
point we provisionally adopted.
I.III Recovering a Discarded Patrimony
The day a rebellious young René Descartes walked out the door of the Jesuit
college of La Flèche for the last time, we all did. Given that the Frenchman’s
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once-eccentric  grievances  with  scholastic  philosophy  went  on  to  shape  the
landscape of discursive acceptability for centuries to come, it is something of an
irony that the thinker who would go on to challenge that orthodoxy would also
turn out to be a freethinking iconoclast. Indeed, sometime in the second half of
the  nineteenth  century,  Charles  Sanders  Peirce,  gripped  by  an  unshakeable
conviction in the powers of logic ever since he read  Richard Whately’s 1826
Elements of Logic in his youth (Fisch 1986, pp. 347–349), took it upon himself
to engage in a detailed study of that discipline’s underpinnings (see Brent 1998,
p.  48).  That  lifelong  project  would  eventually  lead  him  to  breach  the
methodological imperative that had basically defined the modern mindset since
Descartes:  “Thou shalt  not  learn  from the Latins”—to borrow John Deely’s
acerbic  but  telling  characterization  in  his  monumental  Four  Ages  of
Understanding (2001a, p. 613). As Deely recounts: 
From Scotus in particular, but also from Fonseca and the Conimbricenses,
[Peirce] picked up the trail of the sign. He was never able to follow it as far
as the text of Poinsot […]. Nonetheless, what he picked up from the later
Latins  was  more  than  enough  to  convince  him  that  the  way  of  signs,
however buried in the underbrush it had become since the moderns made
the mistake of going the way of ideas instead, was the road to the future.
(ibid.)
Just  as  Paul  Churchland  (1988,  p.  43)  wants  his  own  brand  of
“eliminativism”  to  be  distinguished  from the  more  subdued  “reductionism”
advocated by other scientifically-minded naturalists, so it is more accurate to
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say that  the semiotic  inquiry taken  up by Peirce is  not  “anti-Cartesian”  but
rather  non-Cartesian.  Such  a  characterization  would  seem to  hold  not  only
theoretically  but  historically  as  well.  Going  back,  we  find  a  succinct  and
powerful  definition of the sign in the scholastic “Aliquid stat  pro aliquo”—
literally “Something stands for something else.” This formula does not prejudge
whether the relation at hand is conventional or natural. Although the neutrality
implicit in this definition went on to find its most explicit expression only in the
seventeenth century with John Poinsot’s Tractatus de Signis ([1632] 1985), the
generic  medieval  formula  dates  back  to  Augustine,  a  pivotal  figure  whose
synoptic  sensitivities led “to the first  construction in the history of  Western
thought that deserves to be called semiotic” (Todorov 1992, pp. 56–57).
It may be surprising to find Augustine credited with inaugurating a model
that will in time blossom into a sophisticated theory of representation. We may
recall, for example, Wittgenstein’s paragraphs at the outset of the Philosophical
Investigations ([1953]  2001,  pp.  2–3)—not  exactly  a  work  known  for  its
historical scholarship—that depict Augustine as using names to merely “label”
cognitively complete concepts. All the same, in Todorov’s estimate, Augustine
“affirms more strongly than earlier writers have done that words are merely one
type of sign; this affirmation, which stands out with increasing sharpness in his
later writings, is the cornerstone of the semiotic perspective” (1992, p. 36; see
Eco and Marmo 1989, pp. 4–5; as well as Markus 1957). It is important to keep
in mind, however, that “[Augustine] introduced to the Latins and to philosophy
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the sign as a theme, but he himself was never to thematize it” (Deely 2001a, p.
218). The covering model of the sign put forward in his pregnant reflections
will be discussed by a long succession of thinkers, like a silent undercurrent
beneath the better-known disputes of medieval philosophy. Hence, recent years
have  witnessed a  growing  “body of  research  on the  Middle  Ages  from the
community  of  semioticians  whose  attention  to  both  implicit  and  explicit
medieval  semiotics  now  begins  to  amount  to  a  subgenre  of  semiotic
scholarship” (Evans 1987, p. 177).
Although  the  etymology  of  “semiotics”  is  Greek,  the  theoretical
underpinnings  of  the  inquiry  are  not.  Indeed,  one  of  the  most  interesting
findings to have emerged from the work of Umberto Eco and his colleagues
(Eco and Marmo 1989, pp. 4–5) is the discovery, surprising at first, that Greek
thought had no general notion of “sign” as we understand it today.  In ancient
Greek  culture,  we find on one hand the “semeion,”  which,  like a symptom,
expresses an association such that “If the woman has milk, then the woman has
given  birth.”  This  construal,  which  was  part  of  the  early  development  of
medical  science  (Baer  1983;  Baer  1988),  also  applied  to  subjects  like
meteorology, and was carefully discussed by the Stoics (see Eco 1986b, pp. 29–
33,  214–215;  Manetti  1993,  pp.  97–110).  The  signification  at  play  in  the
semeion  rides  on  a  correlation  which  would  obtain  with  or  without  the
inferential-like movement that finds in the manifest a trace of the hidden. This
is the broad class of signs that natural scientists are usually interested in. The
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feature which allows interpretation to go from a sign-vehicle to an object  is
mind-independent,  and while we can fail in our epistemic apprehension, this
explanatory  mis-attribution  leaves  wholly  intact  the  link  that  would  have
otherwise secured it.
On  the  other  hand,  we  find  in  Greek  thought  the  “symbolon,”  whose
signification  is  wholly  conventional,  like  insignia  or  flags.  Etymologically,
“symbols” were linked coins or clay-plates used to publicly announce the bond
of marriage and other contractual agreements (Eco 1986a, p. 153; Eco 1990, p.
9; Peirce 1998, p. 9). A correlation is involved in the symbolon, but there is
nothing above and beyond interpretation which binds the relata.  To be sure,
Plato had famously argued in the Cratylus (1997, pp. 101–156) that names or
“onoma” in fact bear a natural bond to their objects, their apparent arbitrariness
supposedly being a corruption that was introduced over time. More famously
still, Aristotle urged the exact opposite of this implausible philological view in
De Interpretatione,  insisting  that  a  “name is  a  spoken  sound significant  by
convention [...]  because  no name is  a  name naturally  but  only when  it  has
become a symbol” (1984, p. 25, lines 16a19–16a28).  The imputed link which
allows  interpretation  to  go  from  a  sign-vehicle  to  an  object  is  thus  mind-
dependent, such that any sign that falls in the broad category of symbolon can
“convey the nonexistent with a facility every bit equal to its power to convey
thought about what is existent” (Deely 1990, p. 17). This allows human users to
exploit  channels  not  bound  by  constraints  for  truthfulness,  going  against  a
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default  biological  hard-wiring  in  order  to  acquire  a  uniquely  powerful  and
flexible  resource  (see  Donald  2001).  Symbols  are  the  signs  that  permeate
culture  and  hence,  those  are  the  signs  which  social  scientists  are  usually
interested in.
So,  what  we  have  in  Greek  Antiquity  is  a  division  between  nature  and
culture,  reflected  in the very linguistic  fabric  of  the communities  concerned
(Manetti 2010b). There are two different words for signs, not one. This begins
to change when we come to Augustine.  For reasons that have nothing to do
with philosophy proper, Augustine nursed an aversion to the Greek language,
and remained ignorant of it throughout his productive life. When, as a devout
Christian trained in rhetoric, he felt the need to reflect on how it was that God
could speak to us through the Scriptures—through surface marks on a codex—
he did not first verify what the Greeks had thought on the matter. Proceeding
from  his  native  Latin,  he  instead  defined  the  “signum”  generically  as
“something which is itself sensed and which indicates to the mind something
beyond the sign itself” (1975, p. 86).
Whatever its shortcomings, this definition is novel, in that it accommodates
both natural  and cultural  correlations—the smoke that  indicates fire  and the
white  flag that  stands  for  surrender  (see  Jackson 1969,  pp.  48–49;  Eco and
Marmo 1989, p. 4). Tacitly, in the year 387, “Augustine unifies the two theories
and the two classes of signs” (Manetti 2010a, p. 25). This betokens a massive
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shift.  Indeed,  by  accidentally  clearing  the  way  for  this  unique  perspective,
Augustine laid the groundwork for a genuinely semiotic inquiry (Todorov 1992,
pp.  56–57;  see  Manetti  1993,  pp.  156–168).  Other  divides  will  linger,  for
instance  between  “formal”  and “instrumental”  signs  (see  Maritain  1959, pp.
119–120; Furton 1995, pp.  96–97), but the two sorts of correlations—mind-
independent  and  mind-dependent—will  henceforth  be  recognized  as  falling
under one super-ordinate class as signs tout court.
Augustine’s semiotic  proposal,  which  was  widely  disseminated  in  Peter
Lombard’s  twelfth-century  anthology  of  authoritative  tenets,  Four  Books  of
Sentences,  bequeathed  to  future  generations  a  dilemma:  is  the  unified  kind
“sign”  a  conflation  or  an  insight?  Views  on  the  matter  differed.  After
Augustine, though, it became mandatory for theorists to figure out in precise
technical terms what the common denominator between all these different signs
might be.
A thorough vindication of  the covering model suggested by Augustine’s
reflections was proposed in the seventeenth century by John Poinsot (religious
name “John of Saint-Thomas”), a Spanish philosopher and theologian who left
behind  a  difficult  but  ground-breaking Tractatus  de  Signis ([1632]  1985).
Poinsot was heir to the long and intricate debate over the proper definition of
signs, all of which took Augustine’s definition as their starting point. Indeed, “it
is clear that both Augustine (b.  354; d. 430) and John of St. Thomas [a.k.a.
31
Poinsot] (b. 1589; d. 1644) were engaged in the same intellectual program and
therefore belong together” (Gracia and Noone 2006, p. 1). Some parties to those
debates,  like Petrus  Fonsecus  (1528–1599),  denied  that  there  is  something
which truly unites the different types of signs (Deely 2004, p. 107). Poinsot, by
contrast,  tried  to  vindicate  the  original  Augustinian  proposal  on  principled
grounds,  resting his case on a careful  metaphysical  study  of the category of
relation  in  Aristotle  and  Thomas  Aquinas.  In  this  way,  Poinsot  offers  a
sustained  theoretical  engagement  with  the  cryptic  but  pregnant  insight
enunciated in 1507 by his predecessor  Thomas de vio Cajetan  that  “A rose
existing only in thought is not a rose, but a relation existing in thought is truly a
relation” (quoted in Deely 1994a, p. 22). That is why the sign is indifferent to
whether it is found in the mind or in the world: its “being consists in relating,
and this does not depend on us” (Rasmussen 1994, p. 410).
Unfortunately,  Poinsot’s  proposal  took  place  in  one  of  the  least-known
periods  in  the  history  of  Western  philosophy,  which  consists  of  scholastic
thought  after  René  Descartes  basically  took  historiography  along  with  him.
Since Poinsot’s theoretical advance went almost totally unnoticed, we have to
wait several centuries for the late-medieval insights to be recovered and further
articulated.
The year  1690 nevertheless stands out, for this is when John Locke first
gave “semiotics” its name in the penultimate paragraph of his  Essay.  Locke,
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however, did not carry out the revolutionary promise of that project, since he
remained bound to the view that  “the work of intentionality or aboutness is
done at  the level  of the mental”  (Ott 2008, p.  292).  As Peirce writes:  “The
celebrated  Essay Concerning Humane Understanding contains many passages
which  [...]  make the  first  steps  in  profound  analyses  which  are  not  further
developed” (1931–58, vol. 2, para. 649). Semiotics is one of them.
Although Poinsot’s work shows that “the doctrine of signs proclaimed by
Locke did not have to wait 200 years to rise in the bosom of Peirce’s complex
and  monumental  work”  (Santaella  1991,  p.  155),  philosophy of  signs  truly
came of age when Peirce connected anew with the literature on the topic that
was lost in the shuffle of modernity (see Beuchot and Deely 1995;  Tiercelin
2006). It  was a view of inquiry as a communal endeavour that “led Peirce to
open the dusty folios of the medieval schoolmen” (Colapietro 1989, p. 2) in
order to further his studies:
Drawing to a  large  extent  on the same sources  from which Poinsot  had
drawn,  and  being  a  man  of  scientific  intelligence  [...]  [Peirce]  quickly
reached the substantially same conclusions that Poinsot had reached: that
the  sign  consists  not  in  a  type  of  sensible  thing  but  in  a  pure  relation,
irreducibly triadic, indifferent to the physical status of its objects and to the
source of its immediate provenance, nature or mind. (Deely 2001a, p. 614)
A logician trained in framing things in the broadest terms possible, Peirce
showed how any sign is perforce a three-place relation where something stands
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for something  to something—regardless of what might fill  these three place-
holders  on a given occasion.  Delete  any component  of  a  semiotic triad and
representation  becomes  impossible.  The  roles  themselves,  moreover,  can  be
switched around. If one were to postulate that the basic categories of all things
are up, down, left and right, this would not mean that the universe is populated
with scattered ups, downs, lefts, and rights. Similarly, to be Third is to play a
certain  logical  role. The  basic  triad forms a processual  concatenation which
Peirce,  following  the  first  century  Epicurean  Philodemus  (De  Lacy  1938),
dubbed “semiosis”:
It was a reading of [Philodemus’ work] On Signs that suggested to [Peirce]
the idea of an autonomous science of signs, semiotics, as well as a name for
inference specifically by signs, semiosis. This took place in 1879–80, when
Peirce was supervising the doctoral thesis of his student Alan Marquand on
“The  Logic  of  the  Epicureans,” including  a  translation  of  Philodemus’s
treatise.  (Manetti  2002,  p.  282;  see  also  Fisch  1986,  p.  329;  the  work
supervised by Peirce was subsequently published in Marquand [1883] 1983)
The Peircean tradition I align myself with considers semiosis to be a general
process that extends beyond the human realm. For example, if a squid—call it
squid A—sees an approaching predator and squid A secretes ink, this ink is an
interpretant which can in turn act as a sign-vehicle to another  squid B, whose
interpretant will also be to flee. There is no limit to how much expansion this
process allows: add another squid C which flees upon seeing the flight of squid
B and what  was  an  interpretant  in  the  original  triad  now counts  as  a  sign-
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vehicle in the newest triad. The three categories of semiotic theory are meant to
track the role-switching that permits information to be passed on in a sort of
relay race (that can pause but can never stop, once and for all).
Importantly, the patterns of semiosis disappear if we refuse to ascend to the
level of repeatable triadic relations. If  one refuses to see that  squid B flees  a
predator (and not a cloud of ink), I believe one is going to miss out on what is
really going on. Squid B may never actually see the predator itself—that is the
whole point (and evolutionary utility) of an anticipatory flight. According to the
view I espouse, the familiar secretion which prompts an about face in squid B
cannot  by itself  account  for  that  squid’s aversive  response.  Chemistry alone
won’t do; we must recognize that the ink acted as a sign.
Like rubber-bands layered atop one another until they form a ball shape,
signs can be added to signs even though, at the core, the inner-most rubber band
that started it all is coiled unto nothing but itself. This is what happens when an
error  or  fiction  spreads.  If,  for  example,  squid  A  would  have  secreted  ink
simply because of a malfunctioning organ (instead of an approaching predator),
squid B would still have fled. Erroneous or not, the basic structure of meaning
propagation stays the same.
Striving to further develop these radically non-Cartesian conceptions, Peirce
took the Latin notion of signum to a new level of theoretical sophistication. In
the course of his studies, Peirce came to hold in particularly high regard the
35
writings  of  John  Duns  Scotus  (see  Boler  1963;  Boler  2004),  a  Franciscan
philosopher and theologian whose nuanced doctrines merited him the moniker
“the Subtle Doctor.” As he explained,
The works of Duns Scotus have strongly influenced me. If  his logic and
metaphysics, not slavishly worshipped, but torn away from its medievalism,
be  adapted  to  modern  culture,  under  continual  wholesome  reminders  of
nominalistic criticisms, I am convinced that it will go far toward supplying
the philosophy which is best to harmonize with physical science.  (Peirce
1931–58, vol. 1, para. 6)
Central  to  Scotus’  position  was  a  specific  sort  of  separation which—as  the
scholastic catchphrase goes—is “more than nominal but less than real.” Peter
King  summarizes  it  as  follows:  “The  core  intuition  behind  Scotus’s  formal
distinction is, roughly, that existential inseparability does not entail identity in
definition, backed up by the conviction that this is a fact about the way things
are rather than how we conceive of them” (2003, p. 22; emphasis added).
The motivation for Scotus’ distinction was originally theological, since it
formed part of a concerted argumentative defence (from early-Christian times
onward) against accusations of polytheism:
How can one reconcile the doctrine of the Trinity with a belief in the unity
and simplicity of God? [...] The problems posed by the Trinity supplied the
impulse for the development of the distinction [...]. Of course, it was not the
only field of application, and the formal distinction came to be invoked in
solving a host of purely philosophical problems. (Jordan 1984, p. 1)
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Interestingly,  the expression “formal logic” may have its roots in the formal
distinction  (see  Peirce  1931–58,  vol.  2,  para.  549).  As  R.  G.  Collingwood
noted, “[t]he doctrine of the Trinity, taught as a revelation by early Christianity
[...] becomes in Kant and his successors a demonstrable and almost alarmingly
fertile  logical  principle”  (1968,  pp.  119–120).  As  it  turns  out,  religious
controversies gave birth to a technical tool well suited for the study of signs.
One of Peirce’s  most  important  contributions to  semiotic  theory was his
Scotus-inspired realization that, if one wants to rigorously and systematically
unpack all that is implied by the misleadingly obvious notion of “sign,” then
one must recognize that every sign manifests both an unbreakable  unity (as a
sign whose significance is transparently given “in a flash,” as it were) and a
multiplicity (as a “step-by-step” passage from a sign-vehicle to that which it re-
presents). Construing any of the components that go into making representation
possible as things somehow capable of existing without the collaboration of the
others may not obliterate them metaphysically, but it does rob them of the very
significance that allows them to serve useful cognitive functions. Thus, if we
dissect  a  sign  any  further  and  start  reifying  the  various  parts  we  have
uncovered, we effectively destroy what we wanted to study in the first place,
and  ensure  that  these  no  longer  have  any  representational  value.  Mutatis
mutandis, construing the sign as some airtight atom which reflective thought
cannot  penetrate  would  drain  all  the  properties  that  make  it  a  sign
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(acknowledging the historical origins of this insight, I will call the ontology of
my fourth chapter “trinitarianism”).
Peirce first presented his crucial thesis to the  American Academy of Arts
and Sciences in 1867, in a paper titled “On a New List of Categories.” This is
by no means the most mature of his papers. There is for instance a lingering
commitment to “substance” that will be pruned soon thereafter. That curt text
nevertheless  announced  to  the  modern  world  a  rich  but  forgotten  way  of
approaching some perennial questions of philosophy. 
Exclusive attention consists in a definite conception or supposition of one
part  of  an  object,  without  any  supposition  of  the  other.  Abstraction  or
prescision  ought  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from two other  modes  of
mental separation,  which may be termed discrimination and dissociation.
Discrimination has to do merely with the essenses of terms, and only draws
a  distinction  in  meaning.  Dissociation  is  that  separation  which,  in  the
absence of a constant association, is permitted by the law of association of
images.  It  is  the  consciousness  of  one  thing,  without  the  necessary
simultaneous  consciousness  of  the  other.  Abstraction  or  prescision,
therefore,  supposes  a  greater  separation than discrimination,  but  a  less
separation than dissociation.  (Peirce 1992, pp. 2–3, emphasis added; see
also 1931–58, vol. 1, para. 353; as well as vol. 2, para. 428; for details on
the etymology and alternative spellings of the term, see Peirce 1998, p. 352)
Cary Spinks notes that “prescission is a difficult concept, but it is one of the
most powerful developed by Peirce and also one of the few which he keeps
throughout his life work” (1991, p. 23).
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At the time though, Peirce did not conceive of his endeavours as semiotic
per se, instead nursing an ill-fated hope that his discoveries would be adopted
by mainstream philosophy.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  notion  of  tone  he would
eventually develop is intricately tied to the categorial framework uncovered by
prescission.  A  good  way  to  explain  this  would  be  to  liken  semiotics  to
geometry. While one would be hard-pressed to find in the natural world a line
with no girth or a point with no extension, we nevertheless have the ability to
rigorously  decompose  any  three-dimensional  space  and  manipulate  the
dimensions it subsumes. The organization in such a case is not cardinal, but
ordinal:  nothing in a singular  point  entails a line or a volume,  but  the very
notion  of  volume logically  implies  the  line  and  the  point.  The  geometrical
dimensions, we could say,  do not lie next to each other, but are instead like
Russian dolls nested in one another. Semiotics is articulated around a similar
insight.  As Peirce  showed,  any representation  perforce  involves  a  genuinely
triadic relation that cannot be sundered; that is, one which cannot be reduced to
the dyadic or the monadic on pain of no longer  representing.  In  order to be
meaningful,  something  (monadic  quality)  must  stand  for  (dyadic  relation)
something  else  and  be  taken  (triadic  interpretation)  as  so  standing.
Nevertheless,  we can break  these  three  dimensions  down and  recognize  the
specific role of each in any bona fide representation.
Peirce  died  in  1914,  his  failure  to  secure  a  place  within  the  academic
establishment during his lifetime (see Brent 1998) effectively bequeathing to
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future  generations  the  laborious  task  of  understanding  his  massive  body  of
unpublished  writings.  Thus,  outside  of  a  handful  of  influential  papers  on
pragmatism written mainly in the 1870s (which he eventually repudiated), his
later  thought  remained  largely  unknown  (the  term  “pragmatism”  was
introduced  by  William James  in  1898,  who  cited  a  1878  Popular  Science
Monthly article by Peirce as the source of the term, but oddly the word itself
never  shows up in that  much-cited piece).  Peircean scholar  Joseph Ransdell
recounts that,
As regards  Peirce’s  semiotic in  particular,  hardly anybody had paid any
attention to it at all—it is clear from something [John] Dewey says in his
correspondence with [Arthur F.]  Bentley that,  prior to the publication of
[Charles W.] Morris’s article on the foundations of the theory of signs, not
even he had previously paid any real  attention to that  aspect  of Peirce’s
thought [...]. At most, the term “semiotic” was thought of as referring to a
crackpot  scheme  for  classifying  things  called  “signs”  which  nobody  in
philosophy had any interest  in to begin with […]. (in Deledalle 2001, p.
220; see Rochberg-Halton and McMurtrey 1983)
This unfortunate ignorance is the more lamentable for the fact that many of
Peirce’s mature ideas were in principle available shortly after the First World
War. His extensive correspondence with Victoria Lady Welby (Hardwick 1977;
see also Peirce 1998, pp. 477–491), which dealt  chiefly with semiotics, was
circulated in Europe and sent to prominent intellectual figures (like Bertrand
Russell).  Peirce’s  letters  eventually  reached  C.  K.  Ogden,  who  had  been
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employed as a research assistant to Welby. Together with his co-author I. A.
Richards, Odgen published excerpts of those letters in a trailblazing appendix to
The Meaning of Meaning  ([1923] 1989, pp. 279–290), a book which Charles
Morris  credits  with  identifying  “the  contours  of  a  general  theory  of  signs”
(1971,  p.  7).  The  philosopher  of  mathematics  Frank  P.  Ramsey,  who
collaborated with Ogden in translating Wittgenstein’s  Tractatus (Wittgenstein
[1921]  2002),  came  to  know  of  Peirce’s  ideas  through  this  transitive
connection. By 1923, we find Ramsey arguing in a review that the Viennese
thinker would have benefited greatly from a familiarity with “two words used
by C. S. Peirce,” namely “type” and “token” (Ramsey 1923, p. 468). Through a
precarious  chain of  iterated interpretations,  some of  Peirce’s  most  important
semiotic notions had found their way out of the secluded Pennsylvania home
whence they were spawned. More than that, they were being broadcast in a very
prominent forum, by a respected (if still emerging) Cambridge scholar, during
the  formative  years  of  the  analytic  movement,  in  discussing  what  was  to
become one of its most important founding texts. People took notice.
The notions of “type” and “token” surfaced with growing frequency in the
philosophic literature.  Yet,  regrettably,  what could have been an occasion to
connect  with  non-modern  conceptions  simply became  newfangled  jargon  in
which to reprise some rather stale schemes. The climax of this tale is somewhat
anti-climactic: by the time anybody realized that this famous notional duo was
in fact supposed to be a trio, the error had been fully committed.
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I.IV Tone-Deaf No More
The  absence  I  want  to  call  attention  to  is  effectively  compounded  by  the
prominent  visibility  of  its  counterparts.  For  instance,  we  find  David  M.
Armstrong, a well-known adherent to the materialist wing of the reductionist
program in philosophy of mind (1993), framing the problem of universals in
terms of the type/token distinction developed by “the great  U.S. nineteenth-
century  philosopher,  C.  S.  Peirce”  (Armstrong  1989,  p.  1).  As  part  of  his
introduction,  Armstrong  produces  a  box  within  which  one  finds  the  word
“THE” inscribed twice, and continues: “Peirce would have said that there were
two tokens  of  the  one  type”  (ibid.,  p.  2).  This  characterization,  though not
inaccurate,  is  incomplete.  If  Peirce’s  name  is  to  be  invoked  and  his
nomenclature employed, then it should be remembered that the distinction he
developed is in fact tripartite, the neglected party being the tone.
While  he  basically  misappropriates  the  type/token/tone  distinction  and
describes it as pertaining to “semantics,” Armstrong correctly insists that we are
dealing  here  with  “a  perfectly  general  distinction  applicable  to  any  subject
whatever” (1989, p. 1; for more on Armstrong, Peirce, and the metaphysical
biases  which  are  smuggled  in  when  one  switches  from  semiotics  to
“semantics,” see Legg 2001). The generality of Peirce’s notions owes precisely
to  the  fact  that  his  project  was  not semantic,  in  that  semiotics  is  an  all-
encompassing  enterprise  which  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  “glottocentrist”
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dogma that takes intentionally emitted and conventionally coded expressions to
be paradigmatic exemplars of the sign (recall that, even if we adopt Morris’
tripartition—and it is unclear to me why we should—then “semantics” is only a
part of the disciplinary genus semiotics).
Peirce did not discover the type/token distinction in the sense in which it is
currently used (e.g.,  Hutton 1990;  Wetzel 2009). Plato did that. So the terms
“type” and “token” are not fancy ways to restate the age-old distinction between
universals and particulars, respectively. Given such a hasty reading, it is only
normal that the tone should have fallen by the wayside. For those intimately
familiar  with  the  long-standing  debate  between  realism  and  nominalism,
Peirce’s talk of the tone can appear as something of a conceptual anomaly, a
quirk  that  can  be  all-too-easily  dismissed.  John  Boler  notes  that  quality  is
“certainly the least clear of the categories, and the one that receives the least
attention” (1963, p. 123). It is the latter part of this statement which accounts
for the former.
Peirce’s  type/token/tone trichotomy—resting as it  does  on a fine-grained
distinction  of  distinctions—was  ostensibly  too  subtle.  As  a  result,  it  has
basically been denatured in the last  century to bring it  into conformity with
reigning (dualist) expectations. However, the foundations which underpin these
notions are not beholden to any standard metaphysical outlook. “How far are
the basic categories of Peirce’s phenomenology either particulars or universals?
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In describing Firstnesses as qualities of feeling Peirce never makes their status
plain in terms of this disjunction. All he requests is the disregard of the question
of reality and of connections with other phenomena” (Spiegelberg 1981, pp.
35–36). Indeed, it is important to keep in mind that the complete tripartition is
not arrived at by speculation over “what there is.” The distinction is through
and  through  logical:  “In  Peirce’s  semiotic  the  type/token/tone
(legisign/sinsign/qualisign) trichotomy is based on the idea that a given entity,
assumed to be a sign, can be regarded in respect to any or all of three types of
properties  it  has—monadic,  dyadic,  triadic  (i.e.,  one-term,  two-term,  three-
term)—depending upon the analytical needs in some concrete semiotic inquiry”
(Sebeok 1994, p. 1130).
Peirce  formulated  the  type/token/tone  distinction  under  a  variety  of
nomenclatures throughout his life. Moreover, the distinction itself is imbedded
in a set of three trichotomies which together produce (not by multiplication) a
tenfold  semiotic  declension,  cataloguing  the  modal  steps  by  which
representation  passes  from possibility  to  actuality  to  generality  (I  will  scan
those steps in section IV.IV).  To fully understand the tone,  one must apply
prescission twice over. Strictly speaking, then, the tone is the First element of
the sign (the sign-vehicle or “representamen”) considered in its Firstness as a
not-yet-occurring quality (see Peirce 1998, pp. 289–299). For the record, I find
the less familiar terminology of “qualisign/sinsign/legisign” more conceptually
appropriate, and recognize that the full import of Peirce’s distinctions is best
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brought out when they collaborate as an interwoven whole. That said, in the
interest of letting my historical-cum-logical restoration latch onto those terms
that already enjoy wide currency, I have elected to stay with the better-known
appellations.  There  is  some  exegetical  justification  for  this  choice  of
terminology, since as late as December 1908 Peirce wrote in a letter to Lady
Welby that “For a ‘possible’ Sign I have no better designation than a  Tone”
(1998, p. 480)—although he still juggled with alternative names.
Prescission is a particularly crucial tool for semiotics, given that a sign is
essentially characterized not by any specific material status but by a general
relational structure.
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic
relation to a Second, called its  Object, as to be capable of determining a
Third,  called  its  Interpretant,  to  assume  the  same  triadic  relation  to  its
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. The triadic relation is
genuine, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way that
does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.  (Peirce 1998, pp.
272–273; see also Posner, Robering and Sebeok 1997, p. 4)
If what we have in view is the whole interaction, then we are at the level of
what  Peirce  called  Thirdness,  because  we  are  considering  all  three  parties
involved. In such a case, we have a relation between two relata grasped  as a
relation by some third thing beyond it.  This  is  usually the level  of interest,
especially when one is studying some particular cultural or natural instance of
sign-use.  But,  if  our  goal  is  a  philosophical  analysis  of  the representational
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structure itself,  we may want to go further.  If  we now suppose this relation
between two relata as it  would be without any further recognition of it as a
relation,  we  are  dealing  with  Secondness.  Two  and  only  two  things  are
involved, so we’ve effectively left the realm of intelligibility and entered that of
brute contiguity (see Champagne in press).
Prescinding still  further,  we may also want to  suppose one of  the relata
without its entering into any relation with another. Peirce writes: “[T]he idea of
a quality is the idea of a phenomenon or partial phenomenon considered as a
monad, without reference to its parts or components and without reference to
anything  else”  (1931–58,  vol.  1,  para.  424).  If  we  do  this,  we  eliminate
whatever alterity allowed that relatum (the term now becomes a misnomer) to
have a “contour.” Thus, when we prescind relation away so as to consider only
that which is related, we may no longer think of the resultant tone as we do a
token, since doing so would require us to delimit it in some fashion and ascend
back to Secondness. It  isn’t that  what we began studying suddenly vanishes
from existence  proper;  the  analysis  is  one  in  thought  and  leaves  our  initial
object of study untouched. But, if we choose to prescind all the way, Firstness
is as far as we can go, and we obtain a pure quality that could be actualized but
isn’t.
Peirce argued that any representation involves an irreducible combination of
three parties: firstly a vehicle, secondly that for which it stands, and thirdly a
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mediating term of some sort for which there is such a “standing for.” In many
ways, this is a very liberal definition, as it does not prejudge what might fill its
various  place-holders.  Still,  it  is  a  robust  formula,  as  the  three  components
supply individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for anything to
represent. An immediate or “non-mediate” relation, then, would be just that: a
mere relation between two things which has no representational value (although
it  can have  one,  if  taken  as  such  by  something  external  to  it).  Far  from
concluding from this  that  only what  is  represented  exists,  Peirce  (1998,  pp.
179–195)  insisted  that  the  triadic  character  of  representation  compels  us  to
countenance  realities  that  are  patently  non-  (or  more  appropriately  sub-)
representational (I will make a big deal of this in the fourth chapter, when I
distinguish  the  ontological  commitments  of  semiotic  theory  from  those  of
idealism).
If  we  avoid  the  fallacy  of  elevating  the  sign-vehicle  into  a  sufficient
condition of representation,  we see that  the tone is  emphatically  not a  sign.
“Phonemes, for example, are not signs since they mean nothing” (Nöth 1995, p.
80). To be sure, the tone is at the heart of any and all signs, since anything
triadic perforce subsumes the dyadic and monadic. But it is a contradiction to
approach a quality as if it were alone in the universe yet maintain that it stands
for something else. Although this in no way means there is only one thing in the
universe, it does show that a single quality would by itself be insufficient to re-
present.
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Although the declarative intelligibility expected of introspective reports is
possible  solely  by  recourse  to  triadic  representation,  this  appeal  does  not
preclude but in fact  presupposes  simpler dyadic and monadic ones which are
patently not beholden to any form of mediation (see “The Triad in Psychology,”
Peirce 1992, pp. 257–262). Hence, even though these more elementary relations
require the addition of a third term in order to be interpreted, we can discern
their ordinal priority.  In order to give an overview of the sorts of distinctions
afforded by prescission, let us consider a fairly straightforward example (taken
from Sebeok 1994, p. 1130; adapted from Peirce 1931–58, vol. 2, para. 230): 
Because of his long fast, he was too weak to stand fast or hold fast
or even to run fast.
Through the lens of prescission, the word “fast” appears three times as type,
four times as token, and once as tone.
The idea of token is perhaps the easiest to compass. To be a token is to be
an occurrence, something that has a discrete spatial and temporal location. In
contrast, neither the type nor the tone is bound by such immanence. The tone is
a quality—considered prior to its occurrence as token. If we prescind, we can
isolate the qualitative feature that is common to the tokens “fast” and “fast.” To
be sure, this quality—in this case a configuration of marks—is very much there
as constitutive of each token, and there is no way for us to get to a “suchness”
except through a “thisness.” But the tone itself enjoys a priority which enables
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us  to  logically  isolate  it  while  disregarding  its  numerically  distinct
manifestations. It is, Peirce would say, a First.
The tone may be the qualitative commonality which runs beneath various
tokens, but its position in the triadic order prevents it from accounting for the
specific manner in which such tokens appear. This last task belongs to the type.
Like the tone, the type manifests a certain transcendence—albeit in virtue of a
very different  rationale.  To be a type is to be a generality that legislates the
occurrence of tokens. One type of “fast” applies the adjective to objects that are
quick in motion, whereas another type pertains to things that are firmly fixed
(from a semiotic point of view, it makes no difference whether the regularity
which  governs  the  appearance  of  a  set  of  tokens  owes  to  natural  laws  or
grammatical conventions). It is important to stress that “[a] class, of course, is
neither a tone nor a type in Peirce’s sense” (Willard 1983, p. 284), but is rather
a  collection  of  tokens.  The  members  of  such a collection  can  of  course  be
grouped in virtue a shared tone (see Williams 1936, p. 702). Nevertheless, the
rationale in virtue of which members of a given (natural or non-natural) kind
reappear is not to be explained by the shared quality of those members.
There is a whole tradition preoccupied with the following situation. A set of
things—orange  traffic  cones,  say—are  arranged  in  a  line  and  put  before  a
knowing  subject.  The  subject  then  notices  that  there  is  some  feature  in
common, then proceeds to inquire into the reality of that common feature. As
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part of that inquiry, a story might told about how the orange of the traffic cones
was “abstracted away” from the particulars. Whatever its merit, solubility, or
outcome, this entire debate has already skipped over what interests me. Indeed,
the topic I engage with in this dissertation is best brought out by inquiring into a
single traffic cone.
Nothing prevents anyone from starting their investigation with a single item
instead  of  a  group  of  items.  Now,  looking  at  a  lone  traffic  cone,  the
philosophical tenet that interests me is that this one cone has a quality even if
no other cones like it exists. This means that we do not need two instances of
orange to mentally separate orange from an instance. Moreover, there needn’t
be any law-like tendency to reproduce cones for the quality at hand to be what
it is. Hence, scrutinizing a singular instance reveals that, on some level, quality
is not a “kind” or “class.” As a unique, singular, unrepeated (or unrepeatable)
occurrence,  the  traffic  cone  has  a  distinctive  colour.  So,  the  story  about
“abstracting away” features common to many things is inapplicable here, since
we are dealing with a  lone instance.  As such,  grasping the orangeness  of a
singular  traffic  cone involves nothing remotely “inductive” (this motivates  a
taxonomy of  inferences:  going  from a  plurality  of  tokens  to  unencountered
tokens is induction, but going from a single token to unencountered tokens is
abduction). One will risk skipping right over this crucial nuance if one begins
with a collection of tokens.
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The account of prescission that I pursue in this dissertation can be deployed
in the absence of any plurality. The key to making progress is simply to ask
what can be known of a single individual (instead of assuming a collection of
such  individuals).  So,  modifying  my  earlier  example,  it  may  help  to
contemplate the following:
fast
Looking at this single token, the two semiotic theses I am concerned with are
that  1)  the  here-and-now  “thisness”  of  the  singular  occurrence  can  be
prescinded from its “suchness,” and 2) the “suchness” or tone one arrives at by
prescission determines  what  similar  tokens  would be like without  indicating
whether such other tokens in fact  exist. I explore thesis 1 in this chapter (and
will spend the next chapter exploring thesis 2).
The  separation  of  “suchness”  from  “thisness”  is,  I  think,  what  led  the
Persian philosopher  and Aristotelian commentator  Ibn  Sina (known to Latin
Europe as “Avicenna”) to say that “Horseness is just horseness, neither of itself
one nor many, neither universal nor particular” (quoted in Boler 1963, p. 50).
Indeed,  “what  distinguishes  Avicenna’s  treatment  of  essence is  the  way he
distinguishes three ways  of taking it:  as existing in individual  things and so
determining their kind, as understood to be shared by many such things, and as
it is in itself” (Gracia and Noone 2006, p. 199).  Ibn Sina influenced Scotus,
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Scotus influenced Peirce,  Peirce influenced me, and—since I think the tenet
passed on is correct—I am striving to continue that chain of influence.
A handy summary of these distinctions would be this well-known but often
truncated passage from Peirce:
There will ordinarily be about twenty  the’s on a page, and of course they
count as twenty words. In another sense of the word “word,” however, there
is but one word “the” in the English language; and it is impossible that this
word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason
that  it  is  not  a  Single  thing  or  Single  event.  It  does  not  exist;  it  only
determines  things  that  do  exist.  Such  a  definitely  significant  Form,  I
propose to term a  Type.  A Single event which happens once and whose
identity is limited to that one happening [...] such as this or that word on a
single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call
a  Token.  An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can
neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a Sign a Tone.
(Peirce 1931–58, vol. 4, para. 537; emphasis added)
Linda Wetzel, who authored the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s online
entry on “Types and Tokens,” alludes to this very passage in both the entry and
her book (Wetzel 2009, p. xi), yet she neglects to mention the tone in her book,
and buries a brief mention somewhere in the later parts of her website entry.
Given that Wetzel equates types with universals (ibid., p. xii), I fail to see why
the traditional notions of “universal” and “particular” should have been clad in
labels that belong to a framework foreign to that topic.
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Using Peirce’s less familiar terminology helps to bring out what a transition
can  offer.  As a  “legisign,”  a type  is  a  “law-like”  regularity used as a  sign-
vehicle. A type thus ranges over more than one instance. Children learning a
language may be adept at inducing from use even when there is a poverty of
examples,  but  there  must  a  minimum  two  examples  and  a  possibility  of
implementing a learned rule  again. There is no such thing, for example, as a
word that can be used only once. Of course, as a token, a word can (only) be
used once. What makes a brute event like a noise capable of bearing symbolic
meaning is  that  it  can be re-cognized and re-employed  by language-capable
creatures.  Such  recurrence  is  not  the  whole  story,  since  there  must  be  a
convention that connects that recurrence to an object(s) in some concerted way.
Denaturing  the  tone  by switching to  something less  threatening to  common
assumptions  like,  say,  a  “qualitative  type,”  would  imply  that  the  tone  can
somehow meet this demand. It cannot. A token has a quality,  but there is no
reason  why  that  quality  should  ever  occur  again.  There  is  a  tremendous
difference between what  does occur  repeatedly (type)  and what  could occur
repeatedly (tone). To call the latter situation a “type” is to skip right over this
crucial nuance. That is why Peirce saw fit to use different names.
We can therefore return to our example and say that “fast” is there three
times when we consider it as a law-like regularity, four times when we consider
it as a singular occurrence,  and once when we consider it  as pure quality (a
nominalist would claim that there are only four singular events, but this would
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severely cut down the sorts of sign-vehicles; see Stjernfelt 2013). As an ordinal
First, “fast” is merely a potentiality, a “something” that  could be employed to
stand for something else (but doesn’t have to be). If and when such a quality
occurs,  “fast”  is  a  Second.  To  the  extent  that  such  an  occurrence  is  not  a
singleton, but appears repeatedly in accordance with some sort of rationale that
is not merely haphazard (e.g., a habit), “fast” is a Third. Like a Russian doll, a
type presupposes tokens which presuppose a tone. Even if it makes little sense
to think of “fast” as existing in only one of these respects, be it a quality that
never  occurs  or  a  law  that  never  manifests  itself,  prescission  allows  us  to
carefully distinguish these three axes:
Figure 1   Trichotomy of sign-vehicles
Clearly,  one is not likely going to make much of a dent on any problem
regarding consciousness  if  one persists  in obtusely equating the tone in this
illustration with  a  sound or  configuration of  marks—a legitimate but  by no
means exhaustive case. The moral, in sum, is that one should impose no more
restrictions  on  the  tone  than  on  the  token  and  type—a  popular  pair  also
explained by an appeal  to “words” yet  routinely mobilized in non-linguistic
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domains like philosophy of mind (see for example Guttenplan 1995, pp. 596–
597, or more recently Jaworski 2011, p. 387). In this respect, however novel my
proposal may be, it capitalizes on an already respectable move.
The main thing which concerns me here is the fact that prescission can be
deployed without assuming that anything it uncovers could truly stand on its
own,  that  is,  without  the  involvement  of  those  other  aspects  deliberately
disregarded. As David Savan explains,
The occurrence of a quality in space and time renders the quality at least in
some measure a sinsign [i.e., token] [...]. Similarly, the sinsign is always, to
some degree, a replica of a legisign [i.e., type] [...]. And a legisign, like a
qualisign  [i.e.,  tone],  can not  be encountered as  such in experience  [...].
What this means is that the empirical student of semiotics must use Peirce’s
trichotomy (if he uses it at all) as an analytical tool, by means of which to
distinguish  three  different  aspects  of  semiosis  [...].  Empirically,  no  sign
belongs exclusively to one of these classes. This is not to deny the value of
the distinction,  or the potential  value for empirical  research.  It  is  only a
caution against a threatening misunderstanding. (1987, pp. 23–24)
When we commit ourselves to carefully distinguishing what can and cannot be
supposed  independently  of  other  suppositions,  we  engage  in  an  exercise  of
epistemological hairsplitting that can go still deeper than the level of particular
individuals. Just as “P” implies “possible that P” but not the other way round,
the token asymmetrically implies the tone. This does not, I think, stray far from
Duns Scotus’ original account:
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The first act of the intellect is the immediate and simple apprehension of an
individual in so far as it is present and existing, and, as such, the first act of
the intellect is opposed to the second or abstractive act of the intellect which
reaches the object in its essence. [...] This second act of the intellect gives
us knowledge of the essence of an object  considered in abstraction from
existence,  whereas  the  former  act  gives  us  knowledge  of  an  object  as
existent and actually present. (Almeder 1973, pp. 4–5)
To the extent we consider something (anything) absolutely in itself without
regard to its actual occurrence, we have willingly robbed ourselves of any basis
that  could  have  allowed  the  situation  to  be  more  than  a  mere  potentiality,
because “existence depends on its subject having a place in the general system
of the universe” (Peirce 1931–58, vol. 1, para. 424). Strictly speaking, a merely
“possible that P” without any kind of actuality would be ineffable. If, as I will
argue in the second chapter, there is a point beyond which linguistic symbols
cease to work, then there is a point beyond which we have to stop trying to use
symbols. We can still manage to “show” what we mean using indices and icons,
but we have to accept that such sign convey information very differently than
symbols do.
Just as the type as such cannot be encountered in experience, so the tone can
only  be  encounter  in  a  “degenerate”  form,  via  a  token.  This  means  that,
whenever we reveal the pure tone by prescission, we end up with a qualitative
dimension  so sparse  that  it  forbids  description  (since  this  would require,  at
minimum, that one say something “more” than the quality itself). Clearly, the
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qualia we find in Peircean philosophy of signs “are the artificial product of a
highly sophisticated analysis, and not genuine existents revealed to ordinary,
everyday scrutiny” (Goudge 1935, p. 536). A given quality may be used in a
triadic sign, but looking solely at the quality we have no way to tell whether is
serves any function.  So, it becomes a fallacy of sorts to lose sight of this and
construe the resultant quality as some distinct token. Since the error consists in
taking  a  “doctored”  product  of  our  thinking  to  be  a  “discovered”  fact
independent of that intervention, it is apt to call it a reification.
The ongoing flow of conscious mental life has long been remarked for its
stream-like quality,  one thought always  involving another  one thought  quite
literally leading to another (James 1977, pp. 21–74). Phenomenologists have of
course long recognized this (see for example Merleau-Ponty 1968, pp.  130–
155). A sound philosophy of signs must recognize this too:
The abstraction from which we must begin concerns perceptual  semiosic
processes involving the index and the symbol, that is to say, perceptions that
refer to the object as that which stimulates us, affects us, in a causal and/or
contiguous relation with perception; or perceptual semiosic processes that
refer  to  the  already  given  habitual  world  on  the  basis  of  habits  and
conventions which now function automatically and passively. (Petrilli 2010,
p. 268)
Semiotic  inquiry,  however,  is  not  phenomenology,  so  no  methodological
constraint forbids us from adulterating this baseline of lived experience. 
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The stream of consciousness may be unified, but so long as it has parts, we
can take this complexity and begin to remove some items. The first removals
are more straightforward, and can in fact be regarded as “real” distinctions in
Scotus’  sense.  For  example,  “[w]hen  I  see  the  red  book  and  hear  the  bird
singing, there seems to be no good reason to deny that I could have a visually
identical experience without hearing the bird singing, and so on” (Bayne and
Chalmers  2003,  p.  43).  The  move  is  fully  permissible  because  anything
complex subsumes something simpler.
We prescind the sense modalities,  which usually blend. “The eye  works
together with the ear and with touch and taste,  and so forth, in forming our
perception of  an object  as  sensible.  Yet  the contribution of  each  channel  is
distinct  and  irreducible”  (Deely  2001a,  p.  647).  As  the  complexity  of
experience gets decomposed into simpler and simpler elements, we eventually
have to move from perception to sensation. Here, only a “formal” distinction is
possible. So, in order to reach a tone like, say, the smell of a burnt steak, a lot
needs to be supposed absent (including our knowledge that a steak is present).
In prescinding, we attend to some elements and deliberately neglect others
(see  Deledalle  2000,  pp.  5–6;  Houser  2010,  pp.  95–96;  Stjernfelt  2007,  pp.
246–255). It  is not a matter of psychological focus, but of logical focus.  In a
sense, the method of prescission can be likened to the “simplification” inference
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rule applied to (in our case, three-term) conjunctions in logical derivation (see
Kalish et al. [1964] 1980, p. 60).
Now,  suppose  that,  armed  with  this  logical  “focusing  mechanism”
(Stjernfelt 2007, p. 172), we have done quite a bit of prescssive pruning and are
left with, say, only four things (here using the term loosely). Can there still be a
sign? Certainly, since one of these could conceivably stand for another to yet
another  (Heusden  2009,  p.  118;  Deacon  2008,  p.  173).  So  we  continue
supposing  simpler  scenarios.  Three  items  still  allows  for  sign-action  or
semiosis. A major shift occurs, however, when we get down to two. All of a
sudden, the situation becomes too sparse for us to assemble anything plausibly
resembling a sign.  We as thinkers gleaning this fact  do not suddenly vanish
from existence; we have been (and remain) there all along (a fact I will return to
in  section  IV.VIII).  However,  in  supposing  increasingly  simpler  states  of
affairs,  we  eventually  learn  something  informative  about  the  constitutive
conditions  of  semiosis.  The  passage  from,  say,  500  items  to  4  can  be
implemented rather smoothly, and although the resulting setting becomes more
and more impoverished and artificial, nothing beyond frustrated folk intuitions
prevents semiosis from unfolding. When we dip below three elements, though,
we hit a barrier that is very real, and which turns on impersonal considerations
that are not at all the product of whim or social convention.
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With  less  than  three  things  there  can  be  no  sign-action,  and  this  for
principled (i.e., demonstrable) reasons. And since qualia are defined as simple
qualities  considered  in  themselves,  the  only  way  to  confront  them as  such
(besides inducing a vegetative state) is by prescissive abstraction.
Peirce  recognized  that  the  conclusions  arrived  at  by way of  prescission
manifest a persuasive force very different from the sort provided by traditional
argumentation (De Tienne 2000). The kinship of this Peircean appeal  to the
self-evident with phenomenology is now widely recognized (Dougherty 1980;
Spiegelberg 1981, pp. 27–50; Stjernfelt 2007, pp. 141–159). In the same vein,
the complexity premise can justly be classified as phenomenological. Yet, since
quite a bit of epistemological doctoring needs to be done for that setting to yield
the  insights  that  are  of  interest  to  a  study  of  signs,  in  prescinding  we  are
performing  something  very  different  from  phenomenological  description
(Goudge 1935, pp. 535–536), which is defined by its programmatic desire to
capture  human  experience  as  it  actually  presents  itself  in  first-person
experience. Hence, although a scholar like Spiegelberg (1981, p. 33) is correct
to draw a parallel between the semiotic tool of prescission and the Husserlian
method of “eidetic variation” (see Husserl  1999, p. 70), I disagree with those
(e.g., Haaparanta 1999, pp. 39–41) who think prescission can artificially tease
apart  and omit the bound features of experience whilst still falling under the
rubric of the phenomenological.
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Care must therefore be taken to disambiguate the kinship at hand. Going
back  to  the  parallel  introduced  earlier,  if  prescission  consists  in  using  the
simplification rule to infer “P and Q, therefore P,” then eidetic variation is akin
to appealing to the commutative law to license “P and Q, therefore Q and P.”
Peirce did not address the “hard problem” of consciousness—at least not in
the sense in which it is currently understood. That said, Peirce was fully aware
of  the  problematic  rifts  that  were  starting  to  appear  in  the  study  of
consciousness:
Matters  of  brain-physiology  and  matters  of  consciousness  elbow  one
another  in  unsympathetic  juxtaposition,  in  a  way  which  can  only  be
transitional,  and  is  a  sign  for  us,  as  well  as  we  can  look  forward  to
conceptions not yet attained, that psychologists do not yet understand what
mind is, nor what it does. I am not at all prepared to clear the matter up; but
I  dimly discern,  I  think,  that  the physiological  view has  not  sufficiently
affected the introspective aspect;  and possibly the converse is  true,  also.
(1931–58, vol. 2, para. 42)
I believe prescission and the notion of tone he left us points the way to a more
satisfactory  theoretical  account  of  “what  it’s  like”  to  enjoy  conscious
experience. Let us now explore that possibility.
I.V A Fork in the Road
Twentieth-century  philosophy  ignored  not  only  a  full  third  of  Peirce’s
trichotomy,  but—perhaps more importantly—its very rationale.  Nevertheless,
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as a result of those semiotic notions that did manage to seep through (albeit in
distorted  form),  today’s  philosophers  of  mind  are  unlikely  to  make a  more
onerous ontological  commitment without explicitly recognizing that they are
doing as much—it’s rather hard, for instance, to endorse “type-type identity”
without also being recognized as doing so and being given the appropriate label
(e.g., Hill 1991). Crucial avenues are routinely lost, however, due to the fact
that, in this climate, reification of the  tone can happen without anybody even
noticing the move. I submit that this is exactly what has happened in the case of
phenomenal qualia.
There  are  many thought-experiments  on the market  which attempt,  with
various degrees of success,  to prove that consciousness indeed comprises an
irreducibly  qualitative  dimension.  Although  he  has  since  sought  to  distance
himself from the claims he once made, Frank Jackson’s “knowledge argument”
remains one of the more vivid examples. Jackson (1982; 1986) invites us to
consider a neuroscientist who, upon being raised in a strictly black and white
setting since birth,  is  allowed for  the first  time to emerge from her isolated
confines and step into a fully-coloured environment. Even if she had mastered a
comprehensive physical  and functional account of colour prior to that virgin
exposure, her new experiences would likely give her an additional insight into
“what it’s like” to actually see a colour like red. This is by no means the only
way to  bring out  the qualitative  dimension of  consciousness.  Kripke  (1971;
1980,  pp.  144–155),  for  instance,  offers  another,  more  technical,  argument
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which turns on considerations of modality. In any case, whoever acquiesces to
the common distinction such arguments are intended to convey is eventually
faced with the following question: What might this phenomenal experience be
which seems to escape conventional explanations? Whatever the terminology,
an  all-important  decision  must  therefore  be  made:  what  sort  of  ontological
status  should  be  ascribed  to  the  qualitative  features  that  are  experienced  in
consciousness?
Given  a  generic  commitment  to  phenomenal  qualia,  I  believe  the  core
alternative is whether one shall  reify or  prescind. Admittedly, even if one has
no clue what the second disjunct consists in, raising the spectre of reification is
enough to scare most thinkers into denying that the distinction had any basis to
begin with. Of course, the idea that standard reductionist/eliminativist accounts
are  not  exhaustive  is  tendentious,  but  if  the  “non-exhausted”  party  is  dead
wrong, then there is really no problem left for us to address, and our proposed
reconceptualization cannot even get off the ground. I shall therefore take due
note  of  this  profound  dissension  and  continue  with  the  (in  my assessment,
correct) assumption that the perplexing realization that something is “left out”
is not totally ill-founded.
Those who stand fast by their philosophical conviction that there is indeed
something “more” to consciousness are faced with a fork in the road: 1) does
the reality at hand warrant our engaging in some measure of “thing-making,” or
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2)  is  the  distinction—no  matter  how  objective—nevertheless  insufficient  to
sanction such a reification? My central contention in this first chapter is that,
wittingly or not, the pervasive type/token distinction compels one to adopt the
first of these disjuncts, whereas semiotics provides one with the technical tools
needed to comprehensively follow the latter path.
At  the  risk  of  oversimplifying  (I  shall  here  focus  on  the  most  essential
features  of  the  problem),  those  who  think  mental  life  has  a  qualitative
dimension usually gloss the situation in the following terms: there are  token
brain states on one side, there are token qualia on another side, and the task is to
find something that would correlate these two seemingly disparate relata. This
is what has come to be known, appropriately enough, as the “explanatory gap.”
Although Farrell (1950) is credited with the first use of the expression, Levine
is the more frequent reference. Interestingly, the original coining cited Nagel’s
paper as an influence (see Levine 1983, p. 361n3). An earlier book (Deutsch
1959)  alludes  to  a  “mysterious  leap”  from  the  mind  to  neurophysiology.
Sometimes,  the parties in want  of  a  union are grouped  into  their  respective
types. Yet, this way of viewing the situation unquestioningly treats qualities like
pain and red as tokens and/or types. Given the omission I outlined earlier, the
idea of tone—construed as something irreducible to tokens or types—simply
does not come up. With no visible alternative, the accepted roster of options
thus  misses  a  potentially  fruitful  exit.  This  situation  can  be  summarized  as
follows: 
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Figure 2   Explored and unexplored dialectic options
Although this diagram seeks to relate various programmatic commitments in an
explicit  and  informative  way,  it  is  by  no  means  intended  as  an  exhaustive
survey of all that  could be said (or  not said) on the topic of consciousness.
Moreover, the diagram ends where most theoretical inquiries begin. Indeed, the
five  tracts  that  figure  2  tries  to  make explicit  each  lead to  prolific  research
programs  that  rarely  attend  to  their  founding  suppositions.  The  bulk  of  the
literature on consciousness—including the explanatory gap—lies to the “East”
of the right-hand arrowheads. Each basic combination of commitments carves
out a space of intellectual possibilities within which further discussion unfolds. 
In keeping with the mantra that prescission is less than real and more than
nominal, one could have filled the final box leading to the third tract with “Yes,
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for  epistemological reasons.”  Likewise,  the spirit  of the second tract  can be
encapsulated  by  the  answer  “Yes,  for  metaphysical reasons.”  This
characterization is somewhat crude, but it does capture the essence of what’s at
stake.
However one wants to describe the basic idea, what matters is that, given
the current climate, the bifurcation which leads to either reification (path 2) or
prescission  (path  3)  goes  pretty  much  unnoticed.  As  such,  thinkers  who
acquiesce to the thesis that we can indeed hope to study qualitative phenomena
typically proceed directly from this to a treatment of qualia as tokens and/or
types.  And  of  course,  once  this  much  has  been  granted,  the  problem  of
“relating” the disparate classes surfaces with particular inevitability.
This is where Peirce’s complete trichotomy has much to offer. The theorist
working with a dichotomous palette of types and tokens is inadvertently strong-
armed by her tacit commitments into the inference that if phenomenal qualities
are real  enough to  be  discerned,  then they must exist  in  their  own right  as
something genuinely  distinct.  But  if  we accept  that  prescission allows us  to
robustly differentiate the layers subsumed in triadic relations, the fact that we
can consider the tone to be logically prior to the token is taken to mean no more
than  that,  ontology-wise.  When  the  distinction  between  type-  and  token-
physicalism was introduced in philosophy of mind, it changed the playing field
by  making  room  for  a  new  position.  By  introducing  the  complete
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type/token/tone distinction, I aim to do the same (acknowledging that a notional
space was cleared does not require one to plant one’s flag in that space).
In order to elaborate on this alternative way of viewing the situation, I want
to  examine  the  position  defended  by  Ned  Block.  His  contention  that  the
literature  on  consciousness  routinely  conflates  the  “accessible”  and  the
“phenomenal” has stimulated quite a bit of debate, be it among those who think
he misconstrues the distinction or among those who think there is simply no
distinction  there  to  conflate.  Not  only  is  Block’s  controversial  proposal
interesting in its  own right,  it  provides  us with a template whence to better
comprehend  the  manner  in  which  “what  it’s  like”  comes to  be  regarded  as
“what  there  is.”  As  we  shall  see,  the  insight  behind  Block’s  distinction  is
basically right-headed, but runs into all sorts of problems because it construes
qualia as tokens.
I.VI Carving Consciousness at the Joints Too Deeply
Rehearsing  the  widely  held  sentiment  that  the  notion  of  consciousness  is  a
“mongrel” which clumps together various objects that in fact are (and should be
conceived  as  being)  distinct,  Block  has  challenged  a  seemingly  innocuous
inference  he  deems  fundamentally  mistaken.  The  psychological  literature
describes abnormal cases where, for all intents and purposes, an afflicted person
is missing one or more of the aspect(s) and/or faculty(ies) we typically expect
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consciousness to have (e.g., anything discussed in cognitive science that ends
with “syndrome”). Faced with these puzzling cases, the stock assumption has
been that this want of one or more aspect(s) and/or faculty(ies) is truly a want
(in  kind and not just degree),  medical  exceptions effectively confirming our
starting intuitions about what constitutes a fully healthy consciousness. As an
upshot, it is held that ascertaining the specifics of an abnormal dearth can better
our understanding of consciousness in its normal state. This apparently benign
line of thought is the “target reasoning” Block aims to undermine.  A notable
proponent of this view, according to Block, would be Searle (1992, pp. 107–
108), who argues that if epileptics in the grip of a seizure do not display any
flexibility and creativity in their behaviour, then we can conclude that flexibility
and creativity are important traits of consciousness.
With  its  underlying  inference  explicitly  identified,  Block  contends  that
“[a]lthough some variants of this sort of reasoning have some merit, they are
often  given  more  weight  than  they  deserve,  because  of  a  persistent  fallacy
involving a conflation of two very different concepts of consciousness” (1995a,
p. 228). In sum, Block believes that while certain mental faculties and thought-
processes can be found wanting in afflicted patients, this does not provide a
sufficient basis to infer that the  phenomenal aspect of their conscious lives is
correspondingly missing.
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At  the  heart  of  this  claim  lies  a  distinction  Block  thinks  is  routinely
neglected.  In  fact,  as  Block  explains,  “[n]early  every  article  I  read  on  the
subject  by  philosophers  and  psychologists  involves  some  confusion”  of  the
difference in question (1995a, p. 236). In order to put an end to this widespread
conflation (or at least  make sure it  does not go unrecognized),  he gives this
distinction a semi-technical gloss, the functional side being designated “access-
consciousness”  and  the  qualitative  side  “phenomenal-consciousness.”  Block
spends quite bit of time trying to illustrate this proposal, and the specifics of his
many inventive examples could be debated at length. But the hope seems to be
that  the  distinction  would  be  retroactively  vindicated  by  a  subsequent
contention that the aspects distinguished are very likely mutually-independent,
in the demanding sense of the term. Indeed, Block thinks empirical data and
thought-experiments alike suggest that there can be access without phenomenon
(1995a, pp. 243–245) and phenomenon without access (ibid., pp. 239–243).
Let  us consider the first  of  these situations, where agents  would process
information without actually enjoying any phenomenal episode. Block believes
there is some empirical support for this in the case of “blindsighted” persons
who cannot see things before them, yet supposedly can have reliable responses
to these when pressed by an examiner to venture an answer.  The oxymoron
“blind + sight” was coined in 1974 by the neuroscientist Lawrence Weiskrantz
and his colleagues  (for  an overview of what is  involved,  see Bornstein  and
Pittman  1992;  Milner  and  Rugg  1992;  as  well  as  the  more  philosophical
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treatment  in  Nelkin  1996).  Referring  to  the  information-processing  model
developed by Daniel Schacter (1989), Block (1995a, p. 229) suggests that the
generally  correct  judgements  (about  unseen  things)  which  these  patients
perform is made possible because they somehow  bypass their  “phenomenal-
consciousness  module”  and  proceed  straight  to  the  executive  system whose
end-product is overt behaviour (e.g., decisions, actions, and utterances).
That,  as it  stands,  is  a provocative suggestion.  What Block is  saying,  in
effect, is that qualia are real—and that we should think of them as such—even
though it is possible for an agent without access to them to meet the demands of
functionalism.  Seeing  how  the  case  for  phenomenal  experience  is  already
problematic when such subjective episodes are held to aid cognition, the urge to
shave  off  qualia  is  all  the  more  pronounced  when a prominent  defender  of
“phenomenal realism” (Block’s label in his 2002) insists that correct decision-
making can obtain even when no qualitative episodes are available to a patient.
Chalmers, for instance, voiced such worries:
[T]here is something very strange about the idea of an “epiphenomenal” P-
consciousness  module.  The  main  motivation  for  epiphenomenalism  is
surely that experience seems superfluous to any information-processing; but
Block’s  idea  suggests  an  implausible  epiphenomenalism  within the
information-processing story. Indeed, if the module has no effect on other
processes, then we could lesion it with no external change (same reports,
even), and no empirical  evidence could support the hypothesis. (1997, p.
149)
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As if this wasn’t inflammatory enough, Block enjoins us to fathom a “super-
blindsighted”  person  who  would  declare  that  “Now I  know that  there  is  a
horizontal line in my blind field even though I don’t actually see it” and for
whom  visual  information  “simply  pops  into  his  thoughts  in  the  way  that
solutions  to  problems  we’ve  been  worrying  about  pop  into  our  thoughts”
(1995a, p. 233).
I do not want to wedge a “real” distinction between p-consciousness and a-
consciousness, since I think a “formal” distinction is what is called for. This
differs from Block. Indeed, “[i]t is crucial for Block’s distinction to constitute a
distinction of kinds that it is possible for representations to be merely accessible
without  at  the  same  time  being  phenomenal”  (Schlicht  2012,  p.  313).
“Blindsighted” persons are supposed to be a) able to see, in the sense of being
capable of having the proper responses to visual stimuli put before them; and b)
unable to see, in the sense that there is nothing “it is like” for them to perform
(a). For that conjunction to obtain, one has to determine whether both conjuncts
obtain. Yet, as far as I can tell, the only way (b) is ascertained is by asking the
patients  if  they experience anything during the relevant  acts,  to which they
answer in the negative.
For example, the patient (called G. Y.) reported that his visual experiences
were “like black on black” but, despite giving this substantive description, the
researchers preferred to credit this patient with a lack of phenomenal content
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because “he  still  insists that the use of  visual  terms  is  for  lack  of  a  better
alternative because in fact he does not see the stimulus”  (Stoerig and Cowey
1997, pp. 554–555). Note that the illocutionary force of “he insists” is all that
underwrites the claim that “in fact he does not see” (ibid., emphasis added). In
another case, a patient (called D. B.), was asked whether a stick was horizontal
or  vertical.  Following  a  forced-choice  guessing  paradigm,  this  patient  was
informed that he scored above chance and was asked: “Did you know how well
you had done?” to which he replied “No,” “I didn’t—because I couldn’t see a
darn  thing”  (exchange  quoted  in  Weiskrantz  1986,  p.  24).  Informal
conversations of this sort were deemed sufficient to establish that the subject’s
experiential lights were off. One wonders to what extent the follow-up query
alleviated the methodological challenge at hand: “‘So you really did not know
you were getting them right?’ ‘No,’ he replied, still with something of an air of
incredulity” (Weiskrantz 1986, p. 24; emphasis added).
One would have assumed that any attempt to establish the existence of a-
consciousness without p-consciousness would have no recourse to introspective
reports. However, as we have just seen, researchers basically rely on patients to
inform them about “what is it like” to lack qualia (I surmise that, if “naturalist”
philosophers of mind would look more closely into the matter, they would be
perturbed to see how much weight is being put on introspective authority). It is
said that “[t]he discovery of residual visual functions that were demonstrable in
patients  who consistently claimed not to see the stimuli [...] was met with a
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surprise that bordered on disbelief” (Stoerig 2001, p. 88; emphasis added). This
situation causes amazement only on the assumption that the first-person reports
are reliable/authoritative.
Discussing the report of blindness by a patient who can nevertheless track
any X shown to it, Block writes: “Temporarily taking his word for  it,  I  am
assuming that he has no P-consciousness of the X” (1995a, p. 233). It is unclear,
textually at least, if and when Block ever withdraws this temporary concession.
Well,  if  simply  taking  a  person’s  claims  at  face  value  is  all  there  is  to
establishing  the  absence  or  presence  of  qualia,  then  the  hard  problem  of
consciousness has been solved. After all, I too can insist with great vigour that I
experience colours (if any researcher is prepared to record my statements, we
could publish those revolutionary findings). So, either blindsight is legitimate
and the hard problem is not, or the hard problem is legitimate and blindsight is
not.
Now, it has been suggested by Block (1995a, p. 233) and some others that
“blindsight” may also occur in monkeys. Were this the case, it would nullify the
above grievance since, in the case of monkeys there are no first-person reports.
However,  because  a  monkey  cannot  verbalize  what  it  experiences,  it  is
questionable whether it still makes sense to ascribe “blindsight” to an animal. A
monkey cannot tell us it is blind, so how do we know it is? At first blush, the
solution would seem easy: if, for example, the animal bumps into things, its
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failure to perform regular motor functions in response to visual inputs can be a
solid indicator of its blindness. So far, so good. The problem, though, is precisely
that the monkeys in question  don’t bump into things (see Stoerig and Cowey
1997, p. 549). Indeed, “blindsighted” creatures (human or monkey) are supposed
to function quite well. Therefore, to describe them as blind is a bit bizarre; it
violates everything functionalism prescribes.
Surprisingly, the putative “blindness” of the monkeys is established solely in
virtue of the fact that a portion of the brain is lacking (or lacking activation). In
primates, stimulation of the eyes usually triggers optic nerves that then activate a
portion in the back of the brain called the striate cortex. Researchers thus reason
that a monkey lacking a striate cortex is a blind monkey. Again, that seems like a
plausible inference. However, if a region of the brain is considered relevant to
vision  because  its  absence  impairs  visual  function,  and  if  its  absence  is
subsequently shown not to impair visual function, what reason do we still have
to consider that region relevant to vision?
In reality, total eradication of a given brain region is very difficult to achieve.
“For example, there might be diffusion of light within the eye so that some of it
spreads into the intact field and provides a kind of subtle cue about the presence
of a visual event” (Weiskrantz 1986, p. 11). In the best known case, “[t]here was
some visual cortex left, and the situations in which she [the female monkey
Helen] showed unprompted visual discrimination were natural ones in which
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there was no control of where the stimuli engaged her retina” (Block 1995a, p.
233). Those eager to get philosophical mileage out of such rare cases might want
to gloss over the fact that “almost the entire visual cortex of the monkey’s brain”
(Humphrey  1992,  p.  88;  emphasis  added)  was surgically  removed,  but  the
question of residual tissue matters. By analogy, we would hardly declare kidneys
unnecessary solely on account that, once, a patient had almost all of her kidney
tissue removed yet still managed to filter her blood.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that complete removal of a monkey’s
striate cortex has been histologically verified and that such an operated monkey
goes on to perform visual tasks quite well. The sense of amazement we would
then get from such findings would stem from a contrast: we assume that the
striate cortex is needed for vision, so we are understandably surprised when the
input-output  functions  survive  even  when  that  cortex  is  missing.  Monkey
“blindsight”  thus trades on sustaining the joint  endorsement of  two claims,
namely that “Cortical activation is needed for vision” and “Cortical activation is
not needed for vision.” Well, which is it? The situation is analogous to removing
a cornerstone crucial to holding a building erect and then finding out that the
building  does  not  collapse.  We  could  either  say  that  1)  the  building  can
mysteriously stand in spite of the cornerstone’s absence, or we could say that 2)
the cornerstone was not a cornerstone after all. Clearly, option (2), which says
that it was not a cornerstone after all, is the best explanation.
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There may be other reasons for being interested in a given region of the brain
(like iconic imprinting, which I will discuss in section III.III). But, if a brain
region R is considered necessary for the performance of a function F, and F is
shown to occur even in the absence of R, then R can no longer be considered
necessary for the performance of F.
Weiskrantz (1986, p. v) remarks that his oxymoronic name “blind-sight”
quickly “caught on.” In philosophy, the wave of enthusiasm for these cases has
been fueled in large part by their resemblance to “zombies,” those hypothetical
creatures that perform all humans can without enjoying any of the qualitative
experiences (see Kirk 1974; Kirk 2005; Chalmers 1996, pp. 94–105). To his
credit, Block (1995a, p. 233) prudently states that he “doesn’t know whether
there are any actual cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness.” Owen
Flanagan, however, believes that “the case of blindsight shows its actuality”
(1992, p. 149). That is hyperbole.
A mutual-independence of  access  and phenomenon would entail  another
sort of zombie, who would have the phenomena without having access to them
—as in the case of a busy person who “hears” but does not “notice” the loud
drilling noise that has been present near her during an engaging conversation
(Block  1995a,  p.  234).  In  terms  of  Schacter’s  model,  this  would  mean  an
activation of the phenomenal module that has no repercussion upon anything
beyond  itself,  be it  access-consciousness  (of  the sort  that  would prompt  the
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more overt realization that “Wow, that noise is really loud and/or bothersome”)
or the executive system which could trigger  reactionary behavioural  outputs
(say, covering one’s ears or moving the conversation to another location).
Staying true to his distinction, Block argues that no matter how inaccessible
they may be from the standpoint of information-processing, qualia could in fact
be present in such a zombie’s phenomenal-consciousness module (for an early
statement of the mutual independence of function and qualia, see Block and
Fodor 1972; as well the criticisms by Shoemaker 1975). Schlicht notes that, “if
Block is right, then there is not only a large  part  of  our  mental  life  that  is
inaccessible to us, namely the unconscious part; in addition, even a large part of
our  conscious mental life will then be inaccessible to us, since he argues that
there are phenomenal yet inaccessible experiences” (2012, p. 310).
Block (2007) stresses the need to search for such a phenomenal module
without  expecting  the  episodes  enjoyed  by  a  subject  to  be  in  any  wise
reportable.  He  argues  that  if  we  make  reportability  a  non-negotiable
desideratum  of  our  explanation,  we  will  see  no  need  to  investigate  the
qualitative  experiences  themselves.  However,  “access”  in  Block’s  sense  is
thinner than a verbal report: “Reportability is a legacy of behaviorism that is
less interesting than it has seemed. The more interesting issue in the vicinity is
not  the  relation  between  the  phenomenal  and  the  reportable,  but  rather  the
relation between the phenomenal and the cognitively accessible” (2007, p. 484).
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So presumably, one could have access and still not be able to express this in
any overt act of communication.
It is usually sound methodology to think that, if a posited object does not
manifest itself in any overt way, the object in question does not in fact exist.
Indeed, it seems reasonable to say that a rare beast cannot be so rare that no one
ever witnesses it; and that one must first establish the actual reality of a species
before  labelling  it  endangered  and  adopting  legislative  measures.  This,
however, is the (purportedly hasty) reasoning Block seeks to assail. Although
one  typically  determines  the  absence  of  an  aspect  and/or  faculty  of
consciousness  by  way  of  a  contrast  with  its  manifest  presence  in  healthy
persons, Block claims that the evidence adduced to sanction such a move is
inconclusive, as it does not fully exclude the possibility that the aspect and/or
faculty in question might still lurk in an afflicted patient’s mind.
To  be  sure,  Block  recognizes  that  his  distinction  makes  for  some  very
strange and onerous consequences, notably the two zombies just sketched. But
before we raise the razor of parsimony, he asks us to consider whether the view
of  consciousness  we  adopt  takes  due  consideration  of  experiments  that
supposedly show patients  reliably executing various  cognitive  tasks  without
recourse to the sort of phenomenal resources healthy persons would typically
marshal. As Levine rightfully says: “[T]o the extent that there is an element in
our concept of qualitative character that is not captured by features of its causal
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role,  to  that  extent  it  will  escape  the  explanatory  net  of  a  physicalistic
reduction” (1997, p. 553). The question of course is whether this is actually the
case—that is, if and to what extent qualia indeed merit explanatory attention in
their  own  right.  Although  assorted  empirical  findings  are  often  quoted  in
support of various positions, the debate largely hinges on which party should
assume the burden of (dis)proof. Block (1992) has explicitly accused theorists
of begging the question against  phenomenal-consciousness,  and has recently
reiterated this claim in greater detail (in his 2007; for a further discussion of
Block’s  stance  and  the  inference  he deems inconclusive,  see  Tye  1996,  pp.
291–295).
Convinced by the sorts of arguments presented by Block, Nagel, Jackson,
and others,  some (most notably Chalmers  2010) have proceeded  to  develop
positive theories that try to account for this elusive feature of mind. Others,
unimpressed  by  Block’s  distinction  or  uncomfortable  with  the  thorny
methodological  issues  that  are  raised  when  one  countenances  a  (potentially
inaccessible)  phenomenal-consciousness  “module,”  have  simply  followed
through with the reductionist program, unabated. Still others have tried to make
sense of the fairly strong intuitions Block appeals to by recasting them in a
more  reductionist-friendly mould.  In  the  final  tally,  although Block  has  not
garnered many outspoken adherents, his proposed distinction has come to be
seen as “very useful,” and most theorists would likely agree with Chalmers that,
at the very least, “[t]here is clearly a conceptual distinction here” (1997, p. 148;
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emphasis  in  original;  see also Chalmers 1996,  p.  22;  as  well  as  Bayne  and
Chalmers 2003, p. 28).
The question, then, is how best to handle a “conceptual” distinction which
does not seem to latch onto things that are real in the demanding sense, but
which  is  nevertheless  convincing  enough  to  sustain  a  fairly  stable  set  of
descriptions.  Barring  an  outright  denial,  we  can  recognize  that  something
tangible  is  animating  those  who  think  the  qualitative  dimension  of
consciousness is distinct enough to escape standard accounts.
Some philosophers have suggested, however,  that there might be nothing
more to it all than this sociological convergence. As one of the most vocal (and
eclectic)  opponents  of  qualia,  Daniel  Dennett  (1988;  1991a)  maintains  that
human  consciousness  is  best  understood  as  a  cultural  construct  of  sorts;
inasmuch as one would never claim to possess consciousness unless one did not
acquire the very concept  from one’s societal  surroundings.  Objecting to this
view, Block states: “Now I hope it  is obvious that  P-consciousness is  not  a
cultural construction. Remember, we are talking about P-consciousness itself,
not the concept of P-consciousness” (1995a, p. 238). There are many ways to
read this statement. For one thing, it could be argued that Block does not fully
appreciate the substantial point Dennett is trying to make when he asserts that
the  ontology of  consciousness  is  essentially cultural  (to affirm that  we have
cultural constructs for those things we talk about is a truism, and would make
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Dennett’s thesis a mere platitude). Indeed, Block (1999) thinks the construal of
qualia as social constructs is “ridiculous.”  For my purposes, I should like to
draw  attention  to  the  specious  character  of  Block’s  laconic  reply.  What  it
amounts  to,  in  effect,  is  the  declaration  that  a  certain  thing  (in  this  case
phenomenal-consciousness) has a full-fledged existence apart from discourse,
since we can talk of “the-thing” itself in abstraction from “discourse-on-the-
thing.” In  my view, this sort of reasoning betokens a reification—one which
runs  counter  to  the  Scotist  insight  that  we  can  accurately  identify  (and
intelligibly  discuss)  a  feature  without  that  feature  thereby  becoming  a
supplementary “thing” existing in its own right.
Sensing the tensions at hand, Güzeldere makes an insightful  remark that
encapsulates the predicament I diagnosed earlier (in figure 2): 
[C]ould  it  be  that  the  particular  way  Block’s  distinction  carves  out
phenomenal  consciousness,  separating  it  completely from  its  causal  and
functional aspects in accord with the “segregationist intuition,” renders its
investigation by means of scientific methods theoretically impossible? Put
differently,  could we be painting ourselves into a corner by a conceptual
commitment to Block’s distinction such that we end up with a number of
straightforward problems about A-consciousness and a conjured-up “hard
problem” of P-consciousness that in principle admits no solution? (1997, p.
29; emphasis added)
Given  that  considerable  difficulties  confront  Block’s  “phenomenal  realist”
position (and Dennett’s instrumentalist position; see Dahlbom 1993), I think it
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might be worthwhile for current philosophy to explore an unheeded tract which
explicitly centres on a separation that is less than real yet more than nominal.
Such a framework would have the potential of doing justice to Block’s intuitive
appeals  whilst  resisting  an  all-out  “segregation”  of  the  mind’s  qualitative
dimension.  Let  us  then  return  to  the  fork  in  the  road  identified  earlier  and
venture down a new path.
I.VII What It Could Be Like
As we saw earlier, one of the central tenets of Peircean semiotics is that the
very  idea  of  representation,  carefully  unpacked,  presupposes  a  three-place
relation that cannot be sundered; that is, one which cannot be reduced to the
dyadic or the monadic on pain of no longer representing (see Peirce 1998, pp.
272–273, 411). This does not, however, mean that qualia are representational.
Semiotics does not say that  a quale represents, but rather that representation
perforce involves a quale—there is no reciprocity (i.e.,  no monad is a triad).
This is the crucial feature that is so difficult to make sense of when one follows
the  path  of  reification,  as  witnessed  by  Block’s  suggestion  that  access-
consciousness is what allows phenomenal-consciousness to be “poised” for use
(1995a,  pp.  231,  245n7).  Addressing  this  problematic  idea,  Denise  Gamble
writes: “An ontology of representations is a powerful tool for explaining some
types of content. But not every internal stimulation or activation in mentality
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need  be  a  representation.  Is  there  no  other  conceptual  framework  for
understanding phenomenology?” (1997, p. 150). There is indeed.
Although Peirce draws on a distinct phenomenology (Spiegelberg 1981, pp.
27–50), the notion of the “phenomenal” suggests a “phenomenalism” which he
as a scientific realist found repugnant (see Ransdell 1978). Some semioticians
(e.g.,  Colapietro 1989, p. 18) think the term “representation” has suffered so
much  harm  at  the  hands  of  sceptical  philosophers  that  we  should  opt  for
“mediation” instead. I am not prepared to give it up. “Representations,” from a
semiotic  point  of  view,  are  not  a  special  class  of  objects  such  that  certain
(typically mental) things inherently have to represent while others can never do
so. Much the opposite: the tone emphatically does not have to be the ground
upon which interpretation pole-vaults to an object. If  and when it is, then of
course it has; and there is no question here of denying that all-important service
(known as “renvoi” in French,  pace Jakobson 1988, p. 452). But, the whole
point of prescission is that we can recognize quality as an ordinal First in such a
relation, thereby incorporating into our theoretical picture the idea that a tone
can stand for something else but need not do so. Thus, despite the unbreakable
(triadic)  bond  which  characterizes  any representation,  whatever  is  burdened
with the logical duty of standing for something else—no matter what it may
consist in—can be prescinded in such a way as to disregard its employment in
that capacity.
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This means that, pace Block (1995b, pp. 33–34), orgasms don’t have to be
“about” anything. But it also means that if one is led to infer from this “that
something very pleasing is happening down there” (Tye 1995, p. 269), then, to
that  extent,  the orgasm is  acting as  a  sign  (in  this  case,  an index).  From a
semiotic  standpoint,  however,  there  is  nothing  about  bodily  feelings  or
sensations that make them more apt to serve as bearers of meaning, nor is there
anything that  bars  a  particular  class  from doing so.  Block’s  talk  of  “mental
paint” (1995b,  pp.  27–29),  though couched  in  a  mentalistic  idiom,  at  times
comes  very  close  to  the  notion  of  tone.  Block  does  not  think  that
representational properties are intrinsic, so can view his mental paint as tone.
Even so, Block’s proposal is less desirable because it implies (by its very name)
that the issue of whether something is or is not a vehicle of representation—of
whether it stands for something else to something—can somehow be answered
by studying the nature of the candidate in question. According to the view I
recommend, that is a misguided endeavour:
[T]he being of the sign is the triadic relation itself, not the elements related
or  structured  according  to  their  respective  roles  [...].  The  representative
element within this triadic structure,  which we loosely call  a “sign,” “in
itself” is  not a sign at all, but one of the three elements  necessary to the
being of a sign, one of the three legs on which the sign walks in working its
way through the world, and, indeed, the “foremost” leg, insofar as it is the
leg which takes the direct representative step in carrying a semiosis. (Deely
2005, pp. 176, 178)
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Block states that he does “not want to claim that there are non-representational
phenomenal features  of  every experience or  that  when there are,  these non-
representational features form support [for] the representational features in the
manner of a ‘base’” (1995b, p. 28; see also Seager 1999, p. 4). That is exactly
what  semiotics  claims,  the  tone  being  the  ultimate  ground  one  can  reach.
Having said this, one must keep in mind that “[w]hat is sign-vehicle one time
can be significate [i.e., object] another time; and what is interpretant one time
can be sign-vehicle the next time; and so on, in an unending spiral of (as Peirce
liked to say) abductions, deductions, and retroductions through which symbols
grow” (Deely 2005, p. 178).
Although, as we shall see in the fourth chapter, the cardinal layers at the
heart  of  Peircean  semiotics  can  provide  us  with  a  coherent  metaphysical
outlook,  the  human  ability  to  prescind  certain  features  need  not  entail  any
corresponding  ontological  profligacy.  The  Dictionnaire  de  la  langue
philosophique cites the definition of “la précision” given by J. B. Bossuet as
“l’action que fait notre esprit en séparant par la pensée des choses en effet
inséparables”—“the act which our mind does when it separates by means of
thought things that are in point of fact inseparable” (Logique, I, xxii; quoted in
Foulquié and Saint-Jean 1962, p. 562; my translation).  It  is fully consistent,
therefore,  for  one  to  acquiesce  to  the  above  distinctions  while  steadfastly
denying that there are 8  fast’s in our earlier example (obtained from adding 3
types + 4 tokens + 1 tone).
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Block, in contrast, suggests that the fact that we can conceive of a quality
not  accessed  in  any overt  state  of  consciousness  is  evidence  that  a  distinct
phenomenal-consciousness  module  might  truly  exist.  Let’s  go  back  to  an
example mentioned earlier and see how he describes the qualia involved (I will
quote from the anthologized version, which is more carefully worded): 
[W]e have P-conscious  states  when we see,  hear,  smell,  taste,  and have
pains [...]. Here is another reason to believe in P-consciousness without A-
consciousness: Suppose that you are engaged in intense conversation when
suddenly at noon you realize that right outside your window, there is—and
has been for some time—a pneumatic drill digging up the street. You were
aware  of  the  noise  all  along,  one  might  say,  but  only  at  noon  are  you
consciously  aware of  it.  That  is,  you  were  P-conscious  of  the  noise  all
along,  but  at  noon you  are both P-conscious  and A-conscious of it  [...].
Only at noon is the content of your representation of the drill poised for use
in  rational  control  of  action  and  speech  [...].  The  example  shows  the
conceptual  distinctness  of  P-consciousness  from  A-consciousness  and  it
also puts the burden of proof on anyone who would argue that as a matter of
empirical fact they come to the same thing. (1997, pp. 380, 386–387; in the
original article, Block speaks of a “deafening” drill)
Stripped to its essentials, Block’s argument can be summarized as follows: 1)
Phenomenal-consciousness  is  conceivable  without  access-consciousness  (i.e.,
the  passage  above).  2)  Access-consciousness  is  conceivable  without
phenomenal-consciousness  (i.e.,  the  projected  case  of  “super-blindsight”).
Ergo: 3) We are entitled to distinguish phenomenal-consciousness from access-
consciousness. If we heed the insight that triadic relations can be decomposed
86
without  their  involving  a  multiplicity  of  distinct  objects,  we  can  proceed
straight  to  the  conclusion  after  the  first  premise.  By  contrast,  the  theorist
working  with  the  incomplete  type/token  distinction  needs  both  premises  to
proceed to the conclusion—which is then glossed as proof that qualia exist as
tokens.  Indeed,  Block  has  made his  ontological  commitments  in  this  regard
crystal clear: “Whether we use ‘consciousness’ or ‘phenomenal consciousness,’
‘awareness’ or ‘access-consciousness,’ the point is that there are two different
concepts  of  the  phenomenon  or  phenomena  of  interest.  We  have  to
acknowledge  the  possibility  in  principle  that  these  two  concepts  pick  out
different phenomena. Two vs. one: that is not a verbal issue” (2000, p. 133;
emphasis added). 
Since the mutual-independence upheld by Block is logically posterior to the
distinction on which it  is  deployed,  one can buy into the distinction without
endorsing the onerous relational  thesis which would have them be mutually
independent.  The debt  to  Duns Scotus  is  apparent:  existential  inseparability
indeed does not entail identity in definition. Of course, Scotus was not the only
philosopher  to  have  grasped  this  crucial  fact.  As  Joseph  Levine  writes  in
discussing the problematic  entanglements  that  accompany arguments  for  the
full  reality  of  qualia  in  consciousness:  “One cannot  infer  from a  variety  of
modes of access to a variety of facts being accessed” (1997, p. 546). I believe
semiotic  theory  helps  to  theoretically  articulate  this.  The  fact  that  we  can
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rigorously prescind a tone from a token is not a sufficient reason to think that it
exists in its own right, apart from its functional role(s).
In short, just as Ramsey suggested that Wittgenstein would have profited
from distinguishing between the type and the token, so I hold that carefully
heeding the token/tone distinction can lend support  to Block’s  insightful  but
embattled propositions. Consider for instance the following passage by Peirce: 
Among phanerons [Peirce’s name for phenomena] there are certain qualities
of feeling, such as the color of magenta, the odor of attar, the sound of a
railway whistle, the taste of quinine [...] I do not mean the sense of actually
experiencing  these  feelings,  whether  primarily  or  in  any  memory  or
imagination. That is something that involves these qualities as an element of
it. But I mean the qualities themselves which, in themselves, are mere may-
bes, not necessarily realized [...]. A quality of feeling can be imagined to be
without any occurrence, as it seems to me. Its mere may-being gets along
without any realization at all. [...] I suppose you will tell me that no such
thing could be alone in the universe [...]. But I point out to you that these
things are only known to us by extraneous experience;  none of them are
either seen in the color, heard in the sound, or felt in the visceral sensation.
Consequently, there can be no logical difficulty in supposing them to be
absent,  and  for  my  part,  I  encounter  not  the  slightest  psychological
difficulty in doing so,  either.  (1931–58,  vol. 1, para.  304–305; emphasis
added. See also Peirce 1998, p. 150)
Prescission teaches us that underneath all the hubbub of thought, discourse, and
that general “action of signs” which Peirce called semiosis, there is the tone: a
monadic  dimension  that  has  the  power to  be  the  qualitative  vehicle  of
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representation  but  which  in  virtue  of  its  ordinal  primacy  remains  serenely
ignorant of whether it is actually employed in so raucous an activity (see Peirce
1931–58, vol. 1, para. 422–426).
The kinship between Block’s intuitive illustrations and Peirce’s analysis is
striking. Yet, with these two interpretations now in plain sight, would it not be
preferable to keep intact their common contention that a legitimate distinction is
at  play—all  while  recognizing  that  it  owes  to  our  ability  to  “peel  off”
occurrences and glance in an abstract fashion at the qualities they presuppose?
By refusing to reify the features it prescinds, such a semiotic approach would
allow us  to respect  the distinct  character  of  phenomenal  experience  without
turning it into a chimera. Going back to the Russian doll metaphor, prescission
shows us that the distinctness of qualia does not put them besides mental states,
but in them. On this view, it is not that access-consciousness and phenomenal-
consciousness are tokens of different types; rather, the latter is the tone of the
former’s tokens.
This  explains  why  “A-consciousness  and  P-consciousness  are  almost
always  present  or  absent  together”  (Block  1995a,  p.  242),  and  supports
Chalmers’ surmise that “the co-occurrence of phenomenal and psychological
properties reflects something deep about our phenomenal concepts” (1996, p.
22).  But,  given  that  tones  are  not  themselves  occurrences,  this  steadfast
accompaniment  in  no  way  means  that  the  qualities  at  hand  somehow
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“supervene”  on  the  corresponding  tokens  (Chalmers  1996,  pp.  32–89;  Kim
1990). Although I am reluctant to adopt a facile “-ism” for fear that the crucial
semiotic interrelation I have striven to explicate might be forgotten, it could be
said that the situation involves a species of subsumption.
Some remarks on subsumption have recently been provided by Tim Bayne
(2010,  pp.  20–21).  Bayne  agrees  with  me  that  “[t]he  paradigm  case  of
subsumption is the relation between a complex phenomenal state and a simpler
state that is intuitively one of its ‘component’” (Bayne and Chalmers 2003, p.
40).  However,  whereas  Bayne  and  Chalmers  describe  subsumption  as  “a
relation among token phenomenal states” (2003, p. 40), my account takes the
subsumption to extend farther, since it regards any token state as subsuming a
tone. The unified stream of consciousness (which is mine as a subject) can be
cut  into  signs,  which  can  in  turn  be  cut  into  three  parts.  Despite  Bayne’s
endorsement of a mereological model (2010, pp. 20–46), it never occurs to him
to also sunder tokens.
Try as  one  might,  I  believe  it  is  impossible  to  reproduce  or  mimic  the
relation  provided  by  tract  3  in  my  earlier  diagram  with  the  more  onerous
resources  of  tract  2.  To  the  extent  I  am  right,  then  incorporating  the  full
trichotomy creates  a  shift  in the topography of the debate—a change which
might  spell  promise  for  an  inquiry  that,  by  its  own  admission,  has  been
deadlocked before a seemingly unbridgeable chasm. Attentively considering the
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advantages  and disadvantages  that  come with Block’s  influential  distinction,
Chalmers summarizes the current situation in three points: “(1) one can imagine
access  without  experience  and  vice  versa;  (2)  access  can  be  observed
straightforwardly, whereas experience cannot; and, most important, (3) access
consciousness  seems  clearly  amenable  to  cognitive  explanation,  whereas
phenomenal consciousness is quite perplexing in this regard” (1997, p. 148). To
layer a summary of my own, the outlook I advocate gives good grounds to be
wary of the symmetrical “vice versa” of (1), agrees with the gist of (2), and
marshals  tools  which—when  properly  understood—allow (3)  to  appear  less
foreign from the standpoint of explicit understanding.
Block compares the contribution of phenomena in conscious functions to
that of water in a hydraulic machine (1995a, p. 229). This is a fair  analogy,
especially  since  any  token  perforce  implies  a  tone.  However,  prescission
reminds us  that  water  without hydraulic  machinery would be just  a  puddle.
Since  such a lack of  access  would entail  a  tone  without  any token,  talk  of
“qualia” in the plural would be inaccurate: such a mind would be an unbounded
expanse filled with a unique “what it’s like” that would literally be “I know not
what.” We already have a name for such a “zombie”: we call it a vegetable (see
Brandt 2007, pp. 61–62; Farrell 1955, p. 500).
Prescission is a form of explanation which we can in turn explain—an un-
mysterious technical method we can share amongst ourselves and apply with
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constancy.  Alluding  to  this  mode  of  distinction,  Peirce  wrote:  “It  may  be
noticed that, throughout this process, introspection is not resorted to. Nothing is
assumed respecting the subjective elements of consciousness which cannot be
securely inferred from the objective elements” (1992, pp.  3–4; compare this
with Heil 1988).  Indeed,  it  should be emphasized that  my discussion of the
qualitative  dimension  of  consciousness  relegated  the  (inescapable)  frame  of
reference of lived experience to the background and at no point appealed to the
idiosyncratic  history  of  the  reader  in  order  to  make  its  technical  proposal
intelligible  and/or  persuasive.  This  dissertation  proposes  something different
from phenomenology.
The semiotic  account  of  phenomenal  qualia  I  have tendered  would thus
seem  to  meet  the  desideratum  laid  down  by  Dennett,  who  encouragingly
stressed  that  “[t]he  third-person  approach  is  not  antithetical  to,  or  eager  to
ignore,  the subjective  nuances  of  experience;  it  simply insists  on  anchoring
those subjective nuances to something—anything, really—that can be detected
and confirmed in replicable experiments” (2001, p. 231). Semiotic inquiry can
satisfy this because, as we have seen, it is patently non-Cartesian from the start.
As Thomas Short explains: “[S]ince the human mind, according to Peirce, is
constituted by semeiotic processes of a special type, it should be possible to use
the concept of semeiosis to analyze consciousness, and that precludes using the
concept of consciousness to analyze semeiosis” (1986, p. 105).
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I.VIII Tentative Excursus in Ontology
Tracts  2  and  3  in  my earlier  diagram (figure  2)  both agree  that  qualia  are
amenable to some sort  of description and/or analysis.  In  light  of this shared
commitment, what sort of methodological rigour can one expect? Although his
ontological allegiances leave no room for ambiguity,  Block’s own answer on
this  front  is  a  qualified optimism. While  he thinks  there  is  no reason  to  be
embarrassed  by  the  fact  that  no  non-circular  definition  of  phenomenal-
consciousness can be formulated (Block 1995a, p. 230), he has acknowledged
that  a  realistic  stance  vis-à-vis  this  slippery aspect  of  consciousness  and an
endorsement of scientific naturalism do not fit  comfortably together  (see his
2002).  That  appraisal  seems right.  However,  the semiotic framework I have
offered as a substitute allows one to account for the fact that we can discern
qualia-without making promises it cannot keep. Prescission suffices to establish
that a tone is not a token. On this “quasi-logical” reading, one is not led to
onerously  postulate  a  separate  “module,”  the  actual  presence  of  which
researchers would subsequently have to empirically vindicate (the researcher
who seeks to confirm that 1 + 1 = 2 by adding drops of water basically invites
the objection that two drops joined yield but one; but staying grounded in the
theoretical idiom suited to that truth obviates such criticisms).
The Scotist gloss on prescission as a distinction “less than real yet  more
than nominal” will not be very helpful, however, if it is taken to entail some
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mid-way  “subsistence”  or  other  disingenuous  “quasi-reality.”  That’s  why
Peirce, in spite of his admiration, emphasized that for Duns Scotus’ logic to
fruitfully contribute to a scientific worldview, it would have to be “torn away
from  its  medievalism”  and  kept  under  guard  by  “continual  wholesome
reminders of nominalistic criticisms” (1931–58, vol. 1, para. 6).  Duns Scotus,
as we saw, defended the ideas of Ibn Sina, who had argued that, though the
human  intellect  groups  concrete  instances  into  various  natural  kinds,  the
“essence” which makes each individual item what it is must in some sense be
prior to its “existence” (see Noone 2003, pp. 104–105; Jordan 1984, pp. 143–
147).  In  a  way,  this  resembles  Peirce’s  contention  that  there  is  “no  logical
difficulty”  in  “supposing”  a  quality  or  suchness  that  “is  not  in  itself  an
occurrence” (1931–58, vol. 1, para. 304–305). An informative parallel can thus
be drawn between the type/token/tone distinction and the medieval tripartition
of natures as post rem, in rebus, and ante rem (see Gracia and Noone 2006, p.
199; Goudge 1935, p. 538; Almeder 1973, p. 5).
As interesting as such a gloss is, however, it presents severe limitations one
would do well to keep in mind. In a full-blown reification that makes Block’s
activated-but-inaccessible module pale by comparison, the idea of the ante rem
was usually taken as  what the Divine Mind would be (was?) contemplating
prior  to  the  mysterious  “contraction”  of  inchoate  commonality  into
individualities (Stjernfelt 2007, p. 35); whereas from a (more humble) semiotic
standpoint, the apprehension of the tone’s priority comes simply by way of a
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cognitive operation directed at  a  specific  subclass  of  things  (“signs”)  which
allow  for  such  splitting  to  begin  with.  According  to  Peirce’s  categorial
architecture, representation entails relation and relation entails quality.  But in
establishing  this,  we  always  work  our  way  down  from  a  stock  of
representations, and thus never really encounter a quality that isn’t actualized.
This lack of actuality is not a fault.  Writing about the qualities at the heart of
semiosis, Goudge remarks that:
Although they are abstractions in the sense that they never exist in isolation
in any experience or state of consciousness, we have no right to condemn
them on that account. To do so would be to condemn thought itself […].
Hence the mere fact that “qualities of feeling” can not be sharply articulated
by means of introspective examination, provides absolutely no ground for
denying their logical priority in knowledge. (1935, p. 537)
In  his  well-documented  study  of  Peirce’s  intellectual  relation  to  Scotus,
Boler  (1963,  p.  102)  suggests  that  Peirce  objected  to  the  notion  of  a
dispositional “substantial form”—perhaps the closest scholastic analogue to his
qualitative  “may-being”—on  account  of  its  failure  to  elucidate  the  monadic
structure (or lack thereof) involved. In this sense, the framework I have urged,
though largely continuous with a scholastic past, supplies a tangible advance.
Centuries of semiotic reflection have produced some hard-earned results which
we can now distil to a handful of secure tenets (a store of achievements nicely
summarized  in  the  otherwise  eclectic  Nöth  1995,  pp.  79–80).  Using  the
evocative  terminology  employed  by  Armstrong  (1989),  we  know  that
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representations  necessarily  have  to  be  “layer-cakes”  (and  cannot  be  unitary
“blobs”) on pain of no longer representing, and that this irreducible complexity
in  turn  allows  us  to  prescind—i.e.,  distinguish  without  extinguishing—the
constituents that make up a whole greater than its parts. Moreover (and this is
of special importance to the “extended mind” conception in cognitive science;
compare Clark and Chalmers 1998 with  Skagestad 1999), the previous holds
true  regardless  of  whether  the  triadic  representation  that  pole-vaults  on  a
qualitative vehicle to reach its object does so on the basis of a correlation that is
subjective or objective, conventionally recognized or truly bound to its object.
This  construal  of  representation  as  a  triadic  relation  of  “standing  for”
(“stare pro”) manages to show that there is a “glut”—to borrow a particularly
apt  term  from  multi-valued  logic—between  the  extremes  exemplified  by
Block’s realism and Dennett’s instrumentalism. Minimally, we have to be able
to wedge some sort of distinction in a sign to even realize that it isn’t its object
—that the word “dog” doesn’t bite or that the smoke-from-the-fire is also just
plain  smoke.  Still,  the  partitioning  of  a  sign’s  three  components  is  not  the
product of fiat, in spite of the fact that no quality is by itself significant and that
the meaning we ascribe a vehicle can be wholly conventional (although it need
not be). However one wants to describe all of this, Peirce was probably on the
right track when he characterized semiotics as “the quasi-necessary, or formal,
doctrine of signs” (1931–58, vol. 2, para. 227).
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As was seen in the previous sections, Peirce’s semiotic conception can help
elucidate the intuitive appeal of many thought-experiments that are pro-qualia.
The proponent of phenomenal-consciousness may thus be inclined to think that
prescission  affords  her  a  means  of  further  articulating  her  thesis  that
consciousness includes an irreducible qualitative dimension. As Frank Jackson
insists, “Physicalism is not the noncontroversial thesis that the actual world is
largely physical, but the challenging thesis that it is entirely physical” (1986, p.
291). Accordingly, if it can be shown that the tone simply cannot be reduced to
the token or the type, then this should lend appreciable support to the (for some,
recondite) contention that there is “more” to consciousness than purely physical
occurrences.  Despite  having  reprimanded  the  reification  that  made  this
qualitative dimension some separate “thing” existing in its own right, it seems
correct to say that I have vindicated Block to a certain extent by showing that,
this important flaw aside, he had a point after all.
I will explore metaphysical questions more fully in the fourth chapter. For
now, it suffices to note that prescission can gel with parsimonious ontological
outlooks. In surveying various positions on the subject, Paul Churchland points
out  for  example  that  “[t]he  identity  theorist  can  admit  a  duality,  or  even  a
plurality, of different types of knowledge without thereby committing himself to
a duality of types of things known” (1988, p. 34; see also his 1992, pp. 67–76).
This idea, which I will explore more fully in the next chapter,  clearly harks
back  to  the  Scotist  insight  I  have  reiterated  throughout  this  paper.  But,
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according  to  this  interpretation,  it  should  silence—not  embolden—the
phenomenal realist. All I have done is tell a convincing story about how we
discern features, but since these are in fact bound together, my account gives us
no grounds to think qualia in the typical sense exist in their own right. So it
seems I have criticized Block; and indeed I have.
Unless one is prepared to hold the line that qualia are something  entirely
distinct or the (equally improbable) view that there is absolutely no way to even
notionally seize  upon  the  qualitative  dimension  subsumed  in  a  given
representation, then I think the semiotic account can be used pretty much to
everyone’s benefit. The categorial interrelations I outlined clearly allow those
who initially countenanced qualia to continue doing so—albeit in a modified,
less  provocative,  way.  On  this  reading,  the  type/token/tone  trichotomy
exonerates  their  chief  contention.  Mutatis  mutandis,  theorists  who  didn’t
countenance qualia can cite prescission to plausibly explain why the topic of
qualia has captured with a remarkable consensus the inter-subjective attention
of theorists. They can, that is, emphasize my critique of Block and read the
glass so that it becomes half empty.
Granted, my declared goal was to tug at the realist side of this dialectic so
as  to  prevent  the  grasp  of  a  qualitative  dimension  from  turning  on  the
hardboiled existence of some “thing” capable of being wholly independent. In
keeping with this critique, I have tried to show how prescission rescues sundry
98
intuitions about conscious life from castigation without appealing to any kind of
reification. Nevertheless, a welcomed by-product of this amendment is that it
makes  the  tone  more  palatable  to  theorists  who  reject  the  ontologies  often
promulgated alongside phenomenal qualia. Taken together, these changes have
the power to dislodge a long-standing clog in the flow of inquiry.
I.IX Chapter Conclusion
The notion of tone must recover its rightful place alongside the type and the
token if contemporary thought is to consummate its aspiration of escaping the
centripetal pull of Cartesian dualism. Although I can at best invite a concerted
rectification of  this  neglect  in  this  dissertation,  I  hope this  first  chapter  has
shown that resisting facile interpretations is not only sound from the standpoint
of  exegetic  fidelity,  it  offers  substantial  philosophic  benefits.  For  want  of
historical  sensitivity,  however, philosophy butchered an important distinction
which  involved  a  rationale  completely  foreign  to  the  canons  of  post-Latin
discourse. Indeed, the vocabulary of the parties to the present controversy over
qualia  and  Peirce’s  triadic  vocabulary  do  not  easily  match  up.  A  crucial
question for the former debate is: should we quantify over qualia? Block (and
Nagel)  think that  we should,  Dennett  (and others)  that  we should not.  That
discussion becomes totally warped when it is considered from the framework
(in  the Carnapian  sense)  of  Peircean  semiotics.  And of  course,  that’s  not  a
failing—it’s the whole point.
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Pursuant with this aim (and figure 2), I have not proposed a solution to a
problem as it stands. I have instead proposed a set of tools that allow us to
rethink certain fundamental assumptions so that that problem does not surface
as it does in the first place. Admittedly, the means elected to achieve this are in
many ways deceptively humble. But, like bending a tree in its infancy, it should
not require much if the positioning is  right.  After  looking at what has been
historically  and what  should be  logically,  I  have  previewed  what  could be;
forecasting in a programmatic way the fruitful impact prescission can have on
at least one aspect of the mind-body problem. If most of our theories have until
now been unable to adequately fathom the phenomenal dimension proper to
conscious  life  without  running  into  all  sorts  of  implausible  consequences,
perhaps this is because those theories have been trying to capture that object of
study with dichotomies fundamentally ill-suited to the task.  So at any rate I
argue.
This still leaves much work to be done. Given my concern with elucidating
the problematic status of “phenomenal-consciousness,” I have confined myself
mainly to Firstness, and have disregarded—as one can in prescission—the more
developed  categorial  grades  in  contradistinction  with  which  that  qualitative
dimension finds its meaning. As Peirce wrote: “Experience is the course of life.
The world is that which experience inculcates. Quality is the monadic element
of the world […]. But in saying this, we are straying from the domain of the
monad into that of the dyad” (1931–58, vol. 1, para. 426). Indeed, we prescind
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from the fabric of representation elementary vehicles we do not (and would not
want to) encounter in isolation. The tone may be a good fit for p-consciousness,
but  it  is  by no means  an explanatory panacea  for  consciousness  altogether.
Accordingly,  it  is  legitimate  to  try  and  elaborate  a  semiotic  account  of
consciousness far less static than the one I have presented. This will be my goal
in the next chapters. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to conceive such an
approach as rival and not complementary—a warning-post wisely planted by
Umberto Eco: “[T]he sign is the origin of the semiosic processes, and there is
no opposition between the ‘nomadism’ of semiosis (and of interpretive activity)
and the alleged  stiffness  and immobility of  the sign” (1986b,  p.  1;  see also
Lidov 1999, p. 104).
Just as nothing prevents us from folding our representational apparatus onto
itself so as to inspect its incipient substructure, so can we scrutinize from the
vantage  point  of the present  the historical  developments that  have led us to
where we are. The remaining chapters will explore the landscape of possibilities
which ensues when one decides to backtrack and incorporate the less heavy-
handed method of prescission. Should the gist of my suspicions vis-à-vis the
deep insufficiency of the type/token distinction prove correct, then adopting the
complete trichotomy might go a long way towards remedying some of the more
stubborn problems that have beset contemporary inquiries into consciousness. I




Referring to the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness:
Iconicity Instead of Indexicality
In reference to its object, this footprint is a perfect icon, although reversed
like the image of a person looking at himself in a mirror. But it is  at the
same time the index of a presence on the island, and not just any presence
[...]. The sign in itself has its own existence, an existence of a non-sign, one
might say, just as an ambassador, although representing his country, is what
he is in reference to himself [...].
Gérard Deledalle
Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs (2000, p. 105)
Peirce himself, like Leibniz, gave to the world only fragments of his system,
with the result that he has been very thoroughly misunderstood, not least by
those who professed to be his admirers. I am—I confess to my shame—an
illustration of the undue neglect from which Peirce has suffered in Europe.
Bertrand Russell, foreword to James Feibleman’s
Introduction to Peirce’s Philosophy Interpreted as a System (1946, p. XV)
II.I Chapter Introduction
You and your friend are sitting in a coffee shop when all of a sudden a stranger
walks in. “Oh my,” your friend whispers, “that man looks just like my father.”
Your friend’s father, whom you never met, died years ago in a fiery blaze that
destroyed all photos of him. Given this lack of causal exposure, it would seem
you can never know what your friend has in mind when she thinks of her father.
Yet, thanks to this look-alike, you now have a sense of what her mental state is
like. The two of you have managed this by means of an icon.
Given  the  privacy  that  allegedly  separates  conscious  minds,  such  a
promising  sign-exchange  is  certainly  worth  investigating  (perhaps  the  icon
cannot bear the weight of scepticism, but that is something to be argued for, not
taken  for  granted).  Unfortunately,  glancing  at  the  topics  covered  by  recent
books on consciousness, one rarely finds the term “Icon.” The term “Index,” by
contrast, abounds. That is strange, considering that both notions originated in
Peirce’s symbol/index/icon tripartition.
Although iconicity remains poorly understood, indexicality is arguably “one
of the best known features of Peirce’s theory of signs” (Atkin 2005, p. 161),
and so is now a staple of mainstream philosophical discourse (see for example
Perry 1997). In fact, indexicality has recently been invoked by philosophers of
mind  to  account  for  how  one  refers  to  qualitative  experiences.  The
neuroscientist  Mary  in  Frank  Jackson’s  (1982;  1986)  knowledge  argument
enjoys an experiential exposure that enriches her mastery of a fabric of symbols
(throughout  this  chapter,  I  shall  assume  prior  familiarity  with  Jackson’s
argument). Using a terminology introduced by Bertrand Russell (1910–11), we
can say that Mary in the cave can muster “descriptions,” but will lack a more
intimate  “acquaintance”  until  and  unless  she  undergoes  those  experiences
forbidden to her (Bigelow and Pargetter 2004). By directing one’s attention at a
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specific  time  and  place,  an  index  can  broker  acquaintance.  The  recent
suggestion  is  that,  when Mary exits  her  confines,  she will  refer  to her  new
experience as “this” feeling (Perry 2001, pp. 97, 146).
I  agree  that  “[s]ome  kinds  of  knowledge  require  distinctive  forms  of
engagement between the knower and the known” (Bigelow and Pargetter 2004,
p. 194). Judged by that standard, indices indeed bring us closer to their referents
than symbols do. However, I think the standard roster of options is too coarse,
since according to the sign theory developed by Peirce, there are three ways one
can refer  to objects:  by description,  acquaintance,  and  shared quality.  I  will
argue that knower and known are at their closest when they share a common
quality, and that this is what would have to be involved in successful reference
to phenomenality.
Indeed, this chapter aims to show that reference to phenomenal qualities is
best understood as involving iconicity, that is, a passage from sign-vehicle to
object that exploits a similarity between the two. This contrasts with a version
of  the  “phenomenal  concept  strategy”  that  takes  indexicality  to  be  central.
However, since it is doubtful that phenomenal qualities are capable of causally
interacting  with  anything,  indexical  reference  seems  inappropriate.  While  a
theorist  like  David  Papineau  is  independently  coming  to  something akin  to
iconicity, I think some of the awkwardness that plagues his account would be
remedied by transitioning to a more inclusive philosophy of signs.
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My argumentative journey will start on familiar soil, methodically venture
into semiotic terrain, and then return to the point of departure to see how the
new ideas can shed light on recalcitrant issues. I will begin by looking at the
phenomenal  concept  strategy,  specifically  those  versions  that  appeal  to
indexicality in order to account for reference to qualia. I will then look at how
philosophy of signs in the Peircean tradition countenances a neglected mode of
reference which, unlike the actual exposure required by indexicality, turns on a
shared  quality.  In  order  to  show that  there  is  a  need for  this  notion,  I  will
discuss  the  work  of  David  Papineau,  whose  recent  views  gravitate  towards
something close to the icon. Finally,  using the ideas laid down in the earlier
sections, I will try to reformulate in a more explicit way Papineau’s claim that,
in order to refer to phenomenal qualities, those very qualities would have to be
“included in” the concept employed.
II.II The Indexical Phenomenal Concept Strategy
The “phenomenal concept strategy” (the expression comes from Stoljar 2005)
is an attempt to preserve physicalist  commitments while accounting for why
there  appears  to  be  a  “gap”  when  it  comes  to  explaining  the  qualitative
dimension of consciousness (Levine 1983). The general idea is that, since we
have special  concepts  to  pick  out  conscious  states,  whatever  difficulties  we
have fitting consciousness  into  a  naturalist  picture may owe to  the  peculiar
nature of those concepts. The strategy thus caters to what Chalmers (1996, pp.
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165–168) calls “type-B” materialists, that is, those who accept that there is an
epistemic  gap  between  the  physical  and  the  phenomenal  but  who  deny  an
ontological gap (I will say more about Chalmers’ letter-based classification in
section  IV.V). Although there are several variants of the phenomenal concept
strategy currently vying for adoption (see Balog 2009), this chapter will focus
on stances that call upon the notion of an index.
Indexicality is usually taken to be the direct  mode of reference whereby
language comes into contact with whatever it denotes. Before it got enlisted in
debates about consciousness, indexicality was introduced to a wide audience by
John Perry, whose original intent was to challenge the view that propositions
“have a truth-value in an absolute sense, as opposed to merely being true for a
person or at a time” (1979, p. 6; see also his 1977). Perry looked to indexicality
as  a  means  of  pinning  propositional  attitudes  down  to  the  world,  thereby
permitting  a  better  treatment  of  some difficult  cases.  The  idea  of  indexing
meanings  to  contextual  circumstances  is  less  controversial  than  the  idea  of
indexing truth-values (compare Blome-Tillmann 2008 with MacFarlane 2014).
In  philosophy of  language  though,  Perry’s proposal  has  become a common
place. We use some words like “this” in specific contexts, and these contexts
fix what (in the world) those words point to (Kim 2010).
Given Perry’s preoccupation, indices came to be seen as linguistic devices
“about where one is, when it is, and who one is” (Perry 1979, p. 5). According
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to John O’Dea, this explains the intuitive force of thought-experiments like the
inverted  spectrum  (Shoemaker  1982).  O’Dea  argues,  for  instance,  that  a
disagreement between an Earthling and a Martian about what each would mean
by “I am in pain” would be “tantamount to a disagreement over whether Earth
is here or Mars is here” (2002, p. 180). O’Dea surmises that “[t]he irreducibility
of sensory terms [...] may be nothing more than a straightforward consequence
of  their  indexicality”  (2002,  p.  175).  Context-specificity  is  thus  invoked  to
explain (away?) talk of conscious states. “If this is right, then we may not have
a straightforward physical explanation of consciousness, but we have the next
best  thing:  a  physical  explanation  of  why  we  find  an  explanatory  gap”
(Chalmers 2007, p. 167).
This  indexical  account  thus  strikes  a  bargain  with  scepticism:  one  can
successfully refer to, say,  the fact that one is now enjoying an experience of
green, but the sign one uses to achieve this act of public reference cannot reach
all the way to the qualitative feel of the experience. O’Dea illustrates this as
follows:
Figure 3   The alleged incommunicability of qualitative experience
(Taken from O’Dea 2002, p. 177)
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This depiction seems to recapitulate, rather than solve, the “hard” problem of
consciousness  (Chalmers  1996,  p.  205).  Since  qualia  are  not  captured  by
causality and since indexicality works precisely by exploiting causality, qualia
are not captured by indexicality. This means that the qualitative dimension of
consciousness cannot truly affect  or be affected by discourse.  On the further
assumption—mistaken,  as  I  hope  to  show—that  indexicality  is  our  ultimate
means of reference, the privacy of qualia follows.
Tenets in the philosophy of language thereby constrain what can be hoped
for in epistemology: if meaning is always anchored to an utterer, then one can
at best “believe”—not “know”—the claims others make about what it’s like to
undergo a given conscious experience.  Therefore,  when prompted to convey
how something feels,  the convergence of two persons’  verbal  reports and/or
behavioural  responses remains  inconclusive. People of course remain free to
discuss how they feel, but they cannot really discuss how they feel. My goal in
this  chapter  is  to  find  a  principled  way to  eradicate  this  second  clause—to
genuinely capture the experiential feel of “X” or “Y” in O’Dea’s illustration (I
insist on “principled” so as to exclude dismissals that dodge or miss the issue,
like Baars 1997).
Some (e.g., Daddesio 1995, p. 111) have taken gestures like pointing to be
different from an index because,  unlike a windmill moved by wind, a finger
does  not  necessarily  have  to  touch  what  it  refers  to.  This  is  not  a  helpful
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distinction. To use an index, one has to place the sign-vehicle in the vicinity of
the  relevant  object.  Such  vicinity,  however,  should  not  be  construed  too
literally. One can point to Alpha Centauri in the night sky; but one has to aim at
a specific location if one wants to aid/elicit a specific interpretation. The fact
that  spatial  coordinates  matter  in  fixing  the  reference  shows  that,  even  if
distance  is  not  an  issue,  causal  considerations  are  essential  to  explaining
why/how  anything  could  be  non-arbitrarily  “sensitive”  to  a  context  (for  an
advanced discussion of these issues, see West 2012).
While appealing to indexicality is not irrelevant, it does not seem to get the
reference  in  question  quite  right,  at  least  when  it  comes  to  qualities.  Upon
emerging, Mary will surely want to convey the qualitative character she has just
discovered. When Mary points to, say, a red rose and proclaims that “So this is
what was meant by red,” she cannot mean that particular flower, then and there.
Were this what she meant, one could destroy the colour red once and for all
simply by burning the flower. Hence, seeing how  “indexicality is now pretty
much a given in mainstream analytic philosophy, formal semantics has accreted
some  epicycles”  (Legg  2008,  p.  210).  In  an  attempt  to  surmount  the
insufficiency of indices when it comes to consciousness, some have grafted the
(much used but incomplete)  type/token distinction onto indexicality to  yield
what Brian Loar (1997, p. 597) calls a “type-demonstrative,” that is, a context-
specific gesture and/or utterance by which a subject somehow manages to refer
to “That type of sensation” (see also Levin 2007, pp. 88–89). Alas, I do not
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think this finessing succeeds. It makes perfect sense that one should be able to
point to tokens, since these supply the presence needed for indices to do their
referential  business. But types? If  “type-demonstratives” were truly possible,
one could literally see generality. Surely, one can see instances of a law, kind,
or habit—but not the law, kind, or habit itself.
This ability to “see”  types  is  supposedly achieved  by “thick” perception
(Masrour 2011). Of course, once an agent realizes that what she perceived was
a token of a type, she can become convinced that she somehow “saw” the type.
That, however, would be an embellishment of hindsight. Given that the stream
of consciousness flows in a linear fashion, one way to test claims about so-
called “thickness” would be to require a subject to ascertain—before any other
tokens are experienced—whether there are in fact such other tokens. Clearly, a
subject looking at a painting cannot tell,  just by looking,  whether it has ever
been copied or mass produced. Rather than arguing that kind properties are only
sometimes represented in experience, it seems more judicious to say that, when
perceiving a single token, the most a subject is perceptually (and intellectually)
entitled to answer is that a) it exists and b) another token like it  could exist.
Talk  of  “recognitional  dispositions” (Siegel  2011,  p.  100) captures  this,  but
conflating the modal strength of (b) with the actuality of (a) would constitute a
reification. Loar asserts that “type-demonstratives” are “recognitional concepts”
which, despite their recognitional status, “need involve no reference to a past
instance,”  such  that  “[y]ou  can  forget  particular  instances  and  still  judge
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‘another one of those’” (1997, p. 601). If  one can do without past instances,
what is the relatum in the judgement “another one of those”? That is a bit like
saying that a sibling has no sibling(s).
The standard analysis (from Aristotle to Kant to Frege) breaks “This gerbil”
down into three components, insofar as a particular gets identified as a member
or instance of a kind or universal by an act of judgement (see Peirce 1931–58,
vol. 1, para. 485). It was a tangible advance of twentieth-century philosophy of
language  (Kaplan  1989;  Perry 1979)  to  stress  that,  irrespective  of  how one
glosses the ontological status of universals or the epistemological workings of
judgement, context of use would have to be involved in securing reference to a
particular. Capitalizing on the well-deserved reputation of that account, “type-
demonstratives” (and “thick perceptions”) simply repeat this story to explain
reference to (or perception of) universality.  This implausibly outstretches the
resources of indexicality.
If one wants to refer to “Gerbilhood” by means of a situated sign-vehicle
like “This,” then, given the generality of the intended target, there should be no
reason to prefer one particular gerbil over another. Yet, since in the end not all
gerbils will be pointed to, it may rightfully be asked: why this one? The only
sensible answer seems to be because it is in the vicinity of the utterer (needless
to say,  uttering “This” with no gerbils present would not accomplish much).
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The claim that demonstratives pick out tokens is therefore less contentious than
the claim that demonstratives can somehow pick out types.
Note that “inscrutability” with regards to pinpointing exact referents does
not alter the fact that indexicality works by and on tokens, not types. It may not
be obvious what to look for upon hearing “Look there!,” but it is obvious that to
find out one has to scan the nearby environment for a particular object or event
and that any universal that might be intended by the demonstrative would be
gleaned only via that particular object or event. If, say, your friend points to a
stranger  who just  walked in a  crowded coffee  shop,  you  might  conceivably
have some difficulty pinpointing who your  friend intends;  but  that  does  not
license you to roam the whole city looking for the person she meant.
There is plenty of room in my account for fallibility in interpretation (Eco
1988).  However,  semiotic  theory  does  not  support  the  skeptical  leap  from
fallibility to impotence.  Whatever  correctives  constrain interpretations  in the
long run (if, that is, dialogue and inquiry unfold) are discrete and immanent—
which is just to say that grasping laws, kinds, or habits requires observation and
experience (even though exposure to the world is by no means the end of the
story).
In one of his more cavalier moments, Russell held that “It is obvious… that
we are acquainted with such universals as white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud,
hard,  etc.,  i.e.,  with  qualities  which  are  exemplified  in  sense-data”  ([1912]
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1997,  p.  101).  Taking  Russell  at  his  word,  if  one  is  in  contact  with  an
“exemplification,” is it not a slide to construe this as contact with a universal?
Russell  added: “When we see a white patch,  we are acquainted,  in the first
instance, with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily
learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in learning
to do this we are learning to be acquainted with whiteness” ([1912] 1997, p.
101). Again, if learning and rational intervention is needed to get at the targeted
quality, how can this still count as acquaintance, which is defined as a “direct”
mode of knowledge  (Russell 1910–11, p. 108)? If  one were truly capable of
being acquainted with universals,  these should simply present  themselves  to
one, with no intervening particular(s). Needless to say, a subject-to-type access
differs greatly from a (more plausible) subject-to-token-to-type access. Russell
promises us the former but delivers only the latter. Chalmers (2003, p. 233)
expresses similar worries about Russell’s stance. Perry (2001, pp. 97, 140) is a
proponent of the indexical phenomenal concept strategy who recognizes that
knowledge of a type must pass via knowledge of its tokens (although he does
not say much about how that passage happens).
Mary may not be entitled to point to a particular rose and say that “This” is
what red is, but she can certainly use the same index to sustain the claim that
“This” is  what  red  is  like.  Hence,  picking out  particular  instances  is  by no
means a negligible service, since it is part of what has to happen if one is to
grasp  a  likeness.  Yet,  if  on  full  consideration  we  must  acknowledge  that
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thought, comparison, and other deliberate intellectual interventions are needed,
then these interventions need to figure in the official account. Merely pointing
does not suffice.
One might reply that it is a matter of coming across the “right” exemplar.
After all, if—in keeping with Peirce’s account of abduction (Houser 2005)—the
initial stage of establishing a sign-vehicle’s referent is (and cannot help but be)
a surmise,  then there is  no reason why that  surmise could not benefit  from
beginner’s luck. If so, then the burden would be on the advocate of referential
serendipity to explain why, in the vast majority of cases, we do not grasp types
via a single token. In any event, confirmation that one indeed guessed a type
right from the get-go can be revealed only by further action/experience, so one
cannot “forget particular instances and still judge ‘another one of those’” (Loar
1997, p. 601).
Ideally,  a  story  of  how  one  refers  to  the  qualitative  dimension  of
consciousness should be such that whatever post-emergence Mary does or uses
to refer to her novel colour experience(s) is not something she could have done
or used in  her  pre-emergence  condition,  otherwise Mary would not need  to
emerge. Symbols clearly do not live up to this demand, since prior to seeing red
Mary  can  competently  employ  the  word  “red”  found  in  her  textbooks  (the
adjective “competently” is warranted because Mary can draw more red-based
inferences than most lay persons). Therefore, with a twofold menu of symbols
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and  indices,  all  hope  must  be  placed  on the latter  option.  Interestingly,  the
indices favoured by many phenomenal concept strategists do not fare any better
than symbols. Indeed, if one were to ask pre-emergence Mary what she means
by the word “red,” she could very well point to a diagram of the appropriate
wavelength and answer “This one now.”
Of course, we as outsiders are privy to the fact that Mary has brought the
context-sensitive sign-vehicles “this” and “now” in the vicinity of an object ill-
suited to truly convey what red “is like.” But—and this is crucial—nothing in
the indexical account permits us to regard her gesture as a blunder. This shows
that  another  mode of  reference  is  needed.  I thus  agree  that  “in  order  to  be
successful, the Phenomenal Concept Strategy needs [...] to explain how these
concepts afford us a rich and substantial grasp of their referents” (Schroer 2010,
pp. 509–510).
In contrast with indices, icons work only if (and only because) the qualities
match. What matters in iconicity is not that the sign-vehicle is  near its object
but rather that the sign-vehicle is  like its object.  Hence, if nothing in Mary’s
room is coloured, nothing in that room can be used to refer to colours. To be
sure,  the  confines  of  pre-emergence  Mary  are  filled  with  other  icons.  One
pencil, for example, might resemble another pencil, and could thus be used to
iconically  refer  to  the  other  (and  vice  versa).  Alas,  familiarity  with  office
supplies is not what is at stake, so emergence from the cave is needed for the
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relevant  colour  icons  to  become possible.  Mary’s eventual  exit  is  therefore
doubly enriching: not only does she get to experience something new, she also
gains access to the various sign-vehicles capable of conveying the quality at
hand. As we shall see, this is because in iconicity sign-vehicle and object are
one and the same.
We saw in the first chapter that the type/token distinction was originally
meant  to  be  threefold  and  include  the  neglected  notion  of  tone (Lachs  and
Talisse 2008, p. 777). As a first approximation, the referential relation I will
champion could be characterized as a “tone-demonstrative”: a sign-vehicle that
refers to an object by sharing a common quality with that object. Of course, the
very fact  that  a  similarity is  apprehended  attests  to  the presence  of  two (or
more) tokens brought together by an interpretation. Hence, whenever an icon
actualizes its power to resemble something, it automatically becomes an index.
In  this  sense,  whatever  qualitative  unity  there  is  can  be  evinced  only  by
prescission. Still, as I hope to show, such an analysis suffices to establish that
only icons could refer to qualia.
In order to preview how these ideas can contribute to current debates, let us
look briefly at the argument which led  Frank Jackson ([1998] 2004; 2004) to
abandon the conclusions he once drew from his famous thought-experiment.
Robinson (2008, p. 224) renders Jackson’s rationale as follows:
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1. Reference to any x involves causal influence from x to the referential act.
2. If x is epiphenomenal then it has no causal influence on anything,
    so a fortiori, not on any referential act.
Therefore,
3. If x is epiphenomenal then it is something to which we cannot refer.
Therefore,
4. If qualia are epiphenomenal then they cannot be objects of reference.
5. Qualia (if they exist) are what we refer to by using our
    phenomenal concepts.
Therefore,
6. If qualia exist and are epiphenomenal then they can and cannot be objects
    of reference.
Therefore,
7. Epiphenomenalism about qualia is incoherent.
The claim that  “Reference  to any  x involves causal  influence  from  x to the
referential  act”  obviously does  not  apply to  symbolic  description.  However,
Jackson  insists  (with  Russell)  that  true  descriptions  must  be  reducible  to
acquaintances.  As  Jackson  puts  it,  “[o]ur  knowledge  of  the sensory side  of
psychology  has  a  causal  source,”  such  that  when  making  claims  all  “our
entitlement comes back to causal impacts of the right kinds” ([1998] 2004, p.
418).
Robinson believes the above argument is sound. I disagree; it is valid but
unsound. Indeed, I contend that premise (1) is false, since there exists a mode of
reference  which,  though not  mind-dependent  like symbols,  does  not  rest  on
causality.
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Premise  (1)  is  pivotal  to  what  has  been  called  the  “meaning objection”
(Robinson 2012). Gilberto Gomes gave a canonical formulation of what is at
stake: “But how can we refer to [our experience of red] if, by assumption, it
cannot have any causal effect on our thought?” (2005, p. 78). In this chapter, I
will answer: by means of an icon. Once we incorporate iconic reference in our
overall picture, the terms of the debate shift: working out the logic, (3) and (4)
become false, so (6) and (7) no longer follow.
II.III Removing Relations
In a survey of debates about consciousness, Paul Livingston identifies Charles
Sanders Peirce as the earliest English-speaking philosopher to have used the
term  qualia.  Livingston  remarks  that,  “[f]or  Peirce,  qualia  (often  used  as
cognate to ‘qualities’) were already the most basic constituents of the totality of
sensory  experience,  the  ground  of  what  he  called  Firstness  or  immediacy”
(2004, p. 6). Peirce was primarily interested in studying how signs work (Savan
1987) and  all  that  this  action  of  signs  presupposes  (Deely  1990),  and  his
analyses  shed  direct  light  on  the  topic  of  phenomenal  qualities.  The
foundational  insight of Peirce’s inquiry (rooted in medieval  sign theory;  see
Beuchot and Deely 1995) is that if any sign is truly to act as a sign, it must be a
triadic  compound  of  sign-vehicle,  object,  and  interpretation  (Fisch  1983).
Qualia, as escapees of functionalist reduction, are held to be nonrelational. This
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might seem like it poses a problem. However, there is one sort of sign—the
icon—that does not depend on causal interaction or inference.
Some think that “[i]f qualia represent then it is plausible that they represent
non-conceptually.  That is, they do not have language-like structure but rather
are  akin  to  pictures  [...]”  (Balog  2009,  p.  296).  The  semiotic  class  of  icon
includes images and much else besides. A perfume, for example, is an icon,
even though in resembling the smell of, say, lavender, it is in no way pictorial.
Still, for better or for worse, the image has become a paradigmatic exemplar of
iconicity that continues to inform much theorizing. Jesse Prinz (2002, pp. 25–
32), for example, speaks of “imagism” in the cognitive sciences. The virtue of
focusing on the technical notion of icon is that it compels us to bear in mind
that  these  signs  are  defined in  virtue of  the sort of  referential  relation they
sustain:  to  bear  an iconic  relation  is  to  guide  interpretation  by exploiting a
qualitative bond that would exist regardless of whether another (similar) object
or interpretation was present. To give two succinct illustrations, a cough that
would sound like the word “Attack!” would still resemble that command, and a
morphological  “homoplasy”  between  species  lacking  a  common  ancestry
(Kleisner and Stella 2009) could dupe a predator into attacking the wrong prey.
In both cases, even in the absence of intention and causality, interpretation—
which in semiotics is not the sole preserve of humans (Sebeok 2003)—could
very  much  capitalize  on  the  shared  quality  to  take  one  thing  to  stand  for
something else.
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It is imperative to the evolutionary success of camouflage that the likeness
of,  say,  an insect  with a  leaf,  truly be a mind-independent likeness and not
merely  a  wilful  association  (Maran  2003;  Sebeok  1976,  pp.  1440–1441;
Sonesson  2010,  pp.  50–53).  Despite  helping herself  to  the  term “icon”  and
purporting to develop “A General Theory of Signs,” Ruth Millikan (1984, pp.
83–158) does everything she can to avoid countenancing such real similarities.
Despite his laudable inquiry into the varieties of reference, Gareth Evans is also
hesitant  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  mind-independent  similarities,  and
accepts that one thing could resemble another only “if it strikes people as like
that other thing” ([1982] 2002, p. 292). Analyses of similarity “anchored in the
reactions  they  occasion  in  people”  (Evans  [1982]  2002,  p.  294)  have  been
amply explored—even by semioticians like Charles Morris (1971), Millikan’s
teacher.  However,  such  behavioural  approaches  leave  unanswered  (or  rather
unasked) why these reactions occur in the first place. Resemblance is mind-
dependent  in  the sense  that  there  must  be  an  organism with  an  appropriate
sensory system to deem one experience to be similar to another experience. The
Peircean account I promote has plenty of room for the effects which icons can
have  on  such  organisms.  Still,  it  regards  those  interpretants  as  effects,  not
causes, of underlying similarities.
In a rare pedagogic moment, Peirce (1998, pp. 170–171, 425–427) likened
the relation involved in the action of signs to “giving,” insofar as the very idea
commits one to countenancing not only 1) that which is given, but also 2) that
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to  which it  is  given and 3)  that  which gives.  This example was later  made
popular by Russell ([1918] 1985, p. 59), who picked it up from Josiah Royce—
that friend and intellectual  student of  Peirce (see  Fisch  1986,  p.  326;  Brent
1998, p. 329) who, “[f]or some reason” that Russell could not discern, “always
liked triadic relations” (Russell [1918] 1985, p. 68). As we will see, it is unclear
whether Russell really understood the Peircean emphasis on triadicity. In any
event, like “giving,” the passage at play in a sign cannot be reduced to pairs, so
the point is that nothing below three places will do.
Keeping  speculation to  a  minimum, we  can  thus  conclude  this  much:  a
universe containing only one or two things could contain neither signs nor gifts.
William Seager notes that “[o]ne of the core intuitions about intrinsic properties
is that they are the properties that things have ‘in themselves,’ the properties
that something would retain even if it was the only thing in the universe” (2006,
p. 141). This concurs with the semiotic account I am advocating in stressing the
logical separability of any relatum from a relation. That said, Seager diverges
from  my  account  in  assuming  that  this  is  somehow  unique  or  limited  to
phenomenal consciousness. Although I focus on consciousness, the prescissive
move  can  be  performed  on  anything,  which  is  why  labeling  its  results
“panpsychist” would only be half true (I will develop this more fully in the
fourth chapter).
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Although semiotic inquiry has something informative to say about mental
life,  its  observations  about  quality  do  not  call  or  depend  on  introspection
(Delaney 1979). Peirce explained the approach as follows: “We must begin by
getting diagrammatic notions of signs from which we strip away, at first, all
reference to the mind; and after we have made those ideas just as distinct as our
notion of a prime number or of an oval line, we may then consider, if need be,
what are the peculiar characteristics of a mental sign [...]” (quoted in Colapietro
1989, p. 44). The basic categories used in a semiotic analysis of consciousness
can be demonstrated by almost geometric means (Deledalle 2000, p. 15):
There are three categories, no less and no more. Let us suppose that the
world is a unique sheet of assertion [a technical expression borrowed from
Peirce’s graphical logic; see Shin 2002]. Let us call it “1.” What can we say
of “1”? Nothing—and, of course, as it is “unique,” nobody is there to say
anything. So to speak, “1” is not even there. It is not “something,” and it is
not  “nothing,”  unless  as  non-being,  in  the  Aristotelian  sense  of  sheer
“possibility.” To conceive of “1,” “1” has to have a limit and consequently
we  cannot  have  “1”  without  a  “2”  which  delimits  “1”  on  the  sheet  of
assertion:
“1” can only exist in a pair. But, as Peirce [1992, p. 251] points out, “it is
impossible to form a genuine three by any modification of the pair, without
introducing something of a different nature from the unit and the pair.”
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In other words, to have a pair (1, 2) one needs a “3” which mediates
between “1” and “2”:
Figure 4   Depiction of the three semiotic categories
(Taken from Deledalle 2000, p. 15)
To make the most of the above diagram, a couple of notational reflexes need to
be  avoided.  First,  the  fact  that  “2”  is  in  the  middle  does  not  mean  that  it
“mediates” between “1” and “3.” Rather, the idea is to place “2” right at the
very border delineating “1” so as to mark the delineation as such (irrespective
of whether it is interpreted). Likewise, the line before “3” is not to be taken as a
“minus” sign. Rather, the idea is to set “3” apart from “1” and “2” in order to
emphasize that “3” is whatever would recognize the alterity or contrast for what
it is.
Like Euler and Venn, Peirce explored the potential of images in rendering
proofs  more  parsimonious and perspicacious  (see  Shin 2002).  As a logician
trying out different graphical calculi, Peirce made meticulous observations of
what happens when minds use such signs to reason (see the extended quote in
Stjernfelt  2007,  pp.  93–94).  What,  Peirce  asked,  remains  of  a  diagrammed
circle once its boundary is removed? In other words, what happens when we let
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a  qualitative  content  spread  out  without  obstruction?  In  a  philosophically
radical move, Peirce insisted that, whatever the proof, diagrammatic reasoning
must start by countenancing a blank sheet.  This is Firstness:  an expanse that
awaits further specification.
Peirce did this in logic, but his commitment to the blank sheet is so basic
that it applies also to philosophy of mind. As James notes, when considering a
white paper  without any contrasts,  there is  “no ‘pointing,’  but  rather  an all-
round embracing of the paper by the thought” ([1906] 1975, p. 31; reprinted in
James 1977, p. 156). Such possibility is the canvas of all eventual sign-action.
Peirce held that, however bizarre, we have no basis for denying this modal pre-
condition:  “That which underlies a phenomenon and determines it, thereby is,
itself, in a measure,  a phenomenon” (1998, p. 2).  Everything that  is asserted
can be asserted; everything that is thought can be thought. This is the common
ground which arguing parties must accept if their disagreement is ever to be
resolved (see Peirce 1931–58, vol. 4, para. 431; as well as Pietarinen 2006, p.
60).
Of course,  every sheet  of paper I have ever encountered has a rim. This
applies to all experience; factually, we do not encounter a quality isolated from
all others. In keeping with the pragmatist account of inquiry, we always begin
mid-way.  So, judged by induction alone,  what Peirce says about Firstness is
false. Yet, if one goes in the opposite direction, by deduction, the claim that
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such facts can be decomposed in the abstract seems to me undeniable. Take a
string of qualitative experience, grant that those qualities come to us conjoined,
then apply the simplification inference rule, which licenses one to consider any
single conjunct on its own. That, in essence, is prescission. It shows that, if an
articulate musical symphony is possible, then so must an “eternally sounding
and unvarying railway whistle” (Peirce 1931–58, vol. 1, para. 305). One cannot,
however, infer a complex symphony from a simple sound. “Prescission is not a
reciprocal process” (Peirce 1992, p. 3).
When  we  use  the  three  categories—which  Peirce  called  Firstness,
Secondness,  and  Thirdness—to  analyse  semiosis,  we  gather  that  an  object
referred to occupies the role of “2,” since it must be something which the sign-
vehicle  (“1”)  is  not  (actually,  at  this  level  of  analysis,  the  labels  are
interchangeable,  insofar  as  symmetrical  difference  is  really  what  matters).
Interpretation is what links the two. What this “3” consists in is left unspecified.
This  third  element,  which Peirce  called  the  “interpretant,” can  of  course be
glossed as some mental act which apprehends the brute relation between “1”
and “2.”  The categories  themselves  are  noncommittal.  Yet,  since “3”  is  not
nothing, an interpretant has the potential to figure as a vehicle in a further sign,
so the whole machinery can be applied over and over.
The term “interpretant” is not a fuzzy lay term, but a rigorously defined
term-of-art of semiotic theory. An interpretant is not an interpreter. Even so, as
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shown  by  the  common  etymology,  the  notion  of  an  interpretant  is  not
completely alien from that of an intepreter.
Now, the conception that Peirce takes to be the ordinary, unreflected idea of
sign and sign-process is that the activity of signs [...] involves an utterer and
an interpreter.  Such a view may seem to be almost  opposite to Peirce’s
generalized conceptions of sign and semiosis. But, in fact, Peirce considers
this crude idea to contain the seed of truth. (Bergman 2003, p. 11)
As a logician, Peirce looked at everyday interpreters and was able to discern a
very  specific  relation:  “Such  a  mediating  representation  may  be  termed  an
interpretant,  because  it  fulfils  the  office  of  an  interpreter,  who says  that  a
foreigner says the same thing which he himself says” (Peirce 1992, p. 5; final
emphasis added).
Consider a United Nations interpreter. Unless that function is replaced by a
software, we are clearly dealing with a regular person, liver and all. However,
the role that this person plays is not visible in the same sense as the person is.
Imagine that the bilingual U.N. interpreter is paid to mediate between French
and  English  diplomats.  The  French  diplomat  speaks  in  French,  then  the
interpreter (having listened) speaks in English. The constraints governing the
utterances of the bilingual interpreter are very different from those governing
the  French  diplomat,  who  is  pretty  much  free  to  say  whatever  she  deems
appropriate. The bilingual interpreter does not have that leeway. Of course, that
paid  worker  could  temporarily  suspend  her  vocation  and  say  whatever  she
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wants to her English interlocutor. Were she to do this, though, she would no
longer be linking her signs to the French utterances in a way that would entitle
the former to count as interpretations of the latter. The U.N. worker is a sign-
like conveyor of information only if,  among the many (Chomsky would say
infinite) things she could say, she says a specific subset that reflects the French
diplomat’s own choices. In this way, “differences that make a difference” (in
Gregory Bateson’s sense) are passed on.
The business of a philosopher of signs is to track the role-switching in the
above story. Semiosis is a chain where “the last terms in the series represent the
first by the mediation of the middle terms” (Deely 1990, p. 87). Semiotics can
track  subpersonal  processes  because  it  construes  semiosis  as  an  impersonal
process. We see, then, how the notion of interpretant used in Peircean semiotics
differs  from the common or  lay notion of interpreter. It  “is  why Peirce  can
without circularity define thinking, and hence mind, in terms of semeiosis, or
sign-action,”  since  “a  potential  interpretive  activity  is  presupposed  by  the
concept of signhood, but the subject of that activity is left undefined, except in
so far as it is precisely the subject of an interpretive activity” (Skagestad 2004,
p. 245).  Although the role of interpretant is similar to that of the interpreter
who acts as a “middle-man” between two parties (Savan 1987, pp. 43–48), it is
being in the middle that counts, not being a man.
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Peirce stressed that actual reference arises only when things are involved in
triadic relations, so icons and indices always need to be interpreted. Yet, he also
stressed that because any relation is complex (having more than one relata),
there ought to be no principled impediment to conceiving whatever simplicity a
triad subsumes.  Sign-vehicles do not always signify in virtue of their  hic et
nunc existence as tokens. When a sign-vehicle reaches its object in virtue of a
shared  quality,  it  is  that  quality  (and  nothing else)  that  is  acting  as  a  sign.
Looking at the image above (figure 4), iconicity exploits the quality of “1” and
indexicality exploits the contact in “2.” 
So, one must always make sure to ask: in what respect is something being
used as a sign? It is not as if the question can be answered once and for all. For
instance, if a lime is used to signify a golf ball, then what matters is the shared
spherical character. If the same lime is used to signify a blade of grass, then
what matters is the shared green colour. Figuring out what is the pivot of sign-
action is a task that must be done afresh with every case. A lime is a complex
and  multifaceted  thing,  so  if  that  fruit  is  employed  in  semiosis,  it  has  the
potential to be used in a myriad of ways. It would therefore be a mistake to try
and count all the ways in which a neatly-circumscribed thing in the world can
act as a sign. A far better approach is to wait for the sign-action to occur and
then  ask  what  channel  it  employed.  After  all,  a  lime  can  also  partake  in
symbolic  semiosis,  and  thus  be  assigned  a  meaning  which  it  in  no  way
possesses  naturally.  That  green  fruit  (understood as  a  type)  can be taken to
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stand for justice, for example. The metallic limes on police badges in such a
community of concerted symbol users would act as icons of real limes, which
in  turn  would  act  as  symbols  of  justice.  Mind-independent  relations  can
therefore pass the interpretive baton to mind-dependent relations and vice versa.
Signs  can  act  in  extremely  complicated  ways,  so  the  aim  of  a  well-
conducted  semiotic  inquiry  is  to  give  a  perspicacious  (non-reductive)
description of what happens, tracking what is doing what and how. The roles
that  can  be  played  in  the  triadic  sign  relation  are  sign-vehicle,  object,  and
interpretant.  A sign-vehicle can support  a link to an object  in  virtue of  that
vehicle’s quality,  actual  occurrence in space and time, or regular recurrence.
Considered as tone, a sign-vehicle can only signify by sharing that quality with
its  object.  Considered  as  token, a  sign-vehicle  can  causally  interact  with its
object. Considered as type, a sign-vehicle can support conventional or arbitrary
associations.
A  quality,  on  Peirce’s  ordinal  analysis,  does  not  presuppose  anything
besides itself. So, while it is useful to remind ourselves of just how complicated
things get  in the real  world, the only tones which interest  me are those that
figure as icons, whatever those are. If what is of interest in a lime is the fact that
it is green, then the fact that it is spherical must, along with the identification of
the lime as that sort of fruit, be dropped.
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“Prescission” is the technical name given to this operation of attending to
some elements and deliberately neglecting others (see Deledalle 2000, pp. 5–6,
156–157; Houser 2010, pp. 95–96; Stjernfelt 2007, pp. 246–255).  Unlike the
invitation to conceive of “zombies,” prescission does not subtract qualia from a
person, but rather a person (and everything else) from a quale.  The Peircean
account  does  not  seem  to  belong  to  any  of  the  five  argumentative  routes
favoured  by  Chalmers  (1996,  pp.  94–106)  to  motivate  the  project  of  non-
reductive explanation.
Appeals to conceivability have come under attack (Yablo 1993), especially
in philosophy of mind (e.g., Hill and McLaughlin 1999; Sommers 2002). Some
may thus be uncomfortable with the idea of countenancing something that is
not  (and  could  never  be)  encountered  were  it  not  for  abstract  reasoning.
Minimally, any consistent philosophy of signs must acknowledge the reality of
relations (Bains 2006), since it studies something defined by its ability to relate
things. The question, then, is whether there is any way to both admit the idea of
a relation and deny the idea of a relatum. Peirce did not think this conjunction is
coherent, and neither do I, even if the quality that results can seem strange. As
Peirce put it: “Logic teaches us to expect some residue of dreaminess in the
world [...]” (1931–58, vol. 4, para. 79).
Since  anytime  one  encounters  a  sign  one  perforce  encounters  a  full
relational  triad,  the isolation of  a  quality  only makes  sense  if  it  involves  a
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distinction that is “more than nominal but less than real” (to use the medieval
saying).  For example,  every triangle is trilateral,  but while neither  sides nor
angles  can  be  present  without  each  other,  we do  distinguish  them (and  not
arbitrarily  so).  Likewise,  an  object  and  an  interpretant  are  always  present
alongside any sign-vehicle. I thus accept that consciousness cannot be factually
separated from functional involvement (Cohen and Dennett 2011; Churchland
2011). Nevertheless, I believe there are weaker grades of separation one can
make. To be sure, this exposes one to the threat of reification. Still, there is no
way to understand how iconicity works without employing prescission.
In  a  prominent  collection  of  essays  on  consciousness,  James  H.  Fetzer
claims that “systems are conscious when they have the ability to use signs of
specific kinds and not incapacitated from the exercise of that ability” (2003, p.
303).  The  definition  of  sign  Fetzer  uses—which  he  attributes  to  Peirce—is
“something  that  stands  for  something  (else)  in  some  respect  or  other  for
somebody” (Fetzer  2003, p. 303; see also his 1988).  This view ensures that
anything  less  than  a  three-term  relation  cannot  be  regarded  as  telling  us
anything useful about consciousness. Fetzer’s proposal is telling, because it is
the  opposite  of  what  I  am  trying  to  accomplish.  There  is  no  denying  that
conceiving minds as things for which things can stand for other things is a good
way  to  approach  the  “easy”  (or,  more  appropriately,  “easier”)  problems  of
consciousness;  like  the  ability  to  discriminate,  categorize,  react  to
environmental stimuli, and so on (Chalmers 1995, p. 200). However, the “hard
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problem” stems from the fact that such a theory of sapience or thinking would
not amount to a theory of sentience or feeling. By dipping below the level that
makes cognitive processing possible, my goal is to show how this demand for a
theory  of  sentience  can  fit  into—or,  more  precisely,  be  subsumed  in—an
enriched account of sapience. Fetzer, by contrast, situates consciousness only at
a certain level of complexity (for similar views, see Rosenthal 2010; Carruthers
2000, pp. 237–238; and Deacon 2011, pp. 530–531). The edifice being erected
has no qualitative ingredient in it, but once we reach an upper floor, qualities
suddenly appear. I agree with Chalmers (1996, p. 30) that this does not address
the challenge posed by conscious experience (I will explore the metaphysical
ramifications of this in the fourth chapter).
These  considerations  about  relations  and  their  removal  bear  directly  on
current discussions of consciousness. Josh Weisberg has recently distinguished
between  a  “moderate”  and  “zealous”  reading  of  phenomenal  consciousness.
Those  epithets  are  of  course  biased,  so  we  might  recast  the  distinction  as
“complex”  and  “simple”  readings,  respectively.  On  the  complex  reading,
“‘phenomenal  consciousness’  just  means  ‘experience.’  Many  people  have
embraced  this  sense  of  the  term  and  use  it  to  roughly  pick  out  conscious
experience involving sensory quality” (Weisberg 2011, p. 438).  We can call
this a complex reading because something besides the quality itself is allowed
to enter into the notion. By contrast, on the simple reading, the very presence of
something besides the quality itself disqualifies the candidate from belonging to
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phenomenal  consciousness.  Accordingly,  “any  explanation  of  phenomenal
consciousness in exclusively cognitive, intentional or functional terms will fail
to  capture,  without  remainder,  what  is  really  distinctive  about  phenomenal
consciousness”  (Weisberg  2011,  p.  438).  Weisberg  notes  that  the  simple
reading  is  what  Ned  Block  (1995a)  has  in  mind  when  he  talks  of  “p-
consciousness.”
We  can  now  see  that  the  simple  reading  is  what  prescission  uncovers,
insofar  as it  reveals “what-it’s-like” to be “a monadic property of conscious
states. It is something that a state has or lacks independently of its relations to
other mental states” (Weisberg 2011, p. 439). Indeed, compare this definition
with that given by Peirce:
By  a  feeling,  I  mean  an  instance  of  that  kind  of  consciousness  which
involves no analysis, comparison or any process whatsoever, nor consists in
whole  or  in  part  of  any  act  by  which  one  stretch  of  consciousness  is
distinguished  from  another,  which  has  its  own  positive  quality  which
consists in nothing else, and which is of itself all that it is, however it may
have been brought about [...]. (1931–58, vol. 1, para. 306)
Weisberg is in some sense correct  to maintain that  “what it is to be in a
conscious state is to be aware of oneself as being in that state” (2011, p. 439).
Yet, anyone committed to two layers of thinking is eo ipso committed to there
being one such layer. The point a theorist like Block (1995a) is trying to make
—and  which  I  believe  Peircean  semiotics  succeeds  in  making—is  that  the
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commitment to something simpler (i.e., the first layer) is inescapable, since one
can always suppose that second layer absent by prescinding (I will devote the
entire third chapter to explaining this supposition of absence). True, “[i]t is the
intentional content of the HO [or higher-order] representation that matters for
consciousness,  not  the  presence  of  the  target  first-order  state  the  HO
representation is normally about” (Weisberg 2011, p. 439). Yet, to the extent
this is so, the higher-order theorist is bound to countenance a first-order quality
stripped of all relational involvement.
As  a  logician,  Peirce  was  cautious  never  to  make  this  last  claim  any
stronger  than  it  needs  to  be.  Hence,  he  never  claimed that,  as  a  matter  of
empirical fact, we encounter non-relational qualities. Since what we cognize is
mediated  by  signs  and  since  such  mediation  implies  relations,  Peirce
acknowledged that when we look inside what we see is not “phenomenality”
per se but “psychology” in the functionalist sense (Chalmers 1996, pp. 3–31).
Even so, since the stream of experience (whence we glean all that we know) is
complex, the commitment to subsumed simplicity seems logically inescapable.
Hence, the (Jamesian) observation that “[o]ur phenomenology has a rich and
specific  structure”  that  is  “unified,  bounded,  and  differentiated  into  many
different aspects but with an underlying homogeneity to many of the aspects,
and it appears to have a single subject of experience” (Chalmers 2010, p. 136)
does not pose a problem for a semiotic account, so long as we retain the ability
to prescind.
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Once we grasp  all  this,  important  consequences  ensue.  Loar  asserts  that
“[p]henomenal qualities vary in generality: I can note that a state of mine has
what all smells share, or that it is the smell of new mown grass” (1990, p. 81).
This glosses over several important distinctions. To say that a given quality is
shared by other experiences is already to enter into some sort of comparison,
and thus to take one quality as the (in this case,  iconic) sign of another (or
others). So when Prinz (2007, pp. 188–189) speaks of “iconic memory,” he is
using the adjective loosely. To say that the phenomenal quality in question is
the smell of something besides that smell (like new mown grass) is to confess
that  the  quality  has  already  entered  into  semiosis  (Peirce  1998,  p.  320).
Likewise, the moment a subject notes that a given state has what all such states
share, the recognition of similitude falls within the ambit of functionalism. 
Now,  there  is  nothing  wrong  or  inherently  problematic  in  noting  a
similitude  between  qualities,  nor  is  there  anything  wrong  or  inherently
problematic in the idea of taking a quality as the quality “of” a certain thing.
What is wrong and problematic is the assumption that one can do all this whilst
handling  the  simple  quality itself,  irrespective  of  its  functional  role  or
involvement  in  relations.  Interestingly,  Daniel  Dennett  issued  a  similar
warning:  “[W]hen  philosophers  claim  that  zombies  are  conceivable,  they
invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up
imagining something that violates their own definition” (1995, p. 322).
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I am discussing phenomenal concepts. In the general literature on concepts,
it is common to ask whether concepts are structured or unstructured (Margolis
and  Laurence  1999,  pp.  4–5).  Whether  or  not  it  is  appropriate  to  call  it  a
concept (see Prinz 2007), the simple quality reached by prescissive abstraction
is clearly unstructured. If this is so, then there is not much one can say about a
quale.  In  fact,  this indeterminacy of qualitative experience can be seen as a
strength, not a liability, of an epistemological account, because it motivates the
need for epistemology to begin with. Peirce is well known for showing “How to
Make Our Ideas Clear” (1992, pp. 124–141). One could say that, by removing
relations, philosophy of signs shows “Why our ideas need to be made clear.”
Pereboom  (2011)  has  recently  explored  what  he  calls  the  “qualitative
inaccuracy  hypothesis,”  according  to  which  one  might  represent  qualitative
natures that the objects of those representations do not in fact have. Looking at
a quality, there is no way to tell. Epistemologically, the most a tone can yield is
a  hypothesis  (which  is  why,  for  Peirce,  Firstness  is  the  site  of  abductive
inferences).  This  muddles  the  distinction  between  veridical  and  illusory
experience,  such that “the sorting out of which-is-which is  a problem rather
than a given” (Deely 2003a, p. 188; for a similar view, see Dewey [1929] 1958,
pp. 20–21). One can doubt that a hypothesis is true, but one cannot doubt that a
hypothesis is a hypothesis. Inquiry, then, becomes an expression of the fact that
“[w]e have only the experimental or hypothetical application of the principle of
reason to the fact that we live in a puzzling world” (Bradley 2012, p. 162).
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If,  as  inquiry unfolds,  it  turns  out  that  things  were  not  as  they initially
seemed, that judgement will still have to relate an object to a sign-vehicle that,
by  itself,  retains  its  qualitative  character—otherwise  there  would  be  no
mismatch. As Stroud-Drinkwater puts it: “If I drink too much wine and ‘see’ a
pink elephant, where is that pink patch? [...] Although the word ‘see’ deserves
quotation marks, the thing ‘seen,’ viz.,  the pink elephantine patch, does not.
Qualitatively, as a quale in itself, it may be indistinguishable from that which
would be seen if the pink elephant were real” (1994, p. 353fn20). This means
that  “the  givenness  of  the  qualitatively  phenomenal  does  not  guarantee  the
accuracy of any of my judgments about it” (Adams 2013, p. 730).  Minds, on
this view, are not just accidentally fallible, but constitutively so.
Thomas Sebeok (1986, pp. 77–78) described the mission of semiotics as
mediating between illusion and reality. As a site of vagueness and ineffability,
experiential qualities have a crucial role to play in that fallibilist story. Looking
at the tone, this raises an interesting question:
[W]hy should such a sign without reference be a sign at all? Husserl and the
phenomenological  semioticians  would  consider  it  as  a  nonsemiotic
phenomenon, but to Peirce, it is nevertheless semiotic, since even if a sign
refers only to itself it has the potential of producing an effect in a process of
semiosis. (Nöth 2003, p. 14; see Petrilli 2010)
As we shall now see, this “potential to refer” is the pivot of iconic reference.
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II.IV Referring to Something by “Being Like” that Thing
Iconicity has, until recently, had a bad reputation. I am not persuaded by most
critiques of similarity-based meaning (for the standard roster of grievances, see
Prinz 2002, p. 30).  One stock complaint is that  pictures are misleading.  “Of
course, pictures may be misleading. But, so may sentences” (Moktefi and Shin
2013,  p.  v).  So,  this  grievance  is  either  unjustified  or  applicable  across  the
board. Another frequent complaint is that everything is, in some way, similar to
everything else. This, on the face of it, is plainly untrue: clearly, I am more like
you than I am like a cloud of helium. Of course, one could perhaps add a host
of  stipulations  and  narratives  to  play  up  the  similarities  and  narrow  the
difference(s), but by then the stipulations and narratives would account for the
(stretched)  sense of  sameness.  In  any event,  even if  it  could be shown that
similarity relations are, by degrees, ubiquitous, that would still be insufficient to
discard similarities from the semiotic repertoire. After all, every material thing
is (by transitivity) currently in some sort of causal interaction with everything
else in the cosmos, yet that does not prevent humans and other animals from
using closed causal channels to convey information from one distinct point to
another.
Frederik  Stjernfelt  contends  that  similarity  is  not  a  defining  feature  of
iconicity, since “[s]imilarity is generally symmetrical: if a is similar to b, then b
is  also  similar  to  a;  while  sign-relations  are  generally  asymmetrical:  if  a
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signifies  b, it does not follow that  b signifies  a” (2007, p. 49).  It  is true that
similarity is symmetrical. It is also true that, in any triadic sign, interpretation
will  impose  an  asymmetrical  sense  of  direction  going  from sign-vehicle  to
object. However, it is important to stress that this asymmetry is beholden to
interpretation,  not  to  the  sign-vehicle  or  object.  Since  the  overlaying  of  a
means-end order on qualities that are otherwise identical can just as easily be
turned the  other  way around,  every  object  iconically  referred  to  by a sign-
vehicle is at the same time a potential sign-vehicle in the opposite direction.
This is obscured by the twin facts that there is no reason to “prefer” one quality
over the other, yet an interpretant will always privilege one sense of direction in
a  given  instance.  To  the  extent  the  sign-relation  truly  latched  on  to  a  real
similarity between a and b, nothing in principle would have barred the reverse
from happening, letting b do the “standing for.”
Concretely,  this means that, if the stranger in the coffee shop truly looks
like your friend’s father, then it is as legitimate to find that your friend’s father
looks like the stranger in the coffee shop (for each seesaw on this biconditional,
a new interpretant is spawned).
The world is inter-crossed by similar qualities, and this adds to causation as
a possible channel for the conveyance of meaning (for a discussion of iconicity
in natural languages, see Landsberg 1980). Yet, with a few exceptions, this idea
of reference by shared quality is absent in mainstream philosophical debates.
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Some of  this  neglect  is  an accident  of  history,  but  some of  it  is  concerted.
Looking back, it is distressing to see how early iconicity got discarded, and how
thin  the  grounds  of  that  dismissal  really  were.  Nelson  Goodman’s  (1976)
contribution to this state of affairs cannot be overstated (for a stepwise rebuttal
of Goodman’s case, see Stjernfelt 1999; modified version in Stjernfelt 2007, pp.
49–88). Nearest to our topic, one of the biggest blunders occurred when Arthur
Burks—despite editing Peirce’s Collected Papers—reassured the philosophical
public that the full type/token/tone distinction was articulated by Peirce “in a
way which is too bound up with his system of categories to be of use outside
his philosophy, and without adding anything novel to his original trichotomy”
of symbol/index/icon (Burks 1949, p. 673). Given what systematicity means, it
is  hard to see how being “too bound up with a system” could be seen as a
reproach. Let  us  therefore  rectify  this  neglect  and  explain  how  the
type/token/tone distinction constrains the symbol/index/icon distinction.
Peirce  always  felt  that  advances  in  semiotic,  like those in  logic,  require
tentative  exploration  (Colapietro  2010,  p.  16).  As  such,  he  essayed  several
divisions  (of  unequal  merit)  during  his  lifetime  (for  a  dense  but  accurate
comparative analysis of Peirce’s various taxonomies, see Jappy 1985). Portions
of the Peircean account of sign-action have nevertheless proven consistent and
garnered a consensus.
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Although three parts are needed for the sign to do its referential business,
those parts hang together in a specific ordinal arrangement, and the question of
whether  each  part  is  essential  or  accidental  to  a  given  reference  is  what
motivates the symbol/index/icon distinction. For the symbol, if one deletes the
interpretation, then the sign-vehicle can no longer signify, since interpretation is
all that binds together the sign-vehicle and the object (the “deletion” here is
simply  the  prescissive  supposition  of  one  thing  without  another  that  we
discussed  earlier).  For  the  index,  if  one  deletes  the  interpretation,  the  sign-
vehicle and the object will remain factually connected, so one needs to delete
the object as well in order to extinguish the sign-vehicle’s power to signify it.
For the icon, the interpretation and the object can both be deleted and still the
sign-vehicle retains its power to signify.
Peirce drew on the views of Duns Scotus in crafting this account (Boler
1963).  For  Scotus,  “this  white  thing can  exist  without  similarity.  If  another
white thing comes into being, then similarity begins to exist in this white thing.
Hence, the foundation of the relation can exist without the relation” (Weinberg
1965, p. 101). This may be what Loar was trying to express with the claim that
“[y]ou can forget  particular instances and still judge ‘another one of those’”
(1997, p. 601). However, one must not gloss over the fact that, when a similar
token has  not  entered  the  picture,  the  similarity  of  the  lone  tone  is  merely
potential (and so cannot allow judgements like “another one of those”).
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Putting one of the chapter epigraphs to use, if a footprint leads interpretation
to a foot in virtue of its similarity with that foot, then it is the outline (of either
the foot or the imprint) that matters. What permits iconicity in this case is the
quality of the sign-vehicle “1,” not the object “2” nor the interpretation “3.” If,
however, a footprint leads interpretation to a foot in virtue of the causal contact
it had with that foot, then it is the actual foot that matters. Here, what permits
indexicality is the pair “1, 2”—not “3.” As for the word or symbol “footprint,”
nothing  but  interpretation  (“3”)  holds  its  reference  together.  Peirce  rightly
insisted that these referential relations “are all indispensable in all reasoning”
(1931–58, vol. 1, para. 369; see his 1998, p. 10).
Symbol/index/icon  mark  out  three  different  ways  sign-vehicles  can  be
linked to their objects. We may distinguish those links by a systematic analysis
of which parts of the sign depend on which. In the same way, the nature of the
sign-vehicle will affect what sort of relation it can have with its referent. If one
is going to assemble a sign, there are essentially three resources one can use:
“What /  happens /  again.” Obviously,  an ontology which, for one reason or
another,  rejects  any  of  these  aspects  will  have  less  to  work  with.  Still,  a
Peircean  semiotician  accepts  three  supports  for  meaning.  These  different
supports constrain what sort of referential relation a sign-vehicle can have:
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Figure 5   Three sign-vehicles constraining
three relations to objects
Conventional imputations must be re-applicable, so only as a type can a sign-
vehicle have a symbolic bond to its object. Causation requires particulars, so
only  as  a  token  can  a  sign-vehicle  have  an  indexical  bond  to  its  object.
Similarity requires a shared quality, so only as a tone can a sign-vehicle enjoy
an iconic bond to the quality referred to.
Symbols arguably presuppose a whole linguistic community. The icon does
not presuppose anything besides itself. Indeed, the referential power of an icon
“is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually determining an Interpretant,
nor  even  upon  its  actually  having  an  Object”  (Peirce  1998,  p.  273).
Consequently, the only way to eliminate the semiotic potential of a given tone
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is  to eliminate that tone itself.  Short of doing so, the ability to be linked to
similar things always lies in wait, in germinal form, simply because any quality
would resemble whatever would be like it.
Of course,  the mere  talk  of  “another”  tone would entail  that  we are  no
longer dealing with tones but with tokens, since juxtaposition or comparison
presupposes numerical plurality. Still, when two tokens are related in virtue of
their shared quality, it is the underlying tone they share that matters, not those
particular tokens. Therefore, in order to truly understand iconicity as a mode of
reference,  one has to prescind. Doing so reveals the icon to be an idle sign,
something that “can only be a fragment of a completer sign” (Peirce 1998, p.
306).
Whether  this  idleness  means  that  icons  are  epiphenomenal  is  a  vexed
question. Peirce wrote: “[I]t must not be inferred that I regard consciousness as
a mere ‘epiphenomenon;’ though I heartily grant that the hypothesis that it is so
has done good service to science” (1998, p. 418). It is worth pointing out that,
in terms of the argument laid out at the close of section II.II,  if premise (1) is
indeed  false,  then  the  conclusion  (7)  about  epiphenomenalism’s supposed
incoherence no longer follows (from that argument at least).
When  Russell  wrote  in  The  Philosophy  of  Logical  Atomism that  “[t]he
simplest imaginable facts are those which consist in the possession of a quality
by some particular thing. Such facts, say, as ‘This is white’” ([1918] 1985, p.
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59), he was already several storeys of complexity above the simple “1” in the
earlier  diagram (section II.III).  Peirce and Russell were both pioneers  in the
early florescence of  symbolic  logic:  Peirce reviewed Russell’s Principles of
Mathematics in  1903. Nubiola (1996) reports that  “[o]ne of  [Victoria]  Lady
Welby’s aspirations was to bring about a meeting between Peirce and Russell,
and in fact she acted as an intermediary between them, though to no avail.”
Both philosophers heeded the Leibnizian insight that whatever is complex is
composed  of  simples  (Blamauer  2011).  Yet,  the  method  of  prescissive
abstraction  employed  by  Peirce  pushes  farther  the  decomposition  into
simplicity. It goes beneath “This is white” to reach “white.”  The sign-vehicle
“This” is not white; in fact, here it is black (and, if spoken, it has no colour at
all). Hence, in order to successfully use “This” as a sign of white things, one
has to bring a token of “This” near a token white thing so that interpretation can
relate  the  two.  Such  indexicality  is  indeed  more  primitive  than  description
(which in the case of colours seems quite impotent). A white thing, however,
can  lead  interpretation  to  another  white  thing.  Here  it  is  similarity—not
proximity—that underwrites the interpretive passage from one token to another.
Therefore, the actual tokens are not what is essential.
Russell is sometimes credited with espousing a form of “neutral monism”
(Chalmers 2010, pp. 133–137). However, one should keep in mind that, as an
early advocate of what contemporary philosophers of science call  “structural
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realism,” Russell had an uneasy attitude towards anything that is not involved
in  relations.  Hawthorne  (2002,  pp.  39–46)  wrestles  with  this  idea  that  the
intrinsic suchness or “quiddity” of things is not captured by their functional role
(he even mentions Scotus). Peirce’s work shows no such unease.
As David Pears explains, Russell thought that “when we find that we cannot
push  the  analysis  of  words  any  further,  we  can  plant  a  flag  recording  the
discovery of genuine logical atoms” (in Russell [1918] 1985, p. 5). However, if
one is engaged in the analysis of signs (not just words), one can plant a flag still
further. By analogy with the scale-relativity of the natural sciences, we could
say that philosophy of language is akin to chemistry,  whereas philosophy of
signs  is  akin  to  fundamental  physics.  One can  study the  conditions  for  the
possibility  of  natural  language(s).  But,  as  Sandra  Rosenthal  writes,  “the
epistemic import of such a logic of language lies in the fact that it incorporates
the dynamics of lived experience at its most rudimentary level, a dynamic that
[...] grounds itself in those most rudimentary semiotic structures by which man
experiences  a  world of  appearing objects” (1979, p.  285).  Indeed,  semiotics
splits  triadic relations and thereby reveals  the tone,  which does  not actually
refer to anything, since there is nothing there for it to refer to. Still, even when
considered  in  such  abstract  isolation,  a  qualitative  sign-vehicle  retains  the
power to refer. Simply put, “1” could only refer to (or be referred to by) “1.”
However,  for  such  a  sign-vehicle  to  act,  it  must  come  into  contact  with
something besides itself. The moment a quality does this, it is no longer an icon
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but an index (that subsumes an icon) since the object  with which it is similar
must be in the picture.
II.V Searching for the Icon
Peirce  saw  semiotics  as  a  foundational  account  of  logic,  and  logic  as  a
normative attempt to say, in a principled manner, when we reason properly and
when  we  do  not.  Icons  are  used  to  assist  reason,  because  their  qualitative
character means that not everything is up for conventionalist grabs. The self-
same consistency is  crucial  to this view. Subjects  make correct  reports  only
when they make correct observations of whatever iconic surrogate they have
stored. Yet, since the very qualitative constitution (common to both the sign-
vehicle and the object) constrains what interpretations can and cannot rightly be
made, not all interpretations will work as effectively. After all, you cannot mark
an “x” outside a Venn diagram and claim that it is also inside. The sign-vehicle
repels that interpretant.
Philosophers  like  Legg  (2008;  2013), Pietarinen  (2006;  2012),  Stjernfelt
(2007), and myself (Champagne forthcoming) are currently working to promote
apply, and expand the Peircean account of iconicity. Yet, even before such an
alternative is given any detail, it begins with a dialectic disadvantage, since the
curent received view seems to be that talk of images is misguided. Consider
Papineau, who notes that “[a] first thought might be that perceptual concepts
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refer in virtue of the fact that exercises of them resemble their referents,” and
then immediately adds “I assume that this suggestion does not need to be taken
seriously”  (2002,  p.  111).  This  is  because  Papineau,  like Russell,  thinks  all
knowledge of  the world derives  from two (and only two) channels,  namely
acquaintance and description. This is different from the Peircean view, which
adds shared quality to the mix.
Ironically, no one working from Russellian assumptions has come closer to
independently reconstructing an account of iconicity than Papineau. Block, as
we saw, tersely dismisses resemblance-based accounts, but Papineau develops
views that are very close to the Peircean stance I am advocating. According to
Papineau, when a subject undergoes novel experiences, her “brain is lastingly
altered in certain ways” (2003, p. 359). The alteration consists in the acquisition
of a “stored sensory template.” He uses this to explain what happens to Mary in
the knowledge argument. Until she enjoys the actual experience of red, Mary
has  not  stored  the  relevant  stand-in,  but  experiencing  red  outside  the  cave
allows  her  to  henceforth  “imaginatively  to  recreate  and  introspectively  to
reidentify an experience she could previously think about only in a third-person
way”  (Papineau  2003,  p.  359).  If  Papineau  is  right  that  “the  introspective
identification of some experience requires that it is compared with some model
or template stored in the brain,” then “it would scarcely be surprising that we
should need an original version of the experience in order to form the template
for such comparisons” (2003, pp. 358–359).
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Papineau’s project can be seen as an instance of the phenomenal concept
strategy, insofar as he hopes to capture an “intuition of mind-brain distinctness”
(Papineau 2002, pp. 161–174). As we saw, the phenomenal concept strategist
holds  that  the  apparent  distinctness  of  qualia  is  an  artifact  of  the  special
concepts we deploy to refer to such experiential episodes. Hence, “[l]ike many
physicalists, Papineau diagnoses the apparent threats to physicalism posed by
the  phenomena  of  consciousness  by  locating  the  source  of  anti-physicalist
intuitions  in  features  of  our  thinking rather  than in non-physical  features  of
reality”  (Crane 2005, p. 155).  Papineau (2002, p. 96) champions prescission
when  he  insists  that  one  should  be  a  conceptual  dualist  but  an  ontological
monist. I  obviously sympathize with the aspiration of making such a stance
tenable.
Papineau  (2002,  pp.  116–121)  originally  developed  what  he  called  the
“quotational-indexical”  account  of  phenomenal  concepts.  However,  he
eventually came to think that indexicality imposes too strong a constraint on
when and where phenomenal concepts can be exercised. Papineau’s defection is
reminiscent  of  Jackson’s,  as  both  were  led  to  ponder  the  troublesome
intersection of demonstrative reference and epiphenomenalism. Indices turn on
physical  presence:  one  has  to  be  near  something  in  order  to  refer  to  it  by
ostention.  Likewise,  something  quoted  must  be  present  in  order  for  the
mentioning device to do its work. “Linguistic quotation marks, after all, are a
species of demonstrative construction: a use of quotation marks will refer to
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that word,  whatever  it  is,  that  happens  to  be made salient  by being placed
within the quotation marks” (Papineau 2007a, p. 121).  That will do in most
circumstances.  Yet,  since  qualia  are  not  physically  present  in  any
straightforward manner,  the analogy with quotation seems to bring little aid.
Led by these considerations, Papineau has rebuilt his account so that nothing
turns on the actual presence of what is referred to. His recent work still retains
the core idea that  phenomenal  concepts  involve the very quality  referred to.
This is the basic thesis I am defending in this chapter. However, I believe the
standard  menu  of  options—specifically  the  type/token  and
description/acquaintance bipartitions—doom Papineau’s efforts to failure.
Consider first the type/token bipartition. Papineau asks: “Can phenomenal
concepts pick out experiential  particulars as well as types?” (2007a, p. 123).
Clearly, any concept wedded solely to a particular token is bound to be severely
limited  in  its  use,  so  Papineau  rightly  concludes  that  such  an  hic  et  nunc
concept  (if  it  could  indeed  be  so  called)  would  not  allow  for  crucial
“reencounters,” as he puts it. After all, the taste of the ice cream one ate on the
occasion of one’s seventh birthday—if treated as a token—is a taste found in no
other ice cream. The Peircean semiotician will of course notice that what is
relevant in discussing the taste of ice cream is a tone; but a theorist unable to
call  on  this  crucial  notion  will  recoil  to  her  only  remaining  option  when
rejecting  tokens as  inappropriate.  Predictably,  then,  Papineau concludes  that
what is involved must be “encounters with a type” (ibid.). This response brings
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us back to the unsatisfactory starting point: how does one encounter a type?
Types cannot impact one’s sensory organs, tokens of types do; so any theory
which hopes to account for phenomenal consciousness by invoking experiential
encounters with types is surely ill-fated.
To be sure, we do say, as Peirce [1931–58, vol. 4, para. 537] pointed out,
that there is but one word “the” in the English language. But this is no more
to be taken au pied de la lettre than is the statement that there is only one
poisonous  lizard  in  the  continental  United  States  [...].  There  is  not  one
lizard which  is  the  “type-lizard,”  and  many other  lizards  which  are  the
token lizards. Likewise, there is not one word which is the type, and many
other words which are the tokens. (Willard 1983, p. 287)
Investigations into consciousness have progressed on a lot of fronts in the last
two decades. Yet if, by analogy, philosophers of mind have recently been led
by their discussions of phenomenal concepts to conclude that one can somehow
“see” the type-lizard, then something has gone wrong along the way (using the
full resources of the type/token/tone tripartition, one should say that one does
not “reencounter” a type; rather, a type is what permits one to encounter tokens
of the same tone).
To further illustrate how a limited menu of options strong-arms Papineau
into  adopting  unsatisfactory  conclusions,  consider  next  the
acquaintance/description bipartition. Knowledge by description can be detached
from its  worldly site of origin  and communicated second-hand. Descriptions
can  therefore  work  just  fine  even  though  the  object  described  is  absent.
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Knowledge by acquaintance,  by contrast,  requires  the actual  presence  of  its
object. In order to count as knowledge, (symbolic) reference in absentia must,
in some way, answer to (indexical) reference in praesentia. Indeed, the whole
point  of  the  knowledge  argument  is  to  show  that  mere  description  is
insufficient;  at  least  when it  comes to conveying the content  of experiential
feels.  Papineau  accepts  this,  since  by  his  lights  “[i]t  seems  clear  that  the
preemergence Mary does lack some concepts of color experiences” (2007a, p.
111).  Thought-experiments  notwithstanding,  this  contribution  of  lived
experience explains why “[o]ne cannot give an informative answer about seeing
orange to the congenitally blind” (Pitt 2004, p. 31).
The phenomenal concept strategist is thus in a bind. Either she maintains
that  qualia can be referred  to by description—which is  what  the knowledge
argument  denies;  or  she  maintains  that  qualia  can  be referred  to  causally—
which  is  difficult  to  make  sense  of  in  the  case  of  qualia.  Like  Papineau,
discussants who rely on Russellian notions bounce between these two options
to no avail. I submit that, to dismount this seesaw, one needs the concept of
iconic reference.
The employment of one yellow object to signify another yellow object by
means of their yellowness (and not, say, their proximity to one another) does
not  permit  one  to  dissociate  questions  pertaining  to  “the  medium  and  the
message” (to echo McLuhan), since these admit of a univocal answer, to wit,
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“yellow.”  As  William  Seager  writes:  “What  can  be  called  ‘immediate
consciousness’  just  has  the  peculiar  reflexive  property  of  allowing  an
appreciation  of  both  the  information  being  conveyed  and  the  mode  of
conveyance” (1999, p. 93). Given this overlap, the very quality which acts as a
sign-vehicle  cannot be omitted—on pain of omitting the passage that makes
that quality play a semiotic role in the first place. This explains why “[m]any
phenomenal  kinds  can  be  referred  to  only  through  the  content  shared  by
experiences of the kind at issue” (Nida-Rümelin 2008, p. 310).
In  a  statement  echoing  Peirce’s  remark  that the  icon  has  the  ability  of
“bringing its interpreter face to face with the very character signified” (Peirce
1998, p. 307), Papineau writes that “phenomenal concepts are too close to their
referents  for  it  to  seem  possible  that  those  same  concepts  could  refer  to
something  else,”  since  “the  referent  seems  to  be  part  of  the  concept  itself”
(2007a, p. 132). Of course, given that an icon refers to a quality by being that
very quality, this suggestion that the referent is “part of” the concept is not at all
fanciful.  Nonetheless,  since Papineau lacks  the notional  resources  needed to
properly express this idea, he sometimes frames his conclusions in terms that
hinder their reception. Tim Crane, for instance, writes that:
[I]t seems to me entirely incredible that when one thinks about, say, pain,
one  must,  as  a  necessary  part  of  that  very  act  of  thinking,  have  an
experience which in any way resembles pain. When the narrator of E. M.
Forster’s Where Angels Fear to Tread says that ‘physical pain is almost too
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terrible to bear,’ he is clearly intending to talk about pain in the phenomenal
sense, pain as a feeling,  an event in the stream of consciousness.  In any
normal  sense  of  ‘phenomenal,’  then—any  sense  that  relates  it  to  its
etymology and its traditional philosophical meaning—he is employing the
phenomenal concept of pain. But in order to understand this remark, and
therefore grasp the concepts which it expresses,  I do not think I need to
undergo, as a part of that very understanding, an experience which is in any
sense painful. Yet this is what Papineau seems to be saying. (2005, p. 156)
Armed  with  the  full  symbol/index/icon  taxonomy,  I  want  to  come  to
Papineau’s defence. All parties agree that describing something exclusively by
symbols is a non-starter. Russell would be the first to agree. After all, “Russell
was  as  aware  as  anyone  else  that  not  everything  can  be  thought  of  by
description,  on pain  of  the  whole system of  identification failing to  be tied
down  to  a  unique  set  of  objects  [...]”  (Evans  [1982]  2002,  p.  45).  The
knowledge argument brings this out in a particularly memorable way.  While
sequestered  in  her  cave  from  birth,  Mary  could  have  been  taught  by
unscrupulous  experimenters  to  take Dungeons  and  Dragons seriously  and
thereby make coherent functional responses about “ghouls” and “trolls.” Hence,
given  that  on  one  level  “pain”  is  a  symbol  like  any  other,  there  is  surely
something right in  Crane’s claim that this lexical concept does not have to be
painful. Yet, if one is to truly comprehend what that word refers to, then, in
some respect, one must have experienced pain, and whatever quality one will
have retained from such token episodes will itself be related to pain states by
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being able to indexically spot a similar state if and when it presents itself and
have an iconic sense of “what” those states “are like.”
The second conjunct here is crucial, since it distinguishes the fine-grained
appreciation of qualities that iconicity (via prescission) permits. The concept of
pain can indexically refer to past experience(s), but at some point that concept
will have to share the experiential quality itself, on pain of having no real clue
what that feeling is like. In other words, if one asks the narrator of Forster’s
book “What is pain?,” that narrator is free to answer “What I experienced last
Friday;”  and  when asked  what  was  experienced  last  Friday,  he  can  in  turn
answer “What I experienced the Monday before”—and so on. The semiotician
has no quarrel with any of this. Yet, if the person really possesses the relevant
phenomenal concept, it cannot be anaphora all the way.
Signs are not memes (Kilpinen 2008). So, if a novel would be written by a
congenitally  blind  autistic  literary  savant  who has  no sense  of  fine  grained
emotion concepts, Peircean semiotic theory predicts that, to the extent it would
be considered a good novel by readers, this text generator would have relied on
informant(s)  who  enjoyed  the  relevant  experiences  (those  informants  would
then be the analogues of programmers who feed instructions and symbols in a
Turing machine).
As shown in the earlier grid (figure 5), semiotics arranges icons, indices,
and symbols  in  an  ordinal  fashion,  such that  the more  developed  grades  of
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reference  subsume  the  lesser  ones  but  not  vice  versa  (Peirce  1998,  p.  9).
Interestingly,  this  triadic  pecking  order  is  confirmed  by  empirical  data.
Consider  for  example  the  icon  “IIIIII”  and  the  symbol  “6,”  which  have  a
common  referent  but  relate  to  it  in  different  ways,  the  former  non-
conventionally,  the  latter  conventionally.  If  symbolic  reference  could depart
completely from iconicity, as Crane’s criticism suggests, then one would expect
the  interpretation  of  Arabic  numerals  like  “6”  to  be  untainted  by  whatever
cognitive and mnemonic limits plague its iconic counterpart “IIIIII.” However,
studies  have  shown  that  subjects  asked  to  pick  the  largest  among  pairs  of
symbols like “4 versus 9” demonstrate  a lag in their response times akin to
figuring  out  “IIII  versus  IIIIIIIII.”  “These  results  strongly  suggest  that  the
process used in judgements of differences in magnitude between numerals is
the same as, or analogous to, the process involved in judgements of inequality
for physical  continua” (Moyer and Landauer 1967, p. 1520; for more recent
studies, see Carey 2009, pp. 117–156). Now, if there is evidence that a symbol
such  as  “6”—a  quantitative  concept  not  exactly  known  for  its  poetic
connotations—is in some way IIIIII-like, why should it be absurd to agree with
Papineau that “[e]ven if imaginings of pains don’t really hurt, they can share
some of the phenomenal unpleasantness of real pains” (2002, p. 174)?
One  could  also  look  to  scientific  and  phenomenological  studies  which
suggest that mere contemplation of a word or phrase primes the body for a host
of motor and affective responses,  such that  reading “pain” is  in some sense
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experiencing a trace of the relevant feeling. I will not pursue that line of inquiry
here, but some points of entry would be Shapiro (2011, pp. 70–113), Thompson
(2007), and Gallagher (2006).
The interesting question is not whether concepts need to  always resemble
the things they refer to; there is a clear  sense in which they do not (to that
extent, Crane’s criticism of Papineau is trivially right). The interesting question
is whether mastery of symbols and indices alone could ever suffice to secure
reference  to  the  “feel”  of  experiences.  After  all,  from  a  developmental
perspective, iconic competence is often (and perhaps always)  the gateway to
symbolic  competence.  It  is  doubtful  anyone ever  mastered  “6”  without first
mastering  “IIIIII”  (Resnik  1982,  p.  98).  Some  biologists  (e.g.,  Kull  2009;
Deacon  1997)  believe  that  this  holds  on  the  evolutionary  ladder  as  well.
Holistically drawing inferences on an empty symbol-to-symbol axis certainly
remains possible (especially by machines that have never known otherwise). It
is also possible for one not to feel a hint of pain when one reads or writes the
word  “pain.”  But,  if  one  never does—anywhere,  anytime,  under  any
circumstance—one  can  hardly  lay  claim to  what  the  word  means. Smithies
(2011, pp. 22–25) argues that, unless a subject is phenomenally conscious of
the  object(s)  of  her  demonstratives,  she cannot  rationally  defend  her  claims
when challenged.  It may be okay for Mary to refer to whatever her textbooks
told her; just as it is okay to answer the question “What is pain?” with “What I
experienced last Friday.” But it is not okay for the authors of those textbooks to
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have never enjoyed the relevant icon(s). I thus agree with Peirce that “[t]he only
way of  directly  communicating  an  idea  is  by means of  an icon;  and every
indirect method of communicating an idea must depend for its establishment
upon the use of an icon” (1931–58, vol. 2, para. 278).
The point can be put another way. Suppose that a subject were to possess a
given colour concept solely in virtue of having been told about its relations to
darker  and  lighter  colours  in  the  vicinity.  Being  told,  say,  that  amethyst  is
midway between purple and pink could conceivably be informative to someone
who has  experienced  purple  and  pink.  If  so,  then  that  person’s  concept  of
amethyst would amount to a rule (involving several relata), and the unfamiliar
quality  sandwiched  between  purple  and  pink  would  become  akin  to  a
conclusion that can be inferred once one knows the relevant premises. Since the
rule applies to a spectrum that is ordered, there is a temptation to dismiss the
need to experience the midway quality itself (e.g., Churchland 1992, pp. 102–
110). Yet, that spectrum actually vindicates qualia. The colours sandwiching an
unfamiliar shade remain unproblematic only provided that one does not slide
the very sandwiching relation to either side. Without an iconic access to qualia
though,  one  has to  (constantly)  make  that  slide.  Therefore,  the  premises
adduced to secure a supposed inference of the quality turn out to be insecure
conclusions of their own, leading to a regress or circle.
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David  Rosenthal  believes  that  “[w]e  cannot  acquiesce  in  the  unhelpful
thought that we all know the qualitative state when we see it” (2005, p. 196).
Why not? Rosenthal reasons, quite rightly, that if experiential familiarity with a
quality is  needed,  then “[t]hat  would amount to picking the phenomenon in
purely ostensive terms, which leaves too much open for us to tell whether we
can explain the phenomenon in a way that makes it intelligible” (ibid.). I differ
from Rosenthal in being open to the possibility that, when we move past the
range  of  symbolic  description,  we  move  past  the  range  of  intelligibility.
Language is like a tour guide who can show you around the sites of Prague. It is
a good guide, but you still need to tour Prague.
Compared with words, indices and icons are certainly mute. Of course, one
will run into problems if one demands an articulate account of the inarticulate.
Livingston  is  correct  that  “consistent  maintenance  of  the  position  that  the
contents  of  consciousness  are  literally  unspeakable  threatens  to  require  the
theorist to deny the intelligibility of much of our ordinary language  of self-
description and explanation” (2004, p. 240n27).  Nonetheless, I believe “[t]he
ineffable  is  not  something  mystical  or  mysterious;  it  is  merely  that  which
evades  description.  It  evades  description,  but  it  pervades  experience”  (Short
2006, p. 171).
Iconic reference thus augments the important “semantic” axis brought out
by John Searle’s (1980) “Chinese room” thought-experiment (Harnad 2002).
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Indeed, it should be noted that the distinction between semantics (vehicle-to-
object), syntactics (vehicle-to-vehicle), and pragmatics (vehicle-to-interpreter)
was  introduced  by  Charles  Morris  in  his  influential  1938  International
Encyclopedia of Unified Science paper on “Foundations of the Theory of Signs”
(reprinted  in  Morris  1971,  pp.  13–71)  to  draw  a  methodological  (not
ontological) division of labour between those studying semiosis (i.e.,  the full
triad of vehicle-to-object-to-interpreter). The division was known to medieval
logicians (see Peirce 1998, p. 327). One can prescind the various axes discussed
by Morris, but one can never isolate them in fact.
On a common sense level, most of us grasp that when a dictionary defines a
colour by citing other colours,  its accomplishment is partial.  The Jacksonian
insight—present  in  Russell  and  developed  by  recent  phenomenal  concept
strategists—is  that  symbols  without  indices  are  empty.  In  keeping  with  the
subsumption illustrated earlier, Peircean semiotics takes this insight further by
holding that indices without icons are empty.
Papineau heeds the moral regarding the insufficiency of descriptions, adds
to  it  a  novel  recognition  of  acquaintance’s  insufficiency  with  respect  to
qualities,  and  then  tries  to  construct  a  model  that  could  remedy  this.  The
success of his positive suggestions is partial, but I think his desiderata are on
target. In a coloured world, iconicity trumps indexicality as a more plausible
way to explain reference to phenomenal experience(s).
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II.VI “Being Like” a Quality by “Being” that Quality
I  have been contrasting two modes of reference.  An index “is a sign which
would,  at  once,  lose  the character  which  makes it  a  sign if  its  object  were
removed;” whereas an icon “is a sign which would possess the character which
renders it significant, even though its object had no existence” (Peirce 1931–58,
vol. 2, para. 304; see Cobley 2010, pp. 242–243). Now, a sign-vehicle can serve
as both an index and an icon. Chalmers is therefore correct to describe Mary as
able “to think demonstrative-qualitative thoughts in which both a demonstrative
and a qualitative concept are deployed” (2004, p. 186). Thankfully, prescissive
analysis does not force us to take this double-duty at face value.
Suppose  Mary  utters  “This  is  what  red  looks  like.”  This  involves  both
indexical and iconic reference. The indexical component captured by “this” is
an effective way to track the things in the world that prompt the qualitative
experiences one wants to elicit (Chemero 2006, p. 64). Papineau (2002, pp. 66–
67) expresses doubts about the ability of an indexical construction like “This
feeling” to select a quality in the manifold stream of consciousness with enough
specificity. A lot is going on, so communicators will presumably have to work
to pinpoint what they mean. However,  once Mary exits her black and white
confines,  the  world  provides  her  both  with  qualitative  experiences  and  the
iconic  means  needed  to  convey  those  experiences.  Using  symbols  (i.e.,
language) and indices, Mary can invite her interlocutor(s) to prescissively focus
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on the tone of the tokens she points to. This is where iconicity does its work. If
all goes well, iconicity allows one to glimpse “what” Mary has in mind when
she says “My experience is like that.” A stubborn interlocutor can at any point
spoil the sign-exchange. Still, thanks to iconic reference, one can in principle
convey what a phenomenal quality is like.
Mary could not use her exhaustive neurophysiological premises to make an
inference about the qualitative feel of the colour red, in advance of any face-to-
face experience (for a kindred view, see Robinson 2004). Still, even supposing
Mary could do this (Dennett 1991a, pp. 399–401), then in order to prove her
accomplishment to her peers, she would have to engage in some overt act of
communication. The ensuing question is whether the red things she points to
can be linked to her experience in a way contentful enough to counter fears that
she might be persuading her peers even though “all is dark inside” (Chalmers
1996, p. 96).
As we saw when we looked at the blind trust placed on introspective reports
of “blindsight,” the claim that the mind is qualitatively vacant is not worthy of
much argument these days. In any event, current debates take it that, “[w]hen
you know all of science but don’t know what it is like to see red, then you can
name the relevant property and perhaps interact it [sic] from the outside, but
you lack the mode of presentation that reveals what the quiddity of the property
is” (Hawthorne 2002, p. 44). Usually, it is assumed that only introspection can
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secure confidence that the experiential lights are indeed on. Such a “viewpoint-
relative” (Kirk 2005, pp. 61–63) confirmation that one is conscious  obviously
falls short of third-person verifiability.  Some (e.g., Cohen and Dennett 2011)
make a big deal of this; while others (e.g., Nagel 1986) think it is simply a fact
we  have  to  live  with.  Talk  of  irreconcilable  perspectives  is  arguably  less
offensive to the contemporary palate than talk of irreconcilable substances. Yet,
given that humans have to use signs in the world in order to communicate their
mental states, what results from either stance is very much sceptical business as
usual. Chalmers encapsulates this when he writes that “My qualitative concept
‘R’ plays little direct role in communicative practices. In that way, it resembles
Wittgenstein’s ‘beetle in a box’” (1996, p. 206; see Wittgenstein [1953] 2001,
p. 85; and also Kirk 1994, pp. 46–47).
Papineau, despite being aware that “Mary’s concept [of colour] looks like a
paradigm  of  the  kind  of  thing  Wittgenstein’s  private  language  argument  is
designed to discredit” (2002, p. 128), philosophizes from the assumption that
communication of  phenomenal  qualities  is  possible  (ibid.,  p.  130).  Truth be
told, so do most of us,  most of the time. Is  there any way to vindicate this
commonsensical  point  of  departure—to  make  it  our  philosophical  point  of
arrival too? Let us assume for the sake of argument that the signs emitted by
people are available to you, but that their minds are hidden. A person may tell
you, for instance, when and where she feels green, perhaps locating the objects
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and events that prompt her experience. On those terms, what sort of reference
would be most apt to licence your confidence about their consciousness?
As Edmond Wright  (2008) points out,  mutual  trust  can quickly seal  the
divide between numerically-distinct experiences.  From a practical standpoint,
that is certainly true; after all, symbolic reference employs that very channel.
Seen in this light, indexicality is a way to fine-tune the coupling of two people’s
behaviours, thereby ensuring that your inference by analogy about another mind
involves as little risk as possible. Yet, no matter how adept, those antics will not
amount to a conveyance of what green feels like.  This is because,  even if a
perfect covariation were to hold between what happens “on the outside” and
what happens “on the inside,” one cannot use whatever happens on one side to
figure out what happens on the other,  any more than one can use smoke to
ascertain  what  fire  looks  like.  Indexicality  tracks  only the  covariations,  not
what covaries.  This  is  certainly  more  to  go  on than  a stipulated  agreement
between symbol-users. Nonetheless, since the reach of indexical reference stops
where your partner’s skin begins, conversational goodwill—even when reduced
to a minimum by a judicious use of  indices—pole-vaults  from one mind to
another by a leap of faith.  This yields the isolated conversationalists pictured
earlier.  All  told,  most  philosophers  would  prefer  a  story  less  dependent  on
voluntarism, if such a story can be had.
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Prescissive  abstraction  is  not  mechanical,  so  one  cannot  eradicate
voluntarism altogether. Still, I believe inference to the best explanation licenses
a migration to a semiotic account, since its analysis of resemblance appeals to
considerations more impersonal than outright introspection. Papineau (2002, p.
171)  quotes  approvingly  Thomas  Nagel’s  observation  that  “To  imagine
something sympathetically,  we put ourselves in a conscious state  resembling
the thing itself” (Nagel 1974, p. 446; emphasis added). Given that “[i]cons are
so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished from
them” (Peirce 1992, p. 226),  if the box that holds the beetle is made into an
exact likeness of the beetle, one can gaze at the beetle itself.
Granted, that’s not exactly a naturalist answer, but then again these aren’t
exactly naturalist questions. Only sapient creatures wonder how (and worry if)
they refer to their own sentience (Deely 2002).
II.VII Transparency and Opacity
Is it grandiose to suggest that icons can allow one to gaze at the beetle itself? To
test this claim on a less controversial case, consider “IIIIII” (on this page) as an
icon of IIIIII (on this page). Besides the fact that distinct tokens are present, one
would be hard-pressed  to  say that  there  is  any difference between the sign-
vehicle and its object. Now, anyone who has ever had their attention redirected
by an index finger or sudden scream accepts such mundane events as proof that
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indices are semiotically efficacious. The index cannot bear the full weight of
scepticism, but this hardly stops most philosophers from thinking that we are
better  off  with  indexicality  in  the  mix.  By  parity,  the  manifest  similarity
between “IIIIII” and IIIIII should suffice to show that icons can work.
Note  that  the  pronounced  similarity  of  the  icon  holds  irrespective  of
whether one chooses to use or “mention” a sign-vehicle. This is brought out by
the much-discussed transparency argument  (with  roots in Harman 1990,  but
usually attributed to Tye 2000, pp. 45–68; see also Tye 2002). Imagine that you
are placed before a blue wall so large that it engulfs your entire visual field. The
surface of the wall is uniform in hue and smooth in texture, nothing else enters
the picture, and your subjective vantage is not allowed to shift. Often, one is
told to pick a thing in one’s surroundings and to “concentrate as hard as you
can, not on the colours of the objects, but on the quality of your experience of
those colours” (Carruthers 2000, p. 123; emphasis in original). Yet, if one truly
follows those instructions and “concentrates” on a colour, one can no longer
contrast  that  quality  with  whatever  other  colour(s)  delimit(s)  it.  Prescissive
abstraction must always work with a stream of lived experience that is complex
(Kelley  1984),  so  unless  one  wishes  to  explicitly  defend  gestaltist
commitments, the usual set-up is worded somewhat carelessly.
I agree with Peirce that “prescission, if accurately analyzed, will be found
not to be an affair of attention” (1931–58, vol. 2, para. 428). Since it is not a
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matter of psychology, “it is conceivable, or supposable, that the quality of blue
should usurp the whole mind [...]” (Peirce 1992, p. 290; see also his 1998, p. 4).
The task is to note what can and cannot be gleaned from an examination of such
a lone quality. Speaking strictly as a logician, Peirce wrote: “To suppose, for
example, that there is a flow of time, or any degree of vividness, be it high or
low, seems to me quite as uncalled for as to suppose that there is freedom of the
press or a magnetic field” (1931–58, vol. 1, para. 305).
Peirce  took this  to  vindicate  qualia.  Strangely,  the  conclusion nowadays
drawn from the transparency argument is that qualia cannot exist. “Since the
main  reason  for  believing  in  nonrepresentational  phenomenal  character,  or
qualia, is our alleged direct awareness of it in experience, if there is no such
direct awareness, as transparency suggests, then there is little reason to posit
qualia” (O’Dea 2008, p. 300). Apparently, considerations like these helped tip
the  scale  of  Frank  Jackson’s  deliberation  away from dualism (Bigelow  and
Pargetter 2006, pp. 353–354). Despite changes in terminology, the terms of the
debate are essentially those captured in Searle (1983, p. 59): either a vehicle
intervenes, in which case it blocks access to the object; or access to the object is
achieved, in which case no vehicle intervened (Kind 2010). In my view, what
the  transparency  argument  establishes  is  that  one  would be  impotent  to  tell
whether the qualitative experience one undergoes is “internal” or “external” to
one. Indeed, under the stringent exclusionary conditions just outlined, it would
be just as reasonable to interpret a blue expanse as an opaque screen as it is to
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interpret it as some physical object transparently present before one (Ransdell
1979). What deserves endorsement, then, is not one of these two glosses, but an
agnostic  mid-way,  since  both  options  are  equally  viable  (until  and  unless
further experience is allowed to enter the picture).
In  his  Tractatus de Signis,  John Poinsot  explicitly addressed  the tension
implied by iconicity:
[T]he more a representation is one with the thing represented, the better and
more efficacious is the representation. Yet no matter how perfect, a concept
in us does not attain to identity with the represented, because it never attains
to  this,  that  it  represents  itself,  but  [always  rather]  another  than  itself,
because it always functions as something vicarious in respect of an object; it
always retains a distinction, therefore, between the thing signified and itself
signifying. ([1632] 1985, p. 228)
Poinsot concluded that iconic likeness can never be complete. What motivated
Poinsot  to  endorse  this  minimal  difference  is  something  along  the  lines  of
Aquinas’ thesis that “[a]lthough it is necessary for the truth of cognition that the
cognition answer to the thing known, still it is not necessary that the mode of
the thing known be the same as the mode of its cognition” (Summa Contra
Gentiles, translated by Rasmussen 1994, p. 417). A default recommendation to
tease these two elements apart can certainly benefit philosophic inquiry in most
instances. The problem, however, is that in iconicity what we know is precisely
how we came to know it (for a fuller discussion of Poinsot’s views on iconicity,
see Champagne forthcoming).
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Peirce,  who had a  command of  medieval  semiotics  (Beuchot  and  Deely
1995), agrees with Poinsot that “one and the same thing never represents itself;
for this identity cancels the rationale of a sign” (Poinsot [1632] 1985, p. 234;
see Furton 1995, p. 126). But, as a logician, Peirce  (1998, pp. 186–194)  bites
the bullet, as it were, and accepts that the triadic relations involved in semiosis
must subsume simpler (dyadic and monadic) ones—even if  that  means that,
below a certain point, there cannot properly be a sign (Santaella 2003, pp. 49–
50). This may be what James had in mind when he noted that, approached from
a certain  perspective,  “the  sensation  as  ‘sign’  and  the  sensation  as  ‘object’
coalesce into one, and there is no contrast between them” ([1890] 2007b,  p.
243).  If  an ontology is incapable or unwilling to countenance such an iconic
contact,  then  “any  project  of  explanation  that  applies  to  consciousness  the
empirical methodology of the experimental sciences risks falsifying or omitting
entirely the interpretive kind of access that we have to our own consciousness, a
kind of access that is unique and practically definitive of the special problems
of explaining it” (Livingston 2004, p. 229).
Now, a standard approach to truth sees it as consisting of truth-bearers on
one side, truth-makers on the other side, and a truth-relation between the two.
This essentially reprises the triadic model of the sign. Whatever “truth” we get
in iconic reference, though, reminds us not to take this model for granted, since
in our most proximate experiential dealings with objects, truth-bearer and truth-
maker are one (Bradley 2012, pp. 157–158).  This means that  one should not
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worry about (much less accuse theorists of) conflating physical presence and
cognitive presence (Levine 2007, p. 163) since, at the proper level of analysis,
there is simply nothing to “conflate.”  I  believe this is what John McDowell
means when he says that “there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing
one can mean, or generally the sort of thing one can think, and the sort of thing
that can be the case. When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case”
(1996, p. 27; see Dodd 1995).
Like Peirce, James invites us to consider a white sheet of paper, and to note
that “[t]he thought-stuff and the thing-stuff are here indistinguishably the same
in nature […] and there is no context of intermediaries or associates to stand
between and separate the thought and thing” ([1906] 1975, p. 31; also found in
James  1977,  p.  156).  Matjaž  Potrč  defends  something  analogous  when  he
argues that conscious experience presupposes an “original intertwinedness” of
subject and object (2008, pp. 110–111). His proposal is reminiscent of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on the “chiasm” of experience, according to which
“he who sees cannot possess the visible unless he is possessed by it, unless he
is of it” (1968, pp. 134–135).
Whereas iconicity engulfs the very quality it refers to, acquaintance always
keeps its object at bay. Russell reworked the original notion with the express
intent of preserving such a split: “Now I wish to preserve the dualism of subject
and object in my terminology, because this dualism seems to me a fundamental
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fact concerning cognition” (1910–11, p. 109). Indeed, it should be remembered
that indexicals, which Peirce originated (see Atkin 2005; Sebeok 1990, p. 21),
were  later  changed  by  Russell  to  the  (now  unpopular)  name  “egocentric
particulars”  ([1940]  1997, pp.  108–115).  The  possibility  of  developing  an
account  of  iconicity  has  been  hindered  by  the  assumption  that  such
demonstratives are “the mother and father of all information-based thoughts”
(Evans  [1982] 2002, p. 145). A symptomatic statement can help to appreciate
the scope of the missed opportunities. Chalmers matches my negative claim that
what is involved in phenomenal knowledge is not an index. He writes: “Mary’s
thought involves attributing a certain substantive qualitative nature to an object
that is identified demonstratively.  The concept  R—her qualitative concept of
the sort of experience in question—is not a demonstrative concept at all [...]”
(Chalmers 2004, p. 185).
However, Chalmers does not match my positive claim that what is involved
is an icon. The closest  he comes to reference  by shared quality is  when he
invents  a  “direct  phenomenal  concept” (Chalmers  2010,  p.  267).  Pausing to
take stock of what he has gleaned from his dialectic, Chalmers writes: “All this
is to say that there is something intrinsically epistemic about experience.  To
have an experience is automatically to stand in some sort of intimate epistemic
relation to the experience [...]” (1996, pp. 196–197). Chalmers is saying that to
undergo  an  experience  is  eo  ispo to  know  “what  it  is  like”  to  have  that
experience  (I  would rephrase this by saying that  whenever  there is  a  token,
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there  is  a  tone).  Yet,  Chalmers  immediately  adds:  “[...]—a relation that  we
might call ‘acquaintance’” (1996, p. 197). If  it  is true that “[s]ome kinds of
knowledge require distinctive forms of engagement between the knower and the
known”  (Bigelow  and  Pargetter  2004,  p.  194),  and  if  knowledge  of  qualia
requires  just  such  a  distinctive  form  of  engagement,  then  by  using  the
Russellian label “acquaintance” and speaking of a “relation,” Chalmers (2010,
pp. 283–291) inadvertently takes on a host of philosophical assumptions which
introduce a gap or hiatus between knower and known.
Chalmers is simply working out a consequence of this “dualism of subject
and object” (Russell 1910–11, p. 109) when he asserts that “experiences are not
red in the same sense in which apples are red. Phenomenal redness (a property
of experiences or of subjects of experience) is a different property from external
redness (a property of external  objects)” (Chalmers 2010, p. 254).  Although
Chalmers immediately adds that “both are respectable properties in their own
right” (ibid.), his basic assumptions nevertheless leave him with two tokens to
juxtapose: one “in here,” the other “out there.” Presumably, one comes to know
a token “out there” by means of a token “in here.” Yet, no matter how alike
those  tokens  are,  the  thin  space  of  numerical  distinctness  between  them is
enough  to  cast  doubt  that  one  truly  has  referred  to  the  quality  in  question.
Chalmers is therefore right that a predicament like absent or inverted qualia “is
occasionally found distasteful, but it is a natural consequence of the indexicality
172
of the concept” employed to express phenomenal qualities (Chalmers 1996, p.
205).
The  trichotomy  of  symbol/index/icon  is  distinguished  from  all  this  by
making  room  for  a  mode  of  reference  that  fuses  sign-vehicle  and  object.
Because it is merely potentially similar to something like it, “[a] pure icon can
convey no positive or factual information; for it affords no assurance that there
is any such thing in nature” (Peirce (1931–58, vol. 4, para. 447; for a similar
view, see Crane 2009). Although indexicality has its place, Peircean semiotics
countenances an ideal case where what is signifying and what is signified are
one and the same. In short, careful study of the conditions for the possibility of
sign-action reveals a ground level where similarity becomes so pronounced that
“[i]t is an affair of suchness only” (Peirce 1998, p. 163). When prescinding all
the  way  to  uncorrupted  iconicity  (without  numerically-distinct  tokens),  we
therefore  place  ourselves  at  a  level  incapable  of  supporting  the  distinction
between veridicality and illusion, given that “[o]n a perceptual level you cannot
predicate  anything  of  a  Likeness  other  than  the  recognition  that  it  is  that
Likeness” (Eco 2000, p. 347). This means that, contrary to the view expressed
by Chalmers, if one looks solely at a quality, experiences  are red in the same
sense in which apples are red.
Papineau  comes  to  the  same  conclusion:  “What  it’s  like  to  focus
phenomenally on your visual experience of the bird is no different from what
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it’s like to see the bird” (Papineau 2007a, p. 124). Using symbols, one person
can  invite  another  person  to  use  icons  and  engage  in  such  “focus.”  Such
prescissive disregard of everything except a given quality can be done in a way
that lets the two persons achieve the same result.  But,  in order to verify the
convergence on a shared quality, those persons necessarily have to start talking
and gesturing again. We will never rid ourselves of the fact that communication
requires us to show and tell. Yet, to the extent the transparency argument holds,
then by joint attention subjects can genuinely come to know what it’s like for
each other to enjoy a given phenomenal experience.
All the distinctions in the earlier diagram (figure 4) and grid (figure 5) are
prescissive, so I have no wish to deny that, “[w]hen Mary says, ‘So this is what
it is like!’, what she refers to will almost certainly be a physical property of a
physical event” (Bigelow and Pargetter 2006, p. 377).  Such physical presence
would suddenly matter if, say, Mary were to use a red rose to indicate to her
colleagues  that  she passed by the laboratory while  they were gone.  Indices,
however, do not exhaust the referential repertoire, so I argue that the red rose
can fulfil other roles that turn on its quality. Deliberate focus on a quality does
not erase the fact that a token is needed to see a tone—the referential resources
of  philosophy of  signs  may be  richer,  but  particulars  are  always  needed  to
impinge upon our senses, just like any sign must have some concrete material
support. But if, as I have argued, similarity does not depend on proximity, then
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it  is  misleading  to  claim  in  an  unqualified  way  that  “Reference  to  any  x
involves causal influence from x to the referential act” (Robinson 2008, p. 224).
It is important to keep in mind that similarity can be (and probably always
is)  a  matter  of  degree  (Nöth  1995,  p.  124).  Although  I  am  dealing  with
similarity in its  most  extreme theoretical  case  (as  a pure qualitative identity
uncorrupted  by  numerical  distinctness),  it  nevertheless  remains  that,  in
everyday  sign-use,  one  handles  imperfect  similarities.  Interpretation  must
ultimately answer to mind-independent constraints (Eco 1990), but it has plenty
of wiggle room. For example, the fact that a letter is missing will surely not halt
one  from taking  “Raise  your  f_st”  to  mean  “Raise  your  fist.”  Therefore,  a
philosophical preoccupation with ideal similarity should not be confused for a
practical account of similarity-based semiosis.
Papineau acknowledges that “in phenomenal thought the conscious referent
seems to be present in the thinking itself, without any veil between subject and
object” (2006, pp. 104–105). Papineau has a mixed attitude towards this result.
He writes that “[p]henomenal thoughts do not have any magical  property to
reach out and grasp their objects transparently” (2006, p. 105). This conveys an
unmistakable incredulity. For my part, I do not detect anything magical here. Of
course, if icons enjoy a bond to their object(s) near or far, this does look like
action at a distance, which can in turn seem magical. However, this sense of
magic arises only on the assumption that “[p]henomenal thoughts, just like any
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other intentional states, gain their referential powers from causal and historical
relations” (Papineau 2006, p. 105). I follow most semioticians in recognizing
that not all reference conforms to that indexical model.
Trying to force  every encounter  with  reality into  an indexical  encounter
means that  whatever  fails  to meet this expectation is  discarded as somehow
unreal (see Cockram 2014). A lot of things fall into place once we realize this.
Indeed,
We  may  understand  Quine’s  criterion  of  ontological  commitment  in
Peircean  semiotic  terms  as  an  attempt  to  place  the  full  burden  of
representing  reality  onto  indexical  signs.  This  leads  philosophers  with
realist sympathies to feel they need to ask a raft of questions of the form:
“Does term X [e.g. ethical or aesthetic predicates, number-terms…] denote
a real object?” If  we recall that indexical signs pick out sign-independent
particulars,  it  often seems hard to  answer “yes” to this question for key
terms in manifestly important human discourses [...]. (Legg 2013, p. 16; for
a kindred complaint, see Horwich 2010)
Qualia  are  a  casualty  of  this  assumption.  Widening  the  array  of  referential
options,  so  as  to  include  iconicity,  is  thus  one  way  to  avoid  dismissing
immediate  conscious  awareness  solely  on  account  of  its  linguistically
inarticulate character.
To  be  sure,  the  pure  icon  must  remain  a  theoretical  ideal—the  logical
asymptote of a likeness bereft of any alterity (qualitative and numerical). To the
extent one reaches this limit, one does so only by means of reason. I thus own
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up to the fact that, ultimately, “[s]emiosis explains itself by itself” (Eco 1976, p.
71).  There  is  nothing  spooky  about  this  sort  of  circularity.  In  discussing
philosophical explanations of natural science which rely on the very results of
natural science,  Quine famously wrote that “scruples against circularity have
little point” (1969, p. 76). Nowadays, most have accepted that we do our best
with the means we have at our disposal. All the semiotician does is enlarge that
circle to encompass signs, which we can never stop using. The methodological
difference is that, unlike using symbols to talk about symbols—which is what
linguists do when they employ a meta-language—using symbols to talk about
icons requires  semioticians to subtract,  not  add,  a layer  a discourse.  Neither
strategy is impossible to implement.  In either case, one must disregard one’s
intervention; otherwise no progress can be made.
II.VIII Chapter Conclusion
The moment an organism acts on the basis of a feeling, this generates a worry
that we are studying that feeling’s  discernible effects,  not  the quality of the
feeling  itself.  Properly  understood,  phenomenal  states  or  qualia  are  not
supposed to enter into any kind of relation with the world or other mental states,
otherwise  they  could  in  principle  be  detected  (either  through  their  causal
efficacy or participation in inferences). Hence, “[o]n the phenomenal concept,
mind is characterized by the way it feels; on the psychological concept, mind is
characterized  by  what  it  does”  (Chalmers  1996,  p.  11).  Yet,  since  “doing”
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automatically  changes  the  topic  away  from  phenomenality,  how  could  one
possibly refer to such qualities?  Some (e.g., Levine 2001) have taken this to
mean  that  humans  have  an  inherent  shortcoming  when  it  comes  to
understanding  consciousness.  The  phenomenal  concept  strategist  maintains
that, on the contrary, our epistemic powers are almost too strong for their own
good. We employ a special class of concepts when discussing conscious states,
and a better  understanding of  those  concepts  will  show that  “the disturbing
effect of the explanatory gap arises from an illusion [...]” (Loar 1999, p. 103).
There is  a sense in which I too have endeavoured to disentangle certain
intuitions that generate puzzlement about consciousness. Chalmers remarks that
“[t]he clearest cases of direct phenomenal concepts arise when a subject attends
to  the  quality  of  an  experience  and  forms  a  concept  wholly  based  on  the
attention  to  the  quality”  (2010,  p.  267).  Once  we  enlist  the  resources  of
philosophy of signs to articulate this idea of a concept wholly based on attention
to a quality, we gather that only icons could be up to the task of referring to
qualia. One can prescind a simple quality amidst any segment of semiosis, but
one  has  to  make  sure  that  whatever  one  reports  about  those  impoverished
scenarios does not help itself  to the very resources supposed absent.  Hence,
qualia  “are  the artificial  product  of  a  highly sophisticated  analysis,  and not
genuine existents revealed to ordinary,  everyday scrutiny”  (Goudge 1935, p.
536).  Unfortunately,  mainstream  debates  took  on  selected  Peircean  ideas
without grasping their full semiotic motivation. Present-day advocates of the
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phenomenal  concept  strategy  represent  the  culmination  of  the (mistaken)
assumption that indexicals are the simplest form of reference one can muster.
By  dipping  below  the  level  of  triadic  relations,  I  have  tried  to  approach
phenomenal consciousness from a different—and more promising—angle.
How does the world “convey” information to our minds? The overlooked
possibility I have been exploring is: by doing no conveying to begin with. Icons
are ideal transducers because they involve no transduction; “[a]nd this means
that  philosophers  do  not  have  the  task  of  explaining  how we get  from  our
experience  to  its external object” (Hookway 2007, p. 68). If  we come to the
situation armed with the possibility of such “split-free” iconic reference, it is no
longer mandatory to countenance the disconnect illustrated in figure 3. William
Seager writes that “[t]he privacy of your qualia does not at all imply that others
can’t  know what  experiences  you  are  having or  what  they  are  like.  But  of
course they cannot know this by literally sharing your experiences” (1999, p.
92).  At the risk of sounding provocative, this chapter has suggested that they
can.
Since  icons  can  reach  their  shared  qualities  only  once  we  suppose  all
interpretations and objects absent, I want to spend the next chapter studying this
prescissive supposition of absence.
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Chapter III
Does the Mind Have an “Undo Button”?
Prescission Demystified
What,  [Dennett]  asks,  was the  taste  of  beer  the  first  time you  tasted  it,
before you learned to like it? He seems to think that it had no specific taste,
no  qualia. Dennett’s understanding seems to be that what we mistook for
taste was really a frustrated urge to spit the stuff out. Such a disposition may
well have been part of the experience, but I also remember a taste.
David Lidov, Elements of Semiotics (1999, p. 117)
Supposing  [...]  that  a  certain  representation,  A,  passes  from  some  state
unaccompanied  by  the  I Think  to  a  state  in  which  the  I Think  does
accompany it, will there follow a modification of the structure of A, or will
the representation remain basically unchanged?
Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego:
An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness ([1936–37] 1991, p. 34)
III.I Chapter Introduction
If one thinks about one’s thinking, can one undo what one has done—or is one
forever  burdened  with  the  added  complexity  one  has  generated?  In  The
Conscious Mind, David Chalmers inserts a memorable cartoon of a character,
Zippy  the  Pinhead,  spawning  a  long  (and  seemingly  open-ended)  series  of
higher-order thoughts:
Figure 6   Zippy the metareflective Pinhead
(Taken from Chalmers 1996, p. 230)
I take it that this is comical because, for the most part, such a predicament does
not  hinder  our  daily  affairs.  Sartre  is  right:  if  an  extra  “I  think”  were  to
accompany  every  experience,  “this  superfluous  I would  be  a  hindrance”
([1936–37]  1991,  p.  34),  because  it  would  engender  a  regress.  One  might
conclude from this that “the transparency of the phenomenal is biologically and
philosophically necessary to avoid the sensory overload and the regress implied
in sensing the sensors ad infinitum” (Musacchio 2005, p. 405). However, we
can and do reflect in many cases. So, the question is: when animals capable of
reflection extricate themselves from the mental meta-edifices they erect, must
they wait for the extra layers at hand to “die out” from fatigue and inattention—
or can they do so right away, by deliberately supposing those layers absent?
Answering this question is important, because I have argued in the previous
chapters that tones and icons can be entertained only if their relations with
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other things or states are supposed absent. Because every tone is embodied in a
token and every iconic bond is embedded in an indexical bond, it is only by
dipping  below  the  level  of  actuality  that  the  qualitative  dimension  of
consciousness makes sense. So, a lot hinges on our ability to suppose that we
are not thinking what we already do, in point of fact, think. Dennett (1991a, p.
389)  may  believe  that  humans  mistakenly  confabulate  the  presence  of
experiential qualities sandwiched between their behavioural dispositions, but I
think we can prescind qualities from the various reactions they engender. In
this chapter, I want to demystify the workings of such prescissive abstraction.
Some philosophers  of  mind,  like  David  Rosenthal,  have  argued  that  “a
state’s being conscious consists  in one’s being in some kind of higher-order
mental  state  that  represents  that  state”  (2005,  p.  4).  In a way, this demand
makes perfect sense. Imagine, for instance, a Beefeater—those British palace
guards with the big furry helmets—paid to stay immobile and who, sometime
during his shift, becomes bored. Surely, if that Beefeater does not represent to
himself this experience of boredom, it seems more parsimonious to say that he
performs his duty in a blanked out, quasi-vegetative state.  A given conscious
state must rise to a  minimal level of complexity if it is to be embroiled in
functions that can in principle be studied. Otherwise, if a subject in no way
issues actions or decisions that attest to her enjoying a conscious experience,
shaving  off  that  alleged  experience  seems  the  naturalist  thing  to  do.  A
metarepresentational  theorist  like  Rosenthal  is  thus correct  to  hold that,  at
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minimum, the Beefeater must be a bit like Zippy the hyper-reflective pinhead,
otherwise that does not leave us much to go on.
Ned Block, however, disagrees. He argues that shaving off phenomenal
experiences that do not manifest themselves would be hasty. Intuitively, the
issue comes down to this. Block (1995a, p. 234) argues that when one hears a
nearby drilling noise but notices it only moments later, one was conscious of
the  noise  all  along.  Rosenthal,  by  contrast,  thinks  an  experience  becomes
conscious  only  when  one  notices  it.  Since  I  find  each  of  these  views
compelling, I want to develop an account that can plausibly house them both.
The claim that one was phenomenally conscious of a drilling noise before
noticing it is plausible—it certainly would not violate the laws of physics in
any obvious way. Still, for a standpoint that requires the ascription of mental
states  to  be  backed  by  some kind  of  verification,  Block’s  suggestion  is
problematic. Block believes that results achieved by the psychologist George
Sperling (1960) vindicate his views on phenomenal-consciousness. I thus want
to revisit Sperling’s experiment so that, later, I can give it a new twist.
III.II Ned Block and the Sperling Results
Metarepresentational accounts of consciousness typically fall into two basic
families.  On  the  one  hand,  we  find  theories  that  center  on  “higher-order
thoughts”  or  “HOTs,”  while  others  employ  the  notion  of  “higher-order
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perceptions”  or  “HOPs.”  Despite  their  differences,  both  HOTs  and  HOPs
mobilize a common idea: conscious states involve a folding of the mind onto
itself, as it were. This can be glossed as a substantive claim about the nature of
consciousness:  where  there  is  no  higher-order  folding,  there  is  no
consciousness. Rosenthal,  for  example, holds that “if one isn’t in any way
aware of an experience, there simply isn’t anything it’s like for one to have it”
(2005, p. 191).
I have a lot of sympathy for higher-order theories of consciousness (I have
tried to contribute to their development in Champagne 2009b). Using Block’s
distinction, it does seem right to say that, for a higher-order representation to
represent a first-order state, that high-order representation must “access” the
first-order state. Since Block holds that phenomenal-consciousness can exist
even in the absence of such access, one way of glossing the disagreement is to
say that Rosenthal wants to dismiss Block’s “phenomenal-consciousness” as
ontologically onerous and scientifically uncalled-for. Block, however, thinks
his  distinction  is  not  only  conceptually  sound,  but  that  it  actually  enjoys
empirical support. He uses experiments conducted by George Sperling to show
this. Sperling presented subjects with very brief visual displays of letters lasting
50 milliseconds then asked them whether they saw the whole display and how
many letters they could identify. The stimulus used by Sperling looked like this:
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Figure 7   Example of actual stimulus materials used by Sperling
(Taken from Sperling 1960, p. 3)
The  experiments  conducted  with  these  cues  are  interesting  because  results
showed a pronounced mismatch or discrepancy between what the subjects said
they saw and what the subjects could prove they saw. While subjects reported
that they had seen the whole display of letters, they could only recall a limited
subset (usually a third or less) of these. Even so, in all cases, subjects insisted
on having been conscious, however briefly, of the whole visual display. This
suggests that experience floods the mind with more information than it can use
at any given time.
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The results obtained by Sperling have been widely duplicated and are not
under dispute. The contentious issue pertains to what those results tell us about
the mind. Clearly,  “[i]t  is  difficult  to know exactly what  is  going on in  the
phenomenology  of  the  subject  who  is  undergoing  the  Sperling  experiment,
before being asked about the contents of a row” (Bayne and Chalmers 2003, p.
36). In spite of this methodological challenge,  Block believes the explanation
which “makes the most sense of the data [...] is that although one can distinctly
see all or almost all of the 9–12 objects in an array, the processes that allow
one to conceptualize and identify the specific shapes are limited by the capacity
of ‘working memory,’ allowing reports of only about 4 of them” (2007, p. 487;
emphasis added). Block’s interpretation is controversial, because it states that
subjects  saw “all  or  almost  all”  the  items  shown,  and  moreover  saw them
“distinctly.”
Commenting  on  Block’s  interpretation,  David  Papineau  (2007b,  p.  521)
thinks  it  is  more  parsimonious  to  see  Sperling’s  results  as  motivating  a
distinction between an indistinct “scene” phenomenology and a more distinct
“item” phenomenology. Presumably, only some items in an experienced scene
receive cognitive attention. Indeed,
Consciousness is the subject of many metaphors, and one of the most hardy
perennials  compares  consciousness  to  a  spotlight,  illuminating  certain
mental goings-on, while leaving others to do their work in the dark. One
way of elaborating the spotlight metaphor is this: mental events are loaded
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on to one end of a conveyer belt by the senses, and move with the belt—
perhaps changing as they go—towards a fixed circle of light, which does
not completely cover the width of the belt. Some mental goings-on fail to
pass through the illumination, in which case they never become conscious.
But others are illuminated, and thereby enter one’s consciousness. Beyond
the spotlight, at the other end of the conveyer belt, lies the filing cabinet of
memory, into which some of the more garish or lurid of the belt’s contents
fall. (Byrne 1997, p. 103; for a similar metaphor, see Crick 1993, p. 62)
Proceeding from this picture of the mind, one might ask: what is the point of
(or  warrant  for)  countenancing  unlit  portions?  Jesse  Prinz,  for  example,
recently developed a view where “items to which we have not allocated any
attention  are  not  available.  Thus,  there  is  no worry that  this  account  will
include too much” (2012, p. 105). However, in terms of the conveyor belt
metaphor, what Block is saying is that the surplus portions that do not receive
the spotlight of attention are nevertheless, in their own way, distinctly present
to consciousness.
I think Block’s critics are in many ways right to charge him with promoting
a bloated ontology. Indeed, in keeping with Peirce’s pragmatist maxim (1992,
p. 132), I accept that, if “the object of our conception” does not “conceivably
have practical bearings,” then we have no basis to credit our concept with having
an object. Or, to put that maxim in terms that speak directly to the concerns of
philosophy of mind: “Every form of thinking must betray itself in some form of
expression or go undiscovered” (Peirce 1998, p. 18).  The simple or “zealous”
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(Weisberg 2011) construal  of  phenomenal-consciousness espoused by Block
seems to violate this maxim, since it could never be detected. After all, on the
terms Block has set, the moment experimental evidence supports the existence
of phenomenal-consciousness, one switches the topic to access-consciousness.
Strictly speaking then, only a-consciousness enjoys experimental support.
Yet, having said this, I do not think Block’s view necessarily fails to meet
the demand for tangible effects. If we read the Peircean maxim carefully, it
requires only that an object “conceivably” have practical bearings. So, unlike
Prinz, who holds that “[a]vailability is not mere disposition” (2012, p. 105), I
am willing to admit un-accessed contents, provided they support a power to be
acted upon.  Unnoticed drilling noises are admissible because, eventually, they
are noticed.
Ernest Sosa claims that having an experience need not involve any explicit
awareness that one is having the experience in question. As he writes: “One’s
consciousness contains experiences that go unnoticed; unnoticed altogether, or at
least unnoticed as experiences with an intrinsic, experiential character that they
nevertheless do have” (Sosa 2003, p. 276). I do not want to go that far. As I see
it, any given state in a person’s private mental life must eventually leave some
observable trace if we are ever to infer its presence. One should not recoil so far
away  from  behaviourism  that  one  relinquishes  this  perfectly  sensible
requirement.
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Interestingly, Sperling managed to meet that demand by changing his initial
experimental design:
Sperling’s clever idea was to test whether people really did see all or almost
all  of  the  characters  and  whether  the  phenomenology  persists  after  the
stimulus was turned off by playing a tone soon after the array was replaced
by a blank. Subjects were to report the top row if the tone was high, the
bottom  row  if  the  tone  was  low,  and  the  middle  row  in  case  of  an
intermediate tone. The result was that subjects could report all or almost all
the characters in any given row. (Block 2007, p. 487)
Compared with blind trust in first-person reports, that is a huge improvement.
Philosophically,  though,  it  still  leaves  us with  a  tension:  we  want  to  study
consciousness, not the effects of consciousness.
As we have seen in the previous chapters,  one of  the leading concerns
animating current philosophy of mind is that no matter how good a scientific
account is, it will leave out “what it’s like” to be conscious (Nagel 1974). Indeed,
the “hard problem” of consciousness (Chalmers 1996) stems from the fact that a
full story of what one “does” does not amount to a story of how such doing
“feels.” As such, the challenge in recent years has been to develop a way to
rigorously  study  that  experiential  dimension.  Introspection  is  one  obvious
method, but most would agree that, all other things being equal, it would be
preferable to have something less reliant on private insight. Block (2007, p. 487)
says that “phenomenal-consciousness overflows accessibility,” which is just a
high-flown way of saying that “more is seen than can be remembered” (Sperling
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1960, p. 1). That can seem like a trivial idea, but the requirements of scientific
verification actually make it difficult to prove.
Recently,  in  an  effort  to  sidestep  some  of  the  challenges  posed  by  his
accessibility/phenomenality  distinction,  Block  seems  to  have  weakened  his
stance. Instead of saying, as he once did (Block 2007, p. 487), that phenomenal
consciousness overflows accessibility, he now prefers to say that phenomenal
consciousness  overflows  access.  Looking  at  the  Sperling  experiments,  his
revised view “does not claim that any of the items in the array are cognitively
inaccessible, but rather that necessarily most are unaccessed” (Block 2011, p.
567).
While a strategic shift from the “inaccessible” to the “unaccessed” blunts
the force of many critics (like Cohen and Dennett 2011) who “think that a vote
for overflow is a vote for inaccessible consciousness” (Block 2011, p. 574), I
am  unsure  whether  a  weakening  of  access  succeeds  in  sidestepping  the
methodological  challenges posed by Block’s distinction. Block motivates his
new stance with an analogy: while only one lottery ticket wins, “this does not
show that for any particular contestant the lottery is unwinnable” (Block 2011,
p. 567). This point is well taken; an “unwon” ticket is not an “unwinnable”
ticket. In fact, as long as a ticket could have won, the view espoused by Block
gels with the Peircean modal realism I want to defend. There is, however, an
important  disanalogy.  In  terms  of  the  example  given  by  Block,  scientific
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observations  can  only  work  with  (and  establish  the  existence  of)  winning
tickets. Whereas failure to win does not make a lottery ticket inexistent, failure
to  be  manifested  in  access  certainly  makes  an  experiential  ascription
ontologically suspect.
According  to  Block’s  official  definition,  “a  representation  is  access-
conscious  if  it  is  made  available  to  cognitive  processing”  (2011,  p.  567).
Whether  it  is  computational  or  connectionist,  cognitive  science  is  in  the
business  of  studying  just  such  processing.  If  we  deprive  an  experience  of
access, what are we left with? Many would say: nothing. Strictly speaking, the
correct answer should be: nothing cognitive science can study. This qualified
consequence is still problematic. It  is of course sensible to hold that what  is
experienced  could be  experienced,  but  challenges  remain  when  it  comes  to
articulating this.
While  Block uses the term “overflow” to describe the relation between
phenomenal-consciousness and access-consciousness, I think the troublesome
relation in question is best understood as one of subsumption. If you have ever
handled a hard-boiled egg, you can have a sense of what sort of relation I mean
—and what sort of methodological challenges such a relation poses. For a first
approximation, then, consider the following analogy. A boiled egg is white on
the outside, yet it contains a yellow yolk on the inside (see figure 1 in section
I.IV). Without an x-ray machine, we cannot see the yolk through the opaque
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egg-white, so we have to break away that layer. Once we do this, we can readily
confirm that there is a yolk. Clearly, talk of an egg yolk now involves less
epistemic risk. Yet, since we have destroyed the egg, we have tampered with the
initial situation a way that makes us ill-paced to make any claim about the inner
portion of the egg as it stood prior to any intervention. As egg researchers, we
have to suppose that we did not do what we in point of fact did to obtain this
result.
I submit that one must make such a methodological supposition of absence
in order to fully understand phenomenal consciousness. Block is right: there are
more than winning tickets, and unwon lottery tickets are not thereby unwinnable.
But,  given that  scientists  can only handle  winning tickets,  the  only way to
theorize about unwon tickets is to suppose that the winning tickets one has
access to did not in point of fact win.
Prescission is what happens when, going against the facts, we suppose that
some portion of a thing is absent (when in fact that portion is very much there).
Because prescissive abstraction does not pretend to actually separate anything, it
is, in many ways, a modest move. Still, if we cannot permit the insertion of such
a formal distinction, then the very ingenuity that allows a cognitive scientist to
study  consciousness  will  always  invite  the  retort  that  the  scientist  has  not
“really” studied the quality of consciousness as it is intrinsically, irrespective of
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its functional role. That is an abstract and speculative request, and I think it can
be catered to only by abstract and speculative means.
III.III Experiencing Icons
Impingement on sense organs is an indexical encounter that conveys an icon
that persists once the exposure proper has ended. It is a fortuitous boon of the
chemistry and physics of vision that it allows information to be available for
longer than the strict emission of photons off a screen. Subjects in Sperling’s
experiment were presented with a blank screen immediately afterwards. Block
(2007, p. 487) quotes William James’ Principles of Psychology on this lag time:
“If we open our eyes instantaneously upon a scene, and then shroud them in
complete darkness, it will be as if we saw the scene in ghostly light throught
[sic] the dark screen” ([1890] 2007a, p. 645).  Admittedly, 50 milliseconds is
not a  long time.  Still,  an afterimage,  to  the  extent  it  indeed  qualifies  as  an
image, would manifest enough determinacy to permit interpretations.
Interestingly,  Sperling readily  granted  the  presence  of  phenomenological
afterimages. In his view, “[t]he question is not whether the observer continues
to see the stimulus after  the illumination is turned off,  but  for  how long he
continues to see the stimulus” (1960, p. 20). For my purposes, this question of
duration, while certainly relevant, is less interesting than the qualitative content
of what is contemplated.
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Subjects in the Sperling test were basically interpreting icons. A request to
name what letter one saw is a request to generate an interpretant. In the event of
ignorance, subjects were asked to guess what they saw, so they always provided
complete answers. As fleeting as an afterimage is, “[w]e can read off details in
it which were unnoticed whilst the eyes were open” (James [1890] 2007a, p.
645).  Provided images  after  the  fact  manifest  some  sort  of  diagrammatic
organization (into rows, etc.), these signs contain all that subsequent inferences
might  need  (see  Hoffmann  2011).  A  neuroscientific  account  that  does  not
incorporate  this  idea  that  the  visual  prompt  was  stored  as  an  icon  risks
rendering the subjects’ correct answers a mystery.
The  expression  “iconic  memory”  was  introduced  in  the  mainstream
literature  by  Ulric  Neisser  (1967,  p.  20)  in  the  same  book  that  coined  the
expression “cognitive psychology.” Neisser, however, did not explore all that is
implied by this idea of storing and accessing a past  experience by using an
image-like quality. Philosophy of signs recognizes icons as shared qualities that
can be interpreted but do not have to be interpreted. This seems to be exactly
what Block needs, since it can allow one to say that mental representations were
available in the first round of experiments, even though subjects in that first
round  did  not  muster  interpretants  to  prove  their  experience.  Indeed,
“Sperling’s  study firmly  establishes  that  unreported  letters  could have  been
reported”  (Prinz  2012,  p.  103).  I  thus  believe  Block  deprives  himself  of
powerful resources when (following Coltheart 1980) he rejects the idea that “a
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‘visual icon’ persists after the stimulus is turned off” and deems that “the term
icon is especially unfortunate” (Block 2007, p. 487).
Some philosophers may have developed a bias against resemblance, but it is
not as if icons enjoy no neuroscientific support. By staining monkey brains with
traceable chemicals, researchers have been able to show the presence of map-
like formations in areas of the brain (see Tootell et al. 1982). A grid pattern was
shown to the monkeys and the same grid was found imprinted on the relevant
region of their brain, almost as if the visual stimulus got tattooed on the cortex.
“Like  pictures,  adjacent  neural  populations  in  these  areas  corresponds  to
adjacent boundaries or surface points in the objects they represent” (Prinz 2002,
p. 31). Appropriately, a visual comparison conveys the similarity at hand better
than verbal descriptions ever could:
Figure 8   Imprinting of a map-like shape on a macaque brain
(Taken from Tootell et al. 1982, p. 902)
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The image on the left (A) shows one of the visual stimuli used, while the image
on the right (B) shows the pattern of brain activation in a flat-mounted tissue
section of a macaque striate cortex. Considered as an index, it matters in the
paired  images  above  that  there  is  cause  and  effect  sequence  allowing  a
transduction of the pattern in A to the pattern in B. However, considered as an
icon, the assignment of the roles of sign-vehicle and object to A and B is
interchangeable, depending on which interpretant is generated.
In cognition, an organism (fallibly) infers, by the production of a further
sign, that what holds for the configuration of B will hold for A. Hence, a
further event in the brain, call it event C, will relate to the worldly object A via
the mediation of B, and so on, in an open-ended series of concatenating triads.
Importantly, the production of C is not needed for B to resemble A. It does so,
even when no further thought represents it as doing so.
According to the account of iconic experience I have just sketched, “[e]ven
before having a fully functional semiotic consciousness, our body is not mere
pre-semiotic matter, but a highly complex semiotic system, endowed with […]
the  capacity  to  make  subtle  distinctions  and  respond  in  competent  and
meaningful ways to salient environmental stimuli” (Violi 2007, p. 84).  The
growth of signs which ensues does not have to remain bound by a shared
quality,  and  can  (and  likely  will)  switch  to  discrete  symbolic  encoding
(Pylyshyn 1973). The claim of Peircean semiotics, though, is that the chain of
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signs does not begin that way. Thomas Sebeok and Marcel Danesi  (2000, p.
11) call this the dimensionality principle: iconicity precedes indexicality, and
indexicality  precedes symbolicity.  Organisms tied  to  their  environment  by
shared qualities do not face any problem grounding their symbols (Harnad
2002).
I believe the iconic semiosis shown above substantiates David Papineau’s
claim that “the introspective identification of some experience requires that it is
compared with some model or template stored in the brain,” so that we “need
an original version of the experience in order to form the template for such
comparisons” (2003,  pp.  358–359).  This  is  Papineau’s  way of  saying that
Mary must exit the cave.
Coltheart (1980, p. 184) has  recommended that we distinguish between
“neural,” “phenomenological,” and “informational” persistence. An account of
what happens when we are exposed to the world can certainly be given greater
detail (e.g., Burge 2010). However, as a philosopher of signs, I am mainly
interested in the idea that, in some cases of objective cognition, what skewers
all such levels is a shared quality.  As Clark and Chalmers (1998, p. 8)  point
out, in playing the video game Tetris, one can either rotate a mental tile or an
on-screen tile. Sam Coleman (2011, p. 102) recently objected that this clashes
with normal intuitions about the boundary of consciousness. Such intuitions
are  the sediment of  philosophical  arguments  fought long ago (Champagne
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2008–09).  From  the  standpoint  proper  to  a  study  of  signs,  though,  the
opposition of mental versus worldly Tetris tiles is nugatory. Peirce noted that,
in an iconic sign like a diagram, “similarity concerns the relations of parts, and
is represented through analogous relations” (Petrilli 2010, p. 264). Looking at
the results shown above, researchers wrote that “[o]ne of the most striking
aspects of the [Deoxyglucose] maps is the unexpected sharpness of the borders
between visually stimulated and nonstimulated regions” (Tootell et al. 1982, p.
903). The motivated interpretations that such iconic mappings permit explains
why turning a Tetris tile a quarter turn to the right in the mind yields the same
result (and so is a fit surrogate for) a quarter turn to the right in the world. As
Sperling  put  it:  “It  is  as  logical  or  illogical  to  compute  the  information
contained in a visual image [...] as it is to compute the information in a visual
stimulus” (1960, p. 21).
It is no accident that Sperling organized his visual cues into rows. Placing
items in such a hierarchy allows for informational compression, which in turn
allows one to circumvent well known cognitive limitations (Miller 1956). It is
a bit like working with an abacus: once ten balls have been pushed to the side,
attention can be allocated solely to the next bar. Treating multiple items as
compound figures is sometimes called “chunking,” the classic example being
“CIAFBIIRS,” which Americans can chunk as  their  familiar  governmental
agencies CIA / FBI / IRS, thereby going from 9 items to 3. Making allowances
for the fact that,  linguistically, the letters shown by Sperling were random
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gibberish,  the  configuration  or  spatial  arrangement  of  the  items into  rows
nevertheless aided cognition to surmounting the narrow scope of conscious
awareness, since one can revisit the configuration or spatial arrangement in
order to make further observations.
Icons  provide  an  ideal  way  to  understand  what  the  Sperling  subjects
experienced prior to verbalizing what they saw. Of course, the chemical stains
used  to  highlight  the  stimulated  portions  of  the  brain  make  that  method
inapplicable to the Sperling paradigm, since the monkeys whose brains were
stained were presented with their visual display for 25 to 30 minutes whereas
human subjects in the Sperling test were allowed only a 50 msec glance at the
letters. Yet, as Sperling points out, the situation raises “considerations about
available  information  [that]  are  quite  similar,  whether  the  information  is
available for an hour (as it is in a book that is borrowed for an hour), or whether
the  information  is  available  for  only  a  fraction  of  a  second”  (1960,  p.  1).
Sperling also noted, quite appropriately,  that “[p]artial  reporting of available
information  is,  of  course,  just  what  is  required  by  ordinary  schoolroom
examinations and by other methods of sampling available information” (ibid.).
So, there might be pedagogical applications in the offing if we investigate the
hypothesis that long-term mental representations are also stored as icons (and
not in the discrete symbolic idiom favoured by classic computationalism).
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The  suggestion  that  information  can  be  stored,  accessed,  and
diagrammatically manipulated in virtue of its qualitative character is ostensibly
foreign  to  the  modern  mindset.  Peirce,  however,  is  noted  for  his  unusual
historical breadth, specifically for his familiarity with (and fondness for) pre-
Modern traditions (Deely 2001a). Interestingly, as part of his courses on logic,
the  sixteenth-century  Italian  polymath  Giordano  Bruno  used  to  teach  a
technique called “mnemonology,” which consisted in dividing information into
hierarchical structures. His instructional manual, The Great Key, has been lost,
but his work On the Shadow of Ideas survives. In it, subjects are instructed to
mentally visualize genus and species relations as statues in rooms. “Like files,
these statue collections or  architectures  of  the imagination were designed to
store  thoughts  in  a  way  that  made  them  easily  accessible,  easy  to  recall”
(Rowland  2008,  p.  123).  The  “scene”  and  “item”  distinction  proposed  by
Papineau (2007b) thus seems to allow for subsumption: an item in a scene can
be unpacked into another scene with yet more items. So, when Sperling aided
his test subjects to recollect seen items by using high and low pitched musical
notes to pick out rows, he was exploiting semiotic abilities that can, it seems, be
trained and enhanced.
III.IV The Fidelity of First-Person Reports
Block (1995a, p. 234), as we saw, thinks that if you hear a nearby drilling noise
and only later come to notice it, there is still a sense in which you were aware of
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the noise all along. On this view, your phenomenal consciousness of the noise
does not begin with your noticing it. It would, of course, be difficult to tell how
long  the  noise  went  on  in  your  head  without  being  noticed  since,  prior  to
becoming access-conscious, that experience was a mere quality not involved in
any detectable function. Were you to insist after the fact that you had heard it
all  along,  your  insistence  would come too late.  The contentious philosophic
issue concerns what, if anything, your mental life was like prior to any explicit
grasp.
The  experiments  conducted  by  Sperling  were  more  concerned  with
elucidating  memory  than  with  vindicating  a  philosophical  view  of
consciousness, so if we want to follow Block’s reasoning, we need to focus on
the essentials. Sperling conducted a variety of different tests, but only two are
invoked by Block to serve a philosophical purpose. In the first round, subjects
had a bunch of letters flashed before them but performed poorly when asked to
identify the items they glimpsed. They had to give a letter even if they were
unsure, but the accuracy of what they named was low. However, in a second
round of  testing,  subjects  were  shown the same number of  letters  but  were
given an auditory “retro-cue” that directed their mental focus to a given row.
This allowed them to perform better at identifying the items of whatever row
was cued. In both the first and second round of testing,  however,  Sperling’s
subjects reported seeing the whole visual display.
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Subjects were asked how much of the whole display they saw but, despite
including some instructions (Sperling 1960, p. 11), the methodology assumed
that subjects were competent to answer such queries in a reliable manner. This
reprises a common idea (going back to at least  Descartes) that introspective
reports are by their nature authoritative and infallible. Yet, some (e.g., Gallagher
and  Zahavi  2008)  have  recently  warned  that  first-person  reports  are  often
tainted by assumptions that lived experience does not corroborate. For instance,
careful phenomenological description will reveal that, even when engaged in
ordinary perception,  the area that  appears in focus in our visual  field is not
nearly as wide as folk theory presumes. As befits a fuzzy outline, we can debate
where that area of focus ends, but the clarity certainly does not reach a neat
frame, like a television set. Rather, it ends in a blur. Even so, the “television
set” view remains  the default  way of  understanding the visual  field used in
everyday  folk  psychology.  Sampling  movies  and  video  games  in  popular
culture, we find that, despite the prized emphasis on realism, the first-person
vantage is almost never depicted with a blurred boundary. When it comes to
peripheral vision, it appears we are massively gripped by a mistaken account
(trained  phenomenologists  would  likely  want  tease  more  perscipacious
descriptions out of  the report  of “black on black” vision we encountered in
section I.VI).
Without psychologizing the psychology, it does seem to offend an ingrained
sense of self-worth to admit that our awareness of surroundings is not nearly as
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crisp as we think it is. It is one of the few generalizations of phenomenology
that what is most familiar to us is often what is most difficult to notice (Dreyfus
and Wrathall 2009, p. 460n3). As a consequence, I surmise that most lay people,
test subjects or not, would always report seeing everything shown to them. If it
is  true  that  people  tend  to  credit  themselves  with  overblown  powers  of
discrimination, then it is predictable that subjects in the Sperling tests reported
enjoying a phenomenal-consciousness that “overflowed” their provable access.
Rocco Gennaro, a prominent higher-order theorist,  has recently criticized
Block’s interpretation of the Sperling results. Gennaro cites experiments by De
Gardelle and his colleagues (2009) which showed that “participants persisted in
the belief that only letters were present when pseudo-letters were also included
in the array” (Gennaro 2012, p. 167). This justifies worries about the reliability
of first-person reports. In fact, the participants’ belief in the presence of letters
“persisted even when participants were made aware that they might be misled”
(ibid.).  So,  when subjects report  seeing all  the letters, they might simply be
confabulating.
Now, it  is clearly less risky to believe what subjects report  experiencing
once  those  subjects  make good on  their  claims  in  a  tangible  way.  Can  the
subjects  prove  that  they  saw  the  whole  scene?  In  the  first  version  of  the
Sperling test, they were unable to do so. However, once cues were added to the
experimental design, subjects in the second version were able to draw on the
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previously unused portions of their visual experiences. The verbal reports and
actions still come too late—they have to, given the brief duration of the visual
flash. Still,  the accuracy of those reports and actions lends credence to their
claim that the  whole scene was experienced.  “If an experience is reported, or
accessed in some weaker sense, then we can explain it by reference to how the
brain thinks about itself. But if an experience happens without being accessible,
then it becomes a phantom” (McDermott 2007, p. 518). The Sperling results
make it no longer onerous to ascribe to subjects a possession of the relevant
information,  because  now  they  access  it.  Block  thus  reasons  that  Sperling
managed to experimentally prove what the story about a drilling noise can only
intuitively adumbrate.
Combining  the  introspective  reports  of  subjects  with  their  identification
tasks, we thus have the following clusters of data before us. In the first round of
tests without cues, we have introspective reports of seeing the whole scene and
no behavioural corroboration of those reports. In the second round of tests with
auditory cues, we again have introspective reports of seeing the whole scene,
but  this  time  we  have  strong  behavioural  corroboration  of  what  subjects
reported. Although reporting counts as a form of accessing in Block’s sense,
subjects  were  ostensibly  making  claims  pertaining  to  their  phenomenal-
consciousness  when  giving  reports.  When  subjects  were  making  outputs  in
response to controlled inputs, tests were capturing their access-consciousness.
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Block  wants  to  argue  that  the  good  performances  at  identification  tasks
corroborate  what  was  claimed  in  the  introspective  reports,  namely  that  the
whole scene was seen. Is Block licensed to say this? I think he is, but only if he
has recourse to prescission. Of course, now that success at third-person tasks
corroborates  the  first-person  reports,  it  is  easy  to  turn  around  and  make
pronouncements regarding what was subjects were phenomenally conscious of.
Yet,  presumably,  even if  Sperling had not  devised ingenious ways  to  verify
what subjects saw, it would have been true that subjects experienced the whole
scene.  In  order  to  show  why  a  supposition  of  absence  is  needed—and  to
illustrate how such prescissive abstraction works—I want to give a new twist to
the Sperling test.
III.V A Slow-Motion Sperling Test
My modified version has three steps. The first step consists in looking at the
letters of the stimulus depicted earlier, in figure 7. In contrast with a 50 msec
flash, my “slow-motion” version allows a subject to take ample time to view
the display. So look and take your time. The only directive you must abide by is
to  not  act  on  what  you  experience.  You  are  instructed  to  stay  still,  like  a
Beefeater on duty.
I take it that, already, the brain of any subject following these instructions
will have changed as a result of the causal exposure to the image. It may be
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possible not to act, but it is hard and perhaps impossible not to react. For an
eliminative materialist, once one has fully described this encounter between the
subject’s  human  physiology  and  the  page,  there  is  nothing  more  to  say.
However, the philosophic controversy I am concerned with surrounds “what it
is  like”  for  one  to  undergo  this  event.  Is  there  even  such  a  qualitative
dimension? Perhaps we can track a subject’s involuntary eye movements (if
any) to find out, but it would take an abductive leap to let those minute indices
speak to the experience of a qualitative state, and it is unclear whether such a
leap could ever be done without begging the question. Some further test thus
seems in order.
Step two of my slow-motion experiment thus requires a subject to perform
an identification task. Please look at figure 7 name the letters you see. Alas, the
moment  the  subject  breaks  her  silence  and  immobility  to  act  on  what  she
experiences,  she makes herself  capturable by functional  description.  We are
now recording linguistic outputs, not the intrinsic character of a mental state. In
other words, step two can only detect access-consciousness. So, on the terms
Block  has  set,  the  choice  seems  to  be  this:  silently  enjoy  phenomenal-
consciousness—or switch to access-consciousness.  This  means Block cannot
infer that correct identification tasks speak to what is or was experienced. 
Block  obviously  intends  his  inference  to  go  through,  since  he  thinks
Sperling managed to vindicate reports of phenomenal-consciousness.  Strictly
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speaking, though, Sperling did no such thing. The introspective reports of his
subjects have no more or less value or reliability because those subjects were
later  able to  perform better  at  certain  tasks.  All  that  such performances can
establish pertains to access-consciousness. This may seem like an unpalatable
consequence,  but  it  follows  from  Block’s  phenomenality/accessibility
distinction. I take that, from a dialectic standpoint, Block is not prepared to
jettison the distinction he has spent a whole career finessing. Hence, I argue that
unless we can retroactively “delete” or prescind access, it is self-defeating for
Block to adduce prowess at accessibility in order to substantiate the existence of
a phenomenal-consciousness divorced from all access.
One surprising conclusion of the foregoing is that the very performances
which made the Sperling results interesting have to be supposed absent if they
are to speak in an informative manner about what subjects experienced before
they engaged in overt identifications. In other words, if one wants to follow
Block  and  get  philosophical  mileage  out  of  the  Sperling  results,  one  must
employ prescission.
My slow-motion version of the Sperling test is tailored to address concerns
about consciousness, not memory. I take it that, without any time constraints,
normal adult subjects will report that they see whole scene. I also take it that, if
asked to identify the items in that scene, they will do so without fail. It is clear,
though,  that  if  we  now  want  their  splendid  functional  performance  to  say
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something about their experience apart from functional involvement, we have to
suppose that their experience would have been the same had we not asked them
to identify the items. In other words, we have to suppose that the qualitative
experience of a subject remains the same without or without all the additional
interpretive brouhaha.
Block tacitly relies on this hypothetical deletion when he claims that the
strong behavioural performance of subjects with cues corroborates the reports
those  subjects  made  without cues.  My  stance  differs  from  Block  in  two
respects. First, it makes this an explicit move. Second, it stresses that the move
is perfectly legitimate.
Why should  one  accept  the  legitimacy of  prescinding  function?  This  is
where the third step of my slow-motion experiment comes in. Step one required
subjects  to  look  at  the  display  of  letters,  silently,  without  acting  on  their
experience.  Step  two  required  subjects  to  say  what  they  had  seen,  and  to
tangibly make good on that experiential claim by identifying the various items.
I assume that,  under  my slow-motion conditions,  normal  adult  subjects  will
have  no  trouble  naming  all  the  letters.  Gennaro,  as  we  saw,  calls  on  the
possibility of confabulation to support his view that “not all twelve letters were
conceptualized  or  experienced  initially”  (2012,  p.  166).  This  objection  is
unlikely to apply here, since the extended duration of the slow-motion version
shrinks the possibility of (honest) confabulation. Subjects having looked at the
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letters carefully,  step three now asks them to say  in what order they named
these items.
Let us assume that, like most readers of English, subjects started from the
upper left corner, even though they were not narrating what they were doing at
the time. Now, however, they are asked to represent how they represented the
items.  Until  we come to  this  third  step,  we have  no evidence  that  subjects
metarepresented their activity in step two, thinking to themselves “I am now
naming letters from the upper-left corner outward.” Step three of my modified
Sperling experiment thus stands in the same relationship to step two that step
two stood to  step one.  Indeed,  the word order  has  the same status  that  the
unexpressed quality had: it was something that could have been verbalized but
was not.
Let  us  grant  that  the  verbalization  of  an  experience  transforms  that
experience into an access-conscious experience. My reductio argument is that,
if we are going to say that the visual experiences of subjects who saw the whole
scene needed the overt identifications of step two to be confirmed, then we also
have to say that the sequential identification of items at step two needed the
overt identification of step three.
Rosenthal holds that “[w]hat a qualitative state is like for one is a matter of
[...] how one represents that state to oneself” (2005, p. 193). Do we really want
to say that, until and unless subjects represented to themselves what they were
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doing, there was nothing “it was like” for them to start at the upper-left corner?
That can’t be right. Whereas Rosenthal writes that “a state’s being conscious
consists in one’s being in some kind of higher-order mental state that represents
that state” (2005, p. 4), I find it more plausible to say that every qualitative
experience has  the power to be interpreted,  and every interpretation has the
power  to  generate  further  interpretations,  but  since  we  are  not  Zippy  the
Pinhead, we do not have to do so, and if we do, we can always suppose all the
interpretations absent. I submit that we come to the idea of qualia by the same
benign means.
Whether  or  not  I  subsequently take  stock  of  what  it  feels  like,  there  is
clearly  something  “it  is  like”  for  me  to  read  in  the  direction  I  do.  This
qualitative character becomes apparent when I pit it to its opposite and try to
read  in  the  reverse direction,  from right  to  left.  The  same could be  said  of
walking forward versus walking backward. We are, for the better part of our
lives,  unreflective  creatures.  Those  raw  feels  may  become  easier  to
scientifically track once subjects represent them to themselves, but I think it is a
mistake to make such access our starting point.
The attempt to confirm the presence of p-consciousness without triggering a-
consciousness is a variation on what is sometimes called “the refrigerator light
problem”: to check whether the light in a refrigerator is on, we have to open the
door—and thereby turn on the light. On those terms, tampering with the data
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seems inevitable. “Since any report relies on cognitive access, it cannot inform
us about the presence of an inaccessible  conscious representation” (Schlicht
2012, p. 319fn7). If this is so, then any inquiry into consciousness that manages
to render that object of study tractable by some sort of articulate description risks
being charged with avoiding the qualitative dimension of conscious experience.
The formal distinction between “doing” and “feeling,” if reified and glossed
as a “real” distinction, can spur hope that experimental investigations could one
day isolate a quale. Indeed, at present, many feel “there is a pressing need for a
methodological  approach  that  is  capable  of  separating  P[henomenal-
consciousness] from A[ccess-consciousness] empirically” (Shea 2012, p. 308).
While I do not share the incredulity of so-called “mysterians” like Colin McGinn
(1989) and Joseph Levine (2001), I think waiting for a scientific isolation of
phenomenal consciousness is a forlorn hope. After all, “[t]here is a simple and
fundamental reason why all attempts to get at the ‘raw data’ of experience fail:
introspective evidence always arrives already interpreted” (Jack and Shallice
2001, p. 177). This accords with the semiotic claim that all cognition, being
intelligible, is cloaked in a layer of Thirdness.
Rosenthal  argues  that  “[c]onscious  states  are  those  we  are  actually
conscious of, not just potentially conscious of” (2000, p. 207). It is hard to fault
this sober view. Yet, on my reading, Block is trying to call attention to the fact if
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one does hear a drilling noise, one can hear that noise. I agree because, more
generally, we can suppose actuality absent.
“A thought about a thought” is, I assume, something more complex than
just “a thought.” I assume, moreover, that one can infer “a thought” from “a
thought about a thought,” but that one cannot infer “a thought about a thought”
from “a thought.” Now, what Rosenthal (2005) calls the “transitivity principle”
is basically an acknowledgement that a sign-vehicle, to the extent it merits our
calling  it  by  that  name,  always  produces  one  or  more  interpretant(s).  As  a
semiotician,  I  am  hardly  in  a  position  to  oppose  this.  For  example,  when
advertisers boast on their ads that “You’ve just proven signs work,” they are
tapping into a basic feature of semiosis that governs mental activity as well. The
demand that every relation between sign-vehicle and object be interpreted is a
promising way to tackle the easy problems of consciousness. In fact, were it not
for  controversies  regarding  qualia,  I  think  a  Peircean  philosopher  of  signs
should defend such an account without reserve. I agree with Fetzer that “the
theory of minds as  sign-using (or ‘semiotic’) systems [...] appears to fulfil the
desideratum advanced by Jerry Fodor—namely, that a cognitive theory aims at
connecting  the  intensional  properties of  mental  states  with  their  causal
properties vis-à-vis behaviour [...]” (2003, p. 295). Every sign (say, a colour) is
an interpreted sign (say, a thought about a colour), and every interpretation (the
thought about the colour) leaves itself open to being intepreted in turn (say, a
clinical observation that a subject has a thought about a colour). There is plenty
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of detectability to go around.  Yet,  in this dissertation,  I argue that,  properly
understood, the very triadic model which compels one to recognize the need for
(and growth of) interpretants should also compel one to accept the possibility of
conceiving states simpler than three-term relations.
Epicurus argued that, “when we exist, death is not yet present, and when
death is present, then we do not exist” (1994, p. 29). In a way, what Epicurus
said about death is applicable to sleep.  Even though watching someone else
sleep is not experiencing sleeping, hardly anyone doubts that there exist states
below waking states. To that extent, everyone is prepared to admit that the mind
contains portions which, properly speaking, they never have (and never will)
confirm directly. The question is how low one is prepared to go. Rosenthal is
uncomfortable with the idea that first-order experiences have a quality. Block,
by contrast, is open to the possibility that phenomenal experiences that are not
the target of higher-order representations will nonetheless have a feel. I think
Block’s stance is not as onerous as his critics sometimes make it out to be.
 John  Locke held that it is not “any more necessary for the soul always to
think, than for the body always to move” ([1690] 1978, book 2, chap. 1, para.
12, p. 48). In the same vein, William James wrote:
Like a bird’s life, [the stream of our consciousness] seems to be made of an
alternation of flights and perchings. The rhythm of language expresses this,
where every thought is expressed in a sentence, and every sentence closed by
a period. The resting-places are usually occupied by sensorial imaginations
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of some sort, whose peculiarity is that they can be held before the mind for
an indefinite time, and contemplated without changing; the places of flight
are filled with thoughts of relations, static or dynamic, that for the most part
obtain between the matters contemplated in the periods of comparative rest.
Let us call the resting-places the ‘substantive parts,’ and the places of flight
the ‘transitive parts,’ of the stream of thought. It then appears that the main
end of our thinking is at all times the attainment of some other substantive
part than the one from which we have just been dislodged. And we may say
that the main use of the transitive parts is to lead us from one substantive
conclusion to another. ([1890] 2007a, p. 243; emphasis in original)
Peirce (1931–58, vol. 8, para. 89) considered this “one of the finest, if not the
finest,  passage” in James’  Principles.  Using the same terminology (but  not
crediting  James),  Rosenthal  claims that  “transitive  consciousness  can occur
without intransitive state consciousness” (1997,  p.  737).  This is true if  it  is
analogous to the claim that one can drive on the freeway without stopping.
However, it is false if it is taken to mean the one can drive without retaining the
ability to stop.
Indeed,  I  think  it  is  informative  to  note  that  while  computers  that  self-
monitor routinely “crash,” we do not. The cartoon of Zippy the Pinhead does
not  send  its  readers  into  a  head-spin.  This  is  because  we  can  access  a
phenomenal  quality,  then  access  that  access,  but  we  can  also  move  in  the
reverse direction. We did just that when we read the items sequentially, then
represented to ourselves the direction of the sequence, then acknowledged that
the sequence was there all along, prior to that  verbalized identification.  The
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semiosis made two-steps forward, then one step back. I suggest that prescission
is  meta-representation  in  reverse.  Hence,  what  is  involved  in  prescissive
abstraction is the same disregard that spares one from being forever stuck with
a higher-order thought. That is what I meant when I said (at the close of section
II.VII)  that,  unlike  linguists  who  use  symbols  to  talk  about  symbols,
semioticians  who  want  to  study  icons  must  subtract,  not  add,  a  layer  a
discourse. 
None of this manages to show that qualia exist apart from their involvement
in  interpretive  activity.  Yet,  as  factually  inseparable  as  qualities  and  their
functional roles are, I do not see what can stop rational animals from inserting a
formal distinction between the two, nor do I see why such a power should be
taken to threaten empirical science.
To be sure, prescission is an artificial move that leaves everything as is, so
it can bring only philosophical solace.  While I would not go as far as to label
the predicament an antinomy (Levine 2001, p. 175), I do have a story to tell for
why  rational  animals  are  puzzled  when  they  contemplate  the  idea  of  a
qualitative feeling isolated from all functional involvement. It is because of our
unique ability to prescissively contemplate uninterpreted relations and unrelated
qualities that we humans “can form the idea of phenomena that we do not know
how to detect” (Nagel 1986, p. 24).
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III.VI Chapter Conclusion
Because the moment a subject acts or responds to phenomenal-consciousness
she switches to access-consciousness, the demand for an example of qualitative
Firstness  untainted  by  the  access  of  Thirdness is  tantamount  to  “asking  a
flashlight in a dark room to search around for something that does not have any
light shining upon it” (Jaynes [1976] 2000, p. 23). One might generalize this as
follows:  Everything that  presents  itself  in  the  stream of  experience will  be
couched in triadic signs, so the ubiquity of interpretation demands our theoretical
and ontological recognition.
Given that raw feels almost always prompt a host of responses and further
experiences, should we, as Rosenthal suggests, consider the representation of
such experiences to oneself as the key to understanding consciousness? I do not
think so.  Unless  experiential  qualities  are  somehow  there  from  the  get-go,
adding  layers  of  self-awareness  will  not  solve  the  problem.  The  qualitative
character  of  experience  is  simple,  but  the  actual  world  presents  itself  in
everyday life and scientific inquiry as complex. So, if we want to make sense of
qualia,  what  matters  is  not  the  addition  of  further  complexity,  but  the
subtraction of complexity.
A conscious mind is  coupled to  an environment.  Not only that,  it  drags
behind it a trail of past thoughts. As such, a conscious mind is constantly jostled
by causation and inference. Still, the human mind is so constituted that it can
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pinpoint a given qualitative state and trim away everything besides that quality.
Of course,  if  one contemplates an experiential  quality in such pure isolation
whilst forgetting all that needed to be forgotten in order to yield such a state,
one can end up populating one’s ontology with chimeras. Therefore, we should
insist that conscious states rise to a level of complexity sufficient to bubble to
the  observable  surface;  otherwise,  we  can  end  up  ascribing  all  sorts  of
superfluous experiences to any Beefeater  who stands on guard.  Yet,  if I  am
right  that  prescission  employs  the  same  “undo  button”  which  makes
metarepresentation a manageable endowment,  then forays  into what subjects
experienced before they functionally acted on those experiences can be done
responsibly, and the idea of enjoying an un-accessed experience does not have
to be spooky.
That has been my more modest goal in this chapter. The next step will be to
show  that  qualities—and  the  triadic  relations  they  enter  into—are  genuine
features of reality. It is to that task that I now turn.
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Chapter IV
Locating the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness:
Trinitarianism Instead of Panpsychism
Chalmers, through his use of the information concept beyond functionalism
and computationalism, allows for a kind of panpsychism […]. [H]e needs to
add Peirce’s semiotic philosophy to his theory in order to do that.
Søren Brier, Cybersemiotics: Why Information is not Enough (2008, p. 38)
I  would  say,  actually  it  is  fine  to  derive  one’s  metaphysics  from one’s
semantics—just please, please get a less simplistic semantics!
Catherine Legg, “What is a Logical Diagram?” (2013, p. 16)
IV.I Chapter Introduction
I  am  aware  that  many  do  not  consider  a  position  in  philosophy  of  mind
complete until it has proclaimed how many basic “stuffs” it is committed to. I
am  also  aware  that  any  number  greater  than  one  is  usually  viewed  with
suspicion. Catering to those who seek an exact number (but not those who seek
a low number), this final chapter will explore the idea that reality is comprised
of  three stuffs:  lone quality,  causal  impacts  between two things,  and triadic
relations (that have the power to beget more of themselves). If, as Legg (2013,
p. 16) suggests, it is acceptable to derive a metaphysical outlook from a theory
of meaning, then the Peircean account of meaning as a triadic relation would
seem to entail a triadic ontology. Following James Bradley (2009), I will call
this ontology trinitarianism (my use of the word denotes only a commitment to
three  stuffs,  not  any  religious  doctrine,  as  in Polkinghorne  2003).  On  a
trinitarian view, consciousness, like everything else, is made of one or more of
the sign’s parts.
I  approach  the  topic  of  ontological  commitment  with  some  hesitancy,
because I do not know how disagreements in that area are to be resolved (nor
do I think anyone else really knows). Parsimony is a nice criterion, but then
how exactly does one determine what counts as more parsimonious? Chalmers
writes,  for  example,  that  “[a]ccording  to  Russellian  monism,  all  conscious
experience is grounded in structure plus quiddities, but not in structure alone”
(2013, p. 18; see  Holman 2008). I happen to agree with that claim, and will
spend  the  whole  chapter  defending  it.  Yet,  if  there  is  a  commitment  to
something “plus” something else, how is this still monism? I suppose I could
say that there is only one thing in the world,  semiosis, and that it  has three
“properties”:  Firstness,  Secondess,  and  Thirdness.  However,  there  may  be
genuine ontological commitments involved, and I have no wish to dodge these.
Consider, for example, the subsumption which makes the inference from “a
thought about a thought” to “a thought” a one-way street. This asymmetry is
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not binding in virtue of a mere convention. Hence, what if we were to follow
Peirce  and  consider  the  quasi-logical  principles  that  govern  semiosis  “not
merely as regulatively valid,  but  as truths of being”  (1931–58, vol.  1,  para.
487)? I will look at what happens when the three categories are made into a
bona  fide ontology.  I  will  suggest,  in  effect,  that  semiotics  makes  a  great
metaphysics.
Those who think the preceding chapters do not need to be augmented with
such a metaphysical story can, I think, skip this final chapter without much loss.
I propose trinitarianism only as a back-scratcher for those who feel that itch. I
certainly do. My aim, in essence,  is to paint  a comprehensive picture of the
world  as  composed  of  relations  and  relata.  I  think  countenancing  qualities
gives  us  a  way  “to  account  for  conditions  of  signification  that  are  not
themselves semiotic” (Kruse 1990, p. 212).
I do not have a finished account, so everything I am going to say in this
chapter will be tentative and programmatic (I do not want to genuflect at every
claim, so please bear that qualification in mind throughout). Still, whatever the
shortcomings, I regard trinitarianism as an outlook which “[i]n its schematic,
pre-Socratic  way  [...]  attempts  to  recognize  the  mental  as  a  physically
irreducible part of reality while still clinging to the basic form of understanding
that has proved so successful in physical theory” (Nagel 2012, p. 62).
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I will begin by describing the central motivation for trinitarianism. Like the
panpsychist, the trinitarian countenances qualities at the most fundamental level
so as to avoid making those qualities “emerge” at higher levels of biological
and cognitive complexity. Since this clashes with the standard assumption that
qualia have only a “subjective” existence,  I will revisit the Lockean division
between “primary” and “secondary” qualities in order to show that this division
does not have to be taken as mandatory.  I  will briefly compare/contrast  the
Peircean categories with Karl Popper’s three “worlds” account. I will then look
at how Peirce partitions the steps involved in semiosis. My take-away message
will  be that  much of  Peirce’s  theory is  devoted  to cataloguing potential  (or
“proto”)  signs.  I  then  will  try  to  situate  this  fundamental  semiotic  account
among contemporary views on consciousness.  Finally,  I  will try to combine
positions germane to a trinitarian outlook: some ideas of logical atomism will
supply me with relata,  and some ideas of information theory will supply me
with relations.
I believe that, once we factor in the idea that pattern-grasping animals like
ourselves are sophisticated enough to suppose their sophistication absent, we
can see where qualia fit in the world. I cannot paint a full picture. Still, my hope
is that those who think panpsychism is “not worth investing in” (Goff 2009, p.
289) will give my version of trinitarianism a fairer hearing.
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IV.II Qualities as Primitive Instead of Emergent
John Locke invented the word semiotics ([1690] 2007, book 4, chap. 21, para.
4; see Deely 2003b), he invented the inverted spectrum (ibid., book 2, chap. 32,
para.  15),  and,  according  to  some  (e.g.,  Balibar  2013),  he  invented
consciousness  too.  As  a  founder  of  empiricism,  Locke  agrees  with  the
knowledge argument that experiential exposure to things is needed in a way that
no amount of theoretical learning can supersede. He writes that if, like Mary the
neuroscientist, “a child were kept in a place where he never saw any other but
black and white till he were a man, he would have no more ideas of scarlet or
green, than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster or a pine-apple has
of those particular relishes” (Locke  [1690] 1978, book 2, chap. 1, para. 6, p.
46).
As  healthy  adults,  we  are  unlike  Locke’s  secluded  child  (or  Jackson’s
neuroscientist) in that we have been flooded with many different  (and many
similar) experiential qualities. Indeed, it is too late to put ourselves in a state of
qualitative  deprivation;  were we  to  succeed  in  doctoring  the  right  kind  of
isolation, the sudden drop or lack would be noticed—which is precisely what
Locke’s  child  and  Jackson’s  scientist  are  not  supposed  to  notice.  As
philosophers though, it seems we can disown all that the world has taught us
and call into question the very existence of our conscious experience(s). The
phenomenal character of consciousness thus poses a “hard problem” (Chalmers
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1995) because it fails to fit in a worldview that has decided to exclude such
qualities.
That  worldview  owes  much  to  Locke.  Locke  claimed  that  solidity,
extension, figure, motion, rest, and number “really exist in the [physical] bodies
themselves;”  but  he held that  feelings  like sweet,  blue,  and warm “have no
resemblance of them at all” ([1690] 1978, book 2, chap. 8, para. 15, p. 69; see
Jacovides 1999). This division follows from the view that anything real must, at
bottom, be composed of “atomicules [that] all alike act mechanically upon one
another  according  to  one fixed law of  force”  (Peirce  1998,  p.  186).  Causal
events produced by such micro-bangings are held to have a basis in fact, “[b]ut
as for Qualities, they are supposed to be in consciousness merely, with nothing
in the real thing to correspond to them [...]” (Peirce 1998, p. 187).
If one is gripped by this vision of the world, then the question of “how it is
that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about” will be
“as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp
in the story [...]” (Huxley 1866, p. 193). Advances in cognitive science will
only  exacerbate  the  puzzlement,  because  “matter,  incogitative matter  and
motion, whatever  changes  it  might  produce  of  figure  and bulk,  could never
produce thought” (Locke [1690] 1978, book 4, chap. 10, para. 10, p. 315).
Even  though  many  of  the  assumptions  that  Locke  relied  on  have  now
withered away,  his vision of  “a world made out of ultimate little things and
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collisions amongst  them” (Ladyman et  al.  2007,  p.  23) continues  to  figure
prominently  in  the  attempt  to  give  a  purely  neuroscientific  account  of
consciousness. As we saw in the second chapter, Frank Jackson claims that all
our knowledge of the mind “comes back to causal impacts of the right kinds”
([1998] 2004, p. 418). However, I think such causal chains are interesting only
insofar  as they transmit  information. That seems to involve more than mere
causation. Bernard Baars writes that “[i]f we could zoom in on one individual
neuron  [...]  we  would  see  the  nerve  cell  communicating frantically  to  its
neighbors about one thousand times per second [...]” (1997, p. 18; emphasis
added). Why is the term “communicating” being used here? Stjernfelt remarks
that, “[i]f you take an ordinary textbook, and pick some arbitrary page, you’ll
find  semiotic  terminology”  (in  Emmeche  et  al.  2008,  p.  7).  Stjernfelt  also
remarks that, promissory notes aside, such terms are never actually reduced or
eliminated  (ibid.).  A  trinitarian  would  argue  that  such  reductions  or
eliminations are never done because, fundamentally, they cannot be done. They
cannot be done because the triadic action of signs is a genuine part of reality. 
If,  say,  neuron A impinges directly on neuron B, and neuron B impinges
directly  on neuron  C,  then no matter  how we unpack the impingement,  we
cannot credit these two dyadic events with a “transfer” of information unless
neuron C is affected in a way that  makes it  relate  to neuron A through the
intermediary  of  neuron  B. In  this  sense,  we  have  action  at  a  distance.
Hoffmeyer (2008, p. 64) has therefore suggested that all events which have this
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triadic structure involve “semiotic causality.” This, as we saw with the squids
fleeing ink (in  section I.III),  is  what  Peirce  meant by semiosis,  namely “an
action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such
as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in
any way resolvable into actions between pairs” (1998, p. 411).
Peirce, in what has been called his most “scholastic” passage (Deely 2009a,
p. 268), wrote that “[t]hat which is communicated from Object through the Sign
to the Interpretant is a Form” (Peirce 1998, p. 544n22).  Locke knew of this
scholastic  account,  but  he  dismissed  it  (see  Jacovides  1999,  p.  463).  If
everything the mind knows comes by way of collisions between two things,
then it follows as a matter of course that triadic relations (involving Thirdness)
and intrinsic qualities considered apart  from all  other  things  (involving only
Firstness) will appear suspect. Thus,  Locke is only being consistent with what
his chosen ontology allows him.
By countenancing only efficient causation, the ontology favoured by Locke
resembles a restaurant or night club admitting only couples. An institution with
such  an  admittance  policy  will  not  know  what  to  do  with  single  persons.
However,  it  is  not  as  if,  simply in virtue of  excluding them, single persons
suddenly cease to exist. Couples are, after all, nothing more than conjunctions
of (otherwise single) persons, so I would argue that commitment to paired items
entails commitment to singular items. Likewise, beginning at Secondness does
225
not make Firstness vanish. One may elect to ban qualia from a given discipline,
but that  does not metaphysically eradicate the qualitative dimension itself.  I
thus propose that, metaphysically, we countenance  semiotic triads and all the
simpler (non-triadic) states such triads subsume. Such an ontology makes room
for the causal events favoured by Locke—but it also includes triadic relations
and simple qualitative states.
Formal causality, which is arguably what is involved in iconic reference, is
absent from accounts of perception that countenance only efficient causation.
Locke, for instance, asks “How do bodies produce ideas in us?” and answers
“Obviously they do it  by impact”  ([1690] 2007, book 2,  chap. 8,  para.  11).
Whereas I stressed the centrality of iconic semiosis in uniting physical presence
and  cognitive  presence,  Locke  dismissed  (in  a  single  paragraph)  the  entire
stance of my second chapter:
To reveal the nature of our ideas better, and to talk about them intelligibly,
it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are ideas or perceptions in
our minds, and as they are states of matter in the bodies that cause such
perceptions in us. That may save us from the belief (which is perhaps the
common opinion) that the ideas are exactly the images and resemblances of
something inherent in the object. That belief is quite wrong. Most ideas of
sensation are (in the mind) no more like a thing existing outside us than the
names that stand for them are like the ideas themselves. ([1690] 2007, book
2, chap. 8, para. 7)
226
Locke does not tell us why we need to be “saved” from the supposedly “quite
wrong” belief in mind-world likeness. Focusing on what little argument we find
in this passage,  one cannot infer  from the premise that  “most” ideas do not
resemble external things to a conclusion that none resemble them.
Ostensibly, there were other disputes in the background. There seemed to be
a fear  that,  if  one  accepts  iconicity,  one also accepts  innate  ideas.  It  is  not
entirely clear, to me at least, what the link between the two notions is supposed
to be. I am tempted to agree with Peirce that “Locke failed to see that learning
something from experience, and having been fully aware of it since birth, did
not exhaust all possibilities” (1931–58, vol. 4, para. 92).
Ransdell (2003, pp. 229–231) speculates that modernist “iconophobia” may
have  been  driven  by  religious  controversies.  Perhaps  Locke’s  palpable
impatience with the authorities of the schools and the Church led him to bundle
many of their theses. The reception of earlier versions of the Essay had warned
Locke  that  many  of  his  readers  believed  that,  “if  innate  ideas  were  not
supposed,  there  would be little  left  either  of  the notion or  proof  of  spirits”
([1690] 1978, “Epistle to the Reader,” p. 7). For his part, Locke believed that
“the  great  ends  of  morality  and  religion  are  well  enough  secured,  without
philosophical  proofs  of  the soul’s immateriality  [...]” ([1690] 1978,  book 4,
chap. 3, para. 6, p. 271).
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Are there any religious implications in the notion of iconicity? Well, Galen
Strawson (2006, pp. 250–255) agrees with me that experience can allow for a
bond  where  the  gap  between  knower  and  known  disappears.  He  calls  it
“revelation,” a term used by Mark Johnston (1992) to describe how one could
be acquainted with colours in the Russellian framework. That choice of word
certainly courts non-secular readings.
I  acknowledge  that,  when  dyadic  and  triadic  relations  are  prescinded,
causation and language are rendered inoperable.  In  section II.III,  I looked at
how Peirce, in what is perhaps the most radical move of his diagrammatic logic,
removed  the  rim  of  a  Euler  circle.  Because  the  unbounded  expanse  thus
obtained is a ground that merely awaits sign-action, it cannot be communicated.
Now, Wittgenstein ([1921] 2002, section 6.45, p. 187) suggested that some of
our most problematic intuitions—and deepest mystical sentiments—stem from
our ability to conceive of a bounded whole.  Interestingly,  Keltner  and Haidt
(2003, pp.  303–304) have identified the two main traits  of  religious  awe as
vastness and the need to mentally accommodate that vastness. If we are dealing
with a quality deprived of all relational contrasts, we get vastness, but the need
for accommodation cannot be met. This ineffability can cause alarm, especially
if it  is  taken as a license to indulge in all  sorts  of irrational  whims. Strictly
speaking though, none of those fears follow. I may not be able to put into words
the taste of pickled relish, but I do have to produce a token spoonful of the
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condiment in order  to iconically convey the tone I  mean.  Those wishing to
convey their religious awe are not exempt from this requirement.
Seeing how an outright denial of qualitative experience is hard to sustain—
Locke  certainly  never  tried  an  eliminativist  gambit—granting  such  qualities
“partial” reality seems the next best option. However, endorsing a distinction
between  “primary”  and  “secondary”  qualities  burdens  one  with  explaining
why/how  the  secondary  qualities  emerge  from  (or  are  epiphenomenally
attached to) the primary ones.  Locke suggests that, ultimately,  how ideas are
produced  by  non-idea-like  things  may  be  a  mystery  known  only  to  God;
conscious awareness might accompany material  events  “merely by the good
pleasure and bounty of the Creator” (Locke [1690] 1978, book 4, chap. 3, para.
6,  p.  270).  Bypassing  the  implausibility  of  emergence  is  one  of  the  main
motivations for panpsychism. It is what leads Galen Strawson (2006) to reason
that, if we want to explain qualitative dimension of consciousness in a non-
miraculous  way,  we  must  weave  experiential  properties  into  the  fabric  of
reality.
I  will  differentiate  Peircean  trinitarianism from the  sort  of  panpsychism
currently defended by Strawson. For now, I endorse the following statement,
which I find applicable to trinitarianism:
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Panpsychism rests upon a fairly strong version of the principle of sufficient
reason,  which  it  applies  across  the  board,  metaphysically  as  well  as
epistemologically.  Unlike  emergentism,  panpsychism  doesn’t  tolerate
metaphysical  discontinuities—it  insists  that  high-level  entities issue from
bottom-level  entities.  Unlike  physicalism,  panpsychism  doesn’t  tolerate
epistemological  discontinuities—it  insists  that  high-level  entities  issue
intelligibly from bottom-level entities. (Lewtas 2013, p. 40)
Interestingly,  if one looks at the original  source,  the famous quote by T. H.
Huxley  actually  says  that  consciousness  is  “just  as  unaccountable  as  the
appearance of the Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp in the story,  or as any
other ultimate fact  of nature” (1866,  p.  193; emphasis added;  curiously,  the
final portion is dropped by Bayne 2004, p. 361). This hints at two responses:
magical  emergence—or  simply  countenancing  consciousness  alongside  the
other primitive facts of nature.
On my view, the list of “primary” qualities is much longer than what Locke
thought, since it includes all the items he would have relegated to “secondary”
qualities.  I  consider  qualitative  Firstness  to  be  a  ubiquitous  part  of  reality,
because anything, whatever it is, can be considered “without reference to any
other” (Peirce 1931–58, vol.  6,  para.  224).  However,  to count as conscious,
something must do more than simply have a quality.  This is worth stressing,
because  debates  about  p-consciousness  might  occlude  the  importance  of  a-
consciousness  in  contributing  to  a  complete  account.  That  is  why I  openly
characterize my ontology as comprised of three stuffs.
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I do not think we can assemble human psychology with anything less. Give
me only Firstness, and all I can produce is a vegetable, an inarticulate quality
unresponsive to anything. Give me only Thirdness, and all I can assemble is a
zombie.  Give  me  Firstness  and  Thirdness  but  not  Secondness,  and  I  can
assemble a thinking and feeling creature that cannot act in the world (I will not
discuss  Secondness  in  this  chapter,  but  a  fuller  treatment  can  be  found  in
Champagne in press). To develop a plausible account of consciousness, I think
all three semiotic categories are needed.  The culprit,  then, is not experiential
qualities, but rather an impoverished worldview that makes them seem out of
place.  Freeing  oneself  of  the  worldview  recommended  by  Locke  should
therefore  go a long way towards  reinstating phenomenal  consciousness as a
bona fide constituent of the world.
If  qualities are countenanced at the most fundamental metaphysical level,
then it is less puzzling that we encounter them in our ordinary psychological
lives. Countenancing qualities as a primitive stuff will have different drawbacks
and advantages depending on how the quality at hand is construed. A “pan-
experientialist,”  for  example,  contends  that  reality  contains  something
experiential in nature. However, because “self-styled ‘pan-experientialists but
not panpsychists’ often find themselves doing the same thing,” (Holman 2008,
p. 58), I am going to overlook these domestic divides. Philosophically,  what
unites panpsychist views is an agreement that nothing comes from nothing and
a shared sense that functional description leaves out something akin to qualia.
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There  may  be  other  challenges  (like  the  so-called  “composition  problem;”
which I discuss in section IV.VIII),  but panpsychists usually regard those as
“less daunting than articulating a comprehensible theory of radical emergence
of mind from utterly mindless matter” (Skrbina 2006, p. 156). The argument, in
effect, is this:
1. It is undeniable that we experience qualities.
2. Qualities do not figure in a materialist ontology.
Therefore,
3. Either a materialist ontology is mistaken, or a materialist ontology must
    give an account of how our experience of qualities emerges from matter.
4. Nothing comes from nothing.
Therefore (in light of all of the above claims),
5. It is impossible to give an account of how our experience of qualities
    emerges from matter.
Therefore (in light of premises 3 and 5),
6. A materialist ontology is mistaken.
Therefore,
7. Qualities need to figure in an ontology.
This is my formulation, but the line of reasoning it captures is not new; it was
stated, for example, by Nagel (1979, p. 181). Despite being compact, I endorse
this entire argument, which I consider sound. Importantly though, I differ from
Strawson in that I do not think accepting the final conclusion (7) also entails
accepting panpsychism (which could be grafted as a supplementary claim 8). In
this chapter, I am trying to build an alternative metaphysical view for those who
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find  the  argument  above  persuasive  yet  who  recoil  from  the  prospect  of
scattering mind everywhere.
Someone who wanted to reject the argument could do a couple of things
with it.  One could, for example, reject  the starting claim that  we experience
qualities. After all, if we do not even experience qualities, then the fact  that
qualities do not figure in a materialist ontology (premise 2) does not pose much
of  a  problem.  However,  I  accept  premise  (1),  because  I  agree  with  Galen
Strawson  that  a  “[f]ull  recognition  of  the  reality  of  experience  […]  is  the
obligatory  starting  point  for  any  remotely  realistic  (indeed  any  non-self-
defeating) theory of what there is” (2006, p. 4). I suppose premise (5) might
also be weakened to something like “No account of the emergence of qualia
from matter has thus far been successful.” Instead of betting that science will
(one  day)  vindicate  eliminativism  (Churchland  1981),  one  could  bet  that
science will (one day) vindicate emergentism (Park 2013 does just that). This
would conceivably leave room for optimism, thereby blocking the deductive
inference to claim (6).  However,  I  accept  premise (5)  in an undiluted form,
because I think the burden is on whoever holds it to be false to show that it is
not true.
Panpsychist  views  have  been  around  for  a  long  time  (for  a  survey,  see
Skrbina  2005),  but  they  are  currently  making a comeback  in  philosophy of
mind (Chalmers 2013; Seager 1995; Seager 2006; Strawson 2006). Yet, for the
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use  of  the  prefix  “pan”  to  become  plausible,  the  term  “psyche”  has  to  be
understood in a more impersonal way than usual—more impersonal, at any rate,
than how it is used in fields like psychology. In recent debates, the focus has
been  on the qualitative or  phenomenal  aspect  of  consciousness.  However,  I
want to reiterate that signs are more than just qualities. Only one sort of sign-
vehicle, the tone, is a quality, so trinitarianism is committed to much more than
just qualities. Granting reality to all that goes into triadic signs is, I submit, a
more plausible option.
I am suggesting that, in a certain way, qualities exist “out there.” Now, one
of the main reasons for assuming that qualia are merely “subjective” comes
from observing everyday differences in how people describe their experience of
things. Two people, for example, might eat the same food yet describe the taste
that they experience in different ways.  This leads philosophers like Locke to
reason that while experiential qualities “seem” to be located in the world, really
they  are  not;  or  so  the  common  argument  goes  (Locke  was  not  the  first
philosopher to argue this, but for many his distinction did seal the matter). 
This line of reasoning requires, at minimum, two human subjects and one
thing, say, a sprig of cilantro, being accessed by a sense modality, say, taste.
Were there only one person, the worries just described would probably never
arise. After all, if I am alone, then I have no real cause to doubt that it is the
sprig  itself  that  tastes  like  cilantro.  This  reflects  much  ordinary  linguistic
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practice. Indeed, “[a]sk a child where the green of the lawn is and he will point
out the lawn. [...] Anyway, normally the finger will point to the object, not to
the eye or head of the viewer” (Stroud-Drinkwater 1994, p. 347). Doubts about
the location and ontological standing of “secondary”  qualities like tastes and
colours thus come into view only when someone else refers to the same thing
but recounts their own experience in a different way. Assuming a principle of
charity  that  aims  to  maximize  the  ascription  of  true  beliefs,  these  kinds  of
situations understandably generate puzzlement. If a reliable person experiences
the world in a way so different from me, aren’t I rationally entitled to resolve
the aporia by relegating the troublesome qualities to a purely subjective realm?
This is a common response, but I believe it is hasty.
Subjects who disagree on what cilantro tastes like are engaged in an act of
interpretation. Unless one lets scepticism wipe the slate of shared beliefs clean,
such disagreement is by no means a case of “radical” interpretation. Still, a lot
of  what  Donald  Davidson  has  written  is  applicable  here,  specifically  his
remarks  about  “triangulation”  (2001,  pp.  212–220).  The  three  tips  of  the
triangle are the two persons and one object/event under discussion (in this case,
a sprig of cilantro). Using symbols (i.e., language), interlocutors are trying to
agree about what they intend. Philosophy of signs and philosophy of language
are natural allies here, but the latter study has limitations which the former does
not, since speaker and hearer will eventually resort to non-linguistic semiotic
means. Indeed, based on what I have said in the second chapter, an exercise in
235
triangulation will  never  fully succeed  in capturing qualia  unless the passage
from conventional signs (symbols) to causal signs (indices) also terminates with
a passage to qualitative signs (icons). We whittle discourse down to a point,
then let experience do the rest. However, in order to reach this point, a lot of
contextual pointing and charitable chatting may have to occur. One might even
have to import samples from another source in order to reason by analogy. I am
thus sensitive to the complexity of such situated exercises of interpretation. In
fact, I think the standard reasoning that leads to the supposed subjectivity of
“secondary”  qualities  pays  insufficient  attention  to  just  how  complex  such
situations really are.
When you and I disagree about the taste of cilantro,  we are not  making
claims about  cilantro  per se,  but  rather  about  cilantro-insofar-as-it-interacts-
with-my-sense-organs-now. The taste reported is therefore, implicitly, a report
about the functioning of one’s sense organs. As such, a full description of what
I am claiming when I say that  “This  cilantro  sprig is  bitter” would have to
include facts  about  the temperature  of  my mouth,  allergies  I  may have,  my
blood sugar levels, the number and distribution of receptor cells on my tongue,
psychological priming effects I may be biased by (e.g., being told right before
“Wait until you taste how bitter this is...”), or whatever else might affect how I
experience things. Since we have not controlled for all these variables, I find it
hasty  to  conclude  that,  because  there  can  be  disagreements  or  divergences
between  persons,  tastes  are  subjective.  Every  instance  where  we  might  be
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tempted to attribute P and not-P to a common thing can, I think, be explained as
a divergence in the circumstances of the experiencing agents.
Consider the fact that a small child cannot lift me but a strong adult can.
Clearly,  it would be erroneous to drop the relations involved and hold that I
somehow have  two clashing predicates,  “liftable”  and “unliftable,”  and  that
since I cannot be the site of both, debates about my liftability are bound to
remain a matter of subjective preference. Likewise,  a sprig of cilantro might
taste  very  differently  to  two  people,  but  that  is  no  reason  to  squeeze  two
mutually-exclusive  qualities  into  one  poor  herb  so  as  to  infer  from  the
incompatibility that qualities like taste cannot possibly belong “out there.”
If one puts a high premium on inter-subjective agreement, one could start
refining triangulation using experimental methods. One could, for instance, try
to control the variables listed above. I do not doubt that, pursued with enough
care,  the attempt to make the observational  conditions of two people match
could  succeed.  This  is,  after  all,  the  way  we  deal  with  difficult  “primary”
Lockean  qualities.  When an  engineer  tries  to  communicate  a  very complex
shape  to  another  person,  she  does  not  hesitate  to  draw  on  sophisticated
geometric  formulas  to  convey what  she  has  in  mind.  The  natural  scientific
tradition,  which  so  impressed  Locke,  has  not  treated  the  communication  of
“secondary”  qualities  with  as  much  rigour.  Indeed,  “[c]urrent  perceptual
science,  even  when  it  deals  with  qualitative  aspects  of  experience,  almost
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exclusively explains them in terms of the stimulus quantitatively understood as
a  collection  of  objective  measurements” (Albertazzi  2012,  p.  9).  This,
understandably,  generates the worry that we have left something out. In  any
event,  the inference from difficulty to impossibility that  relegates qualitative
experiences  to  a  merely  “subjective”  ontological  status  clashes  with  many
normal practices and assumptions:
We do not universally agree in our judgments about what is red or salty. But
when there is  disagreement,  we do not blithely continue to maintain our
own views without hesitation. The fact that others report seeing red where
you saw green, or tasting saltiness where you tasted none, makes you less
confident in your own color or flavor judgments. It makes you suspect that
the lighting is funny, or that you are ill or under the influence of a drug, or
that your perceptual equipment is defective (as it is in color-blind people).
To insist without further investigation that your own judgment is right, and
that  the  other’s  is  wrong,  would  be  rash  and  unwarranted.  (MacFarlane
2014, p. 5)
Observation  grounds  empirical  claims,  so  it  is  normal  that  scientific
practitioners seeking a consensus would limit themselves to observations which
they  can  talk  about  with  robust  inter-subjective  agreement.  But,  that
disciplinary predilection does not mean that the other qualities we experience
merit ontological demotion. In my account, agents can eventually agree because
they  can  employ  symbols,  indices,  and  icons;  the  unique  semiotic  service
rendered  by  each  sort  of  sign  cannot  be  replaced.  Some  objects  may  be
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communicable by iconic means alone, but that does not make those objects any
less real.
Locke cordoned off experiential qualities because, no matter how intimately
obvious they seem, they are not mentioned by physicists. Like W. V. O. Quine
(1966,  p.  151),  who  proclaimed  that  “philosophy  of  science  is  philosophy
enough,”  Locke held that “it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-
labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that
lies in the way to knowledge” ([1690] 1978, “Epistle to the Reader,” p. 7). Yet,
a careful reading of Locke’s Essay reveals that he never actually argued for this
deferral. That the scientific theories of his time were thriving was presumably
enough to motivate Locke’s meta-philosophical stance.  Surely, if one is going
to assign philosophy a subordinate role, the demotion requires justification.
Like  Locke,  Peirce  admired  the  natural  sciences.  Peirce  was  aware  that
many follow Locke in taking physics as their metaphysics: “[Henri] Poincaré
would have us  write  down the equations of  hydrodynamics  and stop there”
(Peirce 1998, p. 187). Unlike Locke though, Peirce believed that science needs
an  ontology  that  includes  qualities  alongside  efficient  causes.  The  semiotic
repertoire  has  to  be  varied  because  the  world  we  experience  exhibits  that
variety. I now want to look at this Peircean ontology.
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IV.III Peirce’s Three Categories versus Popper’s Three Worlds
Maybe  I  lack  erudition,  but  I  know  of  only  one  major  contemporary
philosopher  besides  Peirce  who  countenances  three  stuffs,  and  that  is  Karl
Popper. Unlike Sebeok (1979, pp. 204–205), I will not draw on the metaphysics
of  Popper’s  three  “worlds.”  However,  from an  expository  standpoint,  what
Popper had to say can serve as a convenient  foil to gradually introduce the
distinctive commitments of trinitarianism.
Popper  held  Peirce  to  be  “one  of  the  greatest  philosophers  of  all  time”
(1979,  p.  212)  and  praised  him  for  being  one  of  the  first  post-Newtonian
philosophers to espouse indeterminism in physics (Popper 1979, pp. 213, 296;
Popper and Eccles 1981, pp. 22–23). Although Popper did not read Peirce prior
to 1966 (Chauviré 2005, p. 209), the subsequent effects of his reading quickly
became  noticeable. Popper  (1955)  nevertheless  wanted  to  contribute  to  the
traditional  mind-body problem.  Given that  “we find in Peirce no traditional
philosophical arrangement that creates a mind-body problem” (Pietarinen 2006,
p.  76), the  Popperian  worlds  can  be  seen  as  a  bastardized  version  of  the
Peircean ontology that caters to mainstream concerns. Hence, in comparing the
metaphysics of Peirce and Popper,  the shared endorsement of three levels is
important, but so are the differences.
Popper is  known  mainly  for  the  view  that  knowledge  proceeds  by
conjectures and refutations ([1963] 2002). Having explained this epistemology
240
in some detail, Popper eventually felt it necessary to clarify the ontology that
makes such cut-and-parry binding and predictive. As a philosopher of science,
Popper had no wish to deny the mind-independent existence of matter. He did,
however,  think  that  an  exclusively  material  world  would  be  insufficient  to
house  two important  sets  of  facts  which  deserve  acknowledgement,  namely
consciousness and knowledge. In short,  Popper wanted to put scientists in his
scientific worldview.
Popper  thus  strove  to  account  for  what  he  called  “knowledge  in  the
objective  sense,  which  consists  of  the  logical  content  of  our  theories
conjectures, and guesses” (1979, p. 73). Examples of such knowledge would be
“theories published in journals and books and stored in libraries” (ibid). Note
that the “objective” items here are not paper sheets, but the abstract theories that
reside in (and, when interpreted, are transmitted by) such token sign-vehicles.
This  suggests  that  a  commitment  to  physics  needs  to  be  augmented  with
something that can track the flow of information. In keeping with this, Popper
locates physical facts in what he calls “world 1.” Popper describes “world 2” as
“the world of our conscious experiences” (1979, p. 74). The theories and ideas
transmitted by symbols belong to “world 3.”
When Popper promoted his world 3, he was pitting himself against the arid
materialist ontologies of logical positivism. Logical positivists appealed to so-
called  “protocol  sentences”  as  a  way  of  “directly  reporting  the  ultimate
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justificatory basis in first-person experience of the (objective and third-person)
empirical claims of science” (Livingston 2013, p. 80). The truths expressed by
science therefore stand or fall depending on whether or not we can bring a sign-
vehicle  like  an  utterance  in  relation  with  an  object.  There  may  be
misunderstandings about what others mean, but triangulating a correct referent
is  a  worthwhile  pursuit  only  on  the  assumption  that  what  others  do  can
convey/carry some kind of meaning beyond mere sounds and gestures. Popper
held, rightly I think, that the intentionality at work in such protocol sentences
must be presupposed in any attempt to deny intentionality. In essence, Popper
agreed with Lynne Rudder Baker’s (1987, pp. 134–148) formidable objection
to eliminativism: one must defend, not just an ontology, but whatever a defence
of that ontology presupposes. Putting the brain, the mind, and the mind’s ideas
into separate “worlds” was Popper’s way of saying that one cannot “naturalize”
meaning and intentionality.
Although it is tempting to see world 2 as bridging worlds 1 and 3—those
numbers certainly invite such a reading—that temptation must be resisted. To
see  world 3 as  an outgrowth  of  conscious  experience  would be to  consider
rational  entailments  as  rooted  in  psychology.  Like  Peirce,  Popper  rejects
psychologism, and thus makes it clear that “there is a sense in which world 3 is
autonomous: in this world we can make theoretical discoveries in a similar way
to that in which we can make geographical  discoveries in world 1” (Popper
1979, p. 74). World 3 is closer to Plato’s realm of Forms: “We can discover
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new problems in world 3 which were there before they were discovered and
before they ever became conscious; that is, before anything corresponding to
them appeared in world 2” (ibid.). If one wants to learn something about world
3, one should not study the physical brain (which is in world 1) or the mind
(which makes up world 2). Rather, one has to engage with the abstract items
that populate world 3. Hence, “it is impossible to interpret either the third world
as a mere expression of the second, or the second as the mere reflection of the
third” (Popper 1979, p. 149). The point of Popper’s numeral labels, then, is not
to indicate an ordinal arrangement, but to underscore the cardinal distinctness of
the three worlds. This is very different from Peirce’s ordinal categories, where
what is “First” really does come first.
In  the  Popperian  ontology,  the  ideal  entities  located  in  world  3  are  not
allowed to migrate to world 1, just like the material things of world 1 cannot
leap into the unextended domain of world 3. None of this holds in semiotic
trinitarianism. In contrast with Popper’s three worlds, Peirce’s three categories
are not static, but are rather shifting constantly. An interpretant, despite being a
Third,  is  whatever  it  is,  and  so  also  counts  as  a  First.  In  this  way,  triadic
relations  beget  more  of  themselves,  and while  “[t]he  process  as  a  whole  is
unlimited,”  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  the  finite  “stages  and  steps  in  the
process” (Deely 1994a, p. 31).
243
Popper  took  it  for  granted  that  “[c]onsciousness,  and  every  kind  of
awareness, relates certain of its constituents to earlier constituents” (Popper and
Eccles 1981, p. 70; emphasis in original). We also find this idea in Peirce, who
held that the realization “that thought cannot happen in an instant, but requires a
time, is but another way of saying that every thought must be interpreted in
another, or that all thought is in signs” (1992, p. 24). Yet, despite being an expert
in signs that relate things, Peirce differed from Popper in that he did not think
that all awareness relates certain of its constituents to earlier constituents. When
prescissively considered in their Firstness, the intransitive “perchings” alluded to
by James ([1890] 2007a, p. 243) are simply what they are, aside from whatever
functional role(s) they play in cognition. Let us see what a process philosophy
looks like when it countenances those immobile states.
IV.IV A Less Simplistic Semantics
“Semantics,” the hobbyhorse of many, is sometimes defined (when it is defined
at all) as the study of meaning apart from use (see Palmer 1997, pp. 1–8). This
project is, I think, untenable. There is no meaning apart from use—or, more
precisely,  apart  from the  generation  of  Thirds  in  an  open-ended  process  of
semiosis.  No one can  police  the  use  of  labels,  but  I  would argue  that  it  is
inconsistent to self-identify as a pragmatist while trying to do “semantics.” My
section  title  is  thus  ironic,  since  “[t]he  term  [semantics]  is  not  one  found
244
anywhere  in Peirce;  for pragmaticism, the field it  is supposed to demarcate,
simply does not and cannot exist” (Tejera 1991, p. 151).
The  behaviorist  Charles  Morris  (1971)  was  responsible  for  promoting
semantics. Morris claimed to be continuting the work of Peirce. He was not.
John Dewey,  who studied  under  Peirce at  Johns Hopkins,  had a far  clearer
grasp of what the founder of pragmatism meant by meaning, and the passages
where he sought to instruct Morris on the topic are succinct and on target:
Peirce uniformly holds (1) that there is no such thing as a sign in isolation,
every sign being a constituent of a sequential set of signs, so that apart from
membership in this set, a thing has no meaning—or is  not a sign; and (2)
that in the sequential movement of signs thus ordered, the meaning of the
earlier ones in the series is provided by or constituted by the later ones as
their  interpretants,  until  a  conclusion  (logical as  a  matter  of  course)  is
reached. Indeed, Peirce adheres so consistently to this view that he says,
more  than  once,  that  signs,  as  such,  form  an  infinite  series,  so  that  no
conclusion of reasoning is forever final, being inherently open to having its
meaning  modified  by  further  signs.  (Dewey  1946,  p.  88;  for  the
argumentative development of this view, see Peirce 1992, pp. 11–27)
All  students  of  semiotics  should  commit  this  passage  to  memory.  It  is,
unmistakably, the statement of a  process philosophy (Peirce  recognized  an
affinity  between  his  views  and  those  of  Hegel; for a comparative study of
Hegelian and Peircean categories, see Stern 2011, pp. 269–326).
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The meaning of any given sign is given in another, more developed, sign
(Peirce 1931–58, vol. 2, para. 228). Biologists have increasingly been drawn to
this account of meaning as growth (see Favareau et al. 2012). However, I think
that, if we want to understand the steps in the process, logic provides a better
key.  C. I.  Lewis, one of the first twentieth-century philosophers on record to
have  discussed  qualia  (Livingston  2004,  pp.  6–8),  studied  the  Peirce
manuscripts while at Harvard (see Pietarinen 2006, p. 53). Lewis stated that his
ideas about the Mind and the World Order grew out of “investigations which
began in the field of exact logic and its application to mathematics” ([1929]
1956, p. vii). Lewis was the co-founder of modal logic (see Lewis and Langford
[1932] 1959). Following this lead, I propose that we look at trinitarianism as an
ontology  governed  by  a  modal  axiom:  necessity  entails  actuality  entails
possibility.
The idea of necessity, so prized by rationalists (like Descartes), might clash
with  Peirce’s pervasive  fallibilism.  If  so,  then  perhaps  necessity  should  be
demoted to generality,  so as  to  make room for  exceptions (in  logic,  such a
demotion might  require  some changes,  since it  would no longer  licence the
deduction of P from generally-that-P). Such a modification would not change
the  fact  that  deduction  affords  the  highest  grade  of  practical  (though  not
infallible) certainty.  As we are about to see, once we systematically apply the
modal  axiom to the  triadic  model  of  the  sign,  we obtain  a  whole range  of
246
distinctions that are far from simplistic. In keeping with this basic insight, we
can say that signs which are interpreted could be interpreted.
Peirce saw himself as  “an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching
Scotism, but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism” (1998, p.
180; for an account of Peirce’s progression towards “modal realism,” see Fisch
1986, pp.  184–200; as well as  Almeder 1973, pp. 7–13). In plainer terms, he
believed potentials were real. Of course, by the time a quale is detected, it is too
late: it has already had an effect on something beyond itself, and in so doing has
been propelled from Firstness to Thirdness. Hence, on my account, we can only
arrive  at  qualia  after  the  fact,  by  prescission.  Still,  a  theory  can  assign  a
placeholder for this eventual interpretation. In semiotic theory, such a possible
interpretant is called a “rheme” (for the etymology, see Peirce 1998, p. 285).
The  Routledge  Companion  to  Semiotics defines  a  rheme  as  “representing  a
qualitative possibility of some sort rather than a fact of the matter or a reason”
(Cobley 2010, p. 307).
We can thus complete our earlier grid (figure 5) by adding a third and final
taxonomy that tracks whether or not a referential relation could, is, or tends to
be interpreted:
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Figure 9   The three Peircean trichotomies
As we saw in section IV.II,  countenancing uninterpreted qualities spares
one  from  having  to  miraculously  introduce  those  qualities  once  they  are
interpreted.  When discussing the Sperling experiments in the third chapter, I
argued that a feeling of reading is present before one takes self-conscious stock
of it. Now, for the same reasons, I am suggesting that whatever contents were
on the Sperling cue cards (colours and all) were present before any mind took
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stock of them. Just as we can suppose our verbalizations absent in a way that
lets our experiences have a quality apart from those interpretants, so too can we
suppose that, even though no one is looking at figure 7 right now, there are
qualities on that unseen page. This is granting the reality of Firstness.
The  rheme  is  like  a  chemical  valence  that  permits  the  sign-vehicle  to
eventually bond with something other than itself. In chemistry, our account of a
given atom includes what it could connect with, without thereby stating that the
atom  does (or  ever  will)  have  that  connection  (for  more  on  chemistry  and
semiotics,  see  Tursman  1989,  p.  453;  also,  Chris  Campbell,  of  University
College  London’s  Department  of  Science  and  Technology  Studies,  is
conducting doctoral research on the parallels between Mendeleev and Peirce).
In addition to being a chemist, Peirce was also a logician, so he sometimes
described the rhematic interpretant as “[t]hat which remains of a Proposition
after removal of its Subject” (Peirce 1931–58, vol. 2, para.  95). Since this has
become the received gloss among Peirce scholars, textbooks generally divide
interpretants into terms (which assert  nothing),  propositions (which do),  and
arguments. Peirce clearly had this well-known division in mind. However, I do
not  find  the  logical  characterization  helpful,  because  it  proceeds  from  a
terminology  that  hides  just  how  general  the  semiotic  notion  of  rheme  is
supposed to be. In principle, the notion of interpretant should fit a tick capable
of  detecting  the  smell  of  butyric  acid  released  by  the  skin  glands  of  a
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mammalian host (Uexküll [1934] 2010, pp. 44–52). A waiting tick that has this
disposition can be credited with a rhematic interpretant, but it can hardly be
credited with grasping a proposition minus a subject. I thus think a better way
to appreciate the rheme is to think of it as the only sort of interpretant a tone
could possibly generate.  The following passage  by Peirce  is  therefore  more
instructive:
Since a quality is whatever it is positively in itself, a quality can only denote
an Object  by virtue of  some common ingredient  or  similarity;  so that  a
Qualisign [or Tone] is necessarily an Icon. Further, since a quality is a mere
logical possibility it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as a
Rheme. (1998, p. 294)
There are bound to be disagreements about how to render the trichotomy of
interpretants.  Because I am not overly preoccupied with getting Peirce right
(and not at all preoccupied with matters of theology), I depart from the major
studies of Peircean trinitarianism (like Robinson 2010). In this section, I merely
want to showcase how, like the construction of the periodical table of elements,
Peircean semiotics tries to rank signs from simple to complex using the triadic
model and the principled criteria of the categories. So long as all the nitpicking
occurs in semiotics, not semantics, I will be happy.
The  aim  of  a  semiotic  classification,  which  medieval  logicians  called
“speculative grammar,” is “to ascertain what must be true of signs in order for
them to embody meaning” (Liszka 1996, p. 10).  Peirce was familiar with the
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treatment  of  the  three  modalities  in  medieval  logic  (Knuuttila  1993).  By
orthogonally combining the basic modal asymmetry described in figure 9, we
can break semiosis into ten distinct steps (see Peirce 1998, pp. 294–296):
1. Tone / icon / rheme
2. Token / icon / rheme
3. Token / index / rheme
4. Token / index / dicisign
5. Type / icon / rheme
6. Type / index / rheme
7. Type / index / dicisign
8. Type / symbol / rheme
9. Type / symbol / dicisign
10. Type / symbol / argument
Applying  a  simple  modal principle,  we obtain  something far  from simple.
Indeed, Peirce may have articulated “what has probably become the broadest
conception of logic that has ever been written” (Pietarinen 2006, p. 19). It is so
broad that it becomes an account of meaning and being at the same time. This
is, I think, the sort of sophisticated semantics Legg (2013, p. 16) called for.
The semiotic classification does not enshrine word-to-thing relations as the
key to  assessing  ontological  commitment(s).  On a  trinitarian  ontology,  the
extended “matter” of physical scientists is not the truth-making bedrock of all
claims, but rather a fallible sign open to further interpretation. At the close of
his  study  of  Peircean metaphysics,  Boler  writes  that  “my major  complaint
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against his categories is that I find in them no place for things” (1963, p. 162). I
think this is a strength, not a weakness.  The action of signs is a process, an
incessant stream that waxes and wanes between varying degrees of complexity
and  simplicity.  The  most  complex  bookend  of  semiosis  is  the  argument,  a
recognizable type that has been assigned a conventional meaning which, once
understood, compels the production of a further symbol. This is where logic,
the study of proper reasoning, begins. Everything prior to this is meant to give a
foundational account of where such inferences fit in the world.
The ten-fold classification of signs begins with the tone and ends with the
argument. In an elegant loop, only agents capable of grasping arguments can
strip  away  relations  and  prescissively  glean  tones.  Monist  accounts  like
materialism have been accused of “leaving out” qualia (Levine 1997), but my
claim  in  this  chapter  is  that  everything  that  exists  can  be  captured  in  the
taxonomy above. Whereas some philosophies of language hold that “The limits
of  my language mean  the  limits  of  my world”  (Wittgenstein  ([1921]  2002,
section 5.6, p. 149; emphasis in original), my account extends the range and
holds  that  the limits  of  my signs  mean the  limits  of  my world.  Qualia  are
ineffable, but they are real. It is hard to see how the boundaries of metaphysics
could be pushed any farther.
Let us walk slowly through three examples to see how signs develop into
increasingly complex forms.  In  the simplest  case  imaginable,  we can,  using
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prescission, consider a quality,  say the colour yellow, all on its own. Such a
quality is never encountered in actual experience, so it is, as Peirce (1998, p.
294) says, “a mere logical possibility.” As I explained in the second chapter, a
qualitative sign-vehicle can only signify that same quality; it is too simple and
impoverished to accomplish anything  else. Indeed, “the proper Interpretant of
an Icon cannot represent it  to be an Index, the Index being essentially more
complicated than the Icon” (Peirce 1998, p. 277). For the same reason, the only
interpretant such a quality could produce would be, also, yellow. Thus, in the
first of the ten signs, the qualities at hand cannot yet be differentiated. Still, like
a city planner drawing lines in the ground before buildings are erected, Peircean
philosophy of signs is prepared to draw what could be called a “pre-division”:
Figure 10   The tone / icon / rheme
Now, recall the formal definition of the sign (section I.IV):
A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic
relation to a Second, called its  Object, as to be capable of determining a
Third,  called  its  Interpretant,  to  assume  the  same  triadic  relation  to  its
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (Peirce 1998, pp. 272–
273)
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Looking at figure 10, we see that if a yellow interpretant (noted as “3” in that
figure) were produced, this Third yellow would stand in the same relation to the
Second yellow that the First yellow stood. Qualia are credited with being proto-
signs because, minimally, “anything is fit to be a substitute for anything that it
is like” (Peirce 1998, p. 273). The bond in this case would be underwritten by a
quality that really is shared. Even though the tone is a tranquil expanse not yet
disturbed by the ripples of semiosis, this iconic potential sows the seed of all
subsequent  semiosis.  The  self-same  quality of  this  primordial  sign  is  what
renders all inference possible:
Any object, A, cannot be blue and not blue at once. It can be blue and hard,
because  blueness  and  hardness  are  not  thought  of  as  joined  in  quale-
consciousness, one appealing to one experiment and the other to another.
But  A cannot be blue and yellow, because these would blend and so the
color would cease to be blue or yellow either. Thus, the positive truth in the
principle of contradiction is that  quale-consciousness has but one element.
(Peirce 1931–58, vol. 6, para. 231)
Compare the first sign with the actuality of the fourth sign:
Figure 11   The token / index / dicisign
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This is the kind of sign that mechanists and behaviourists favour, because all its
parts  are  observable.  In  figure  11,  I  insert  the  term  “nearby,”  because
“[p]erception signs are [...] always spatially bound, and, since they take place in
a certain sequence, they are also temporally bound” (Uexküll [1934] 2010,  p.
54). If you suddenly clap your hands and this creates sound waves that affect
my ear drum and cause me to leap in surprise, the event has generated an actual
interpretant.  The  dividing  lines  are  no  longer  dotted  because,  even  though
“[t]alking about the relationship between discrete causal facts implies that one
abstracts from a continuous process of causation” (Hulswit 2001, p. 342), the
parts of the sign could in principle be separated using a real distinction. Apart
from my sense of shock, there is no reason why airwaves would have to “stand
for” anything. It is the triadic relation that makes the three events significant. A
dicisign (from the Latin  “dicibile”) is  an interpretant  that  actually “says”  or
“asserts” something (for a whole book devoted to the dicisign,  see Stjernfelt
2014). Now, compare sign four with the most sophisticated sign:
Figure 12   The type / symbol / argument
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Peircean  philosophy  of  signs  describes  the  argument  as  “a  sign  whose
Interpretant  represents  its  Object  as  being  an  ulterior  sign  through  a  law,
namely, the law that the passage from all such premises to such a conclusion
tend to the truth” (1998, p. 296). Consider a familiar argument like the modus
ponens. The sign-vehicle used in this argument has to be general enough not to
be bound to any particular token instance, that type will have to be linked to its
object(s) by some (constant) convention, and the symbolic notation will be such
that, in its own way, it will be compelling. If all this is in place, an interpretant
should ensue (teachers of logic usually feel gratified when they witness such
semiosic growth).
The first sign does not imply the fourth sign, and the fourth sign does not
imply the tenth sign. However, in the reverse direction, this independence does
not hold. If, for example, one cannot bring the two premises of a modus ponens
in  indexical  proximity with  each  other,  then there  is  no hope  of  eventually
drawing an inference, let alone a correct one.
My presentation of three particularly straightforward signs has skipped over
the intermediary signs that lie between them. However, it is important to stress
that, ontologically, those missing steps cannot be skipped (for an exposition of
the  left-overs,  consult  Atkin  2008;  Farias  and  Queiroz  2006,  pp.  287–289;
Liszka  1996,  pp.  43–52;  Peirce  1998, pp.  294–296; Savan 1987,  pp.  1–14).
Even though one might  press  all  sorts  of  worries  about  the  account  I  have
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gestured  at  here,  I  will  be satisfied  if  I  succeeded  in  showing that  Peirce’s
theory of signs  “does not establish a mere dichotomy between semiosis and
nonsemiosis,  but  distinguishes  many  transitions  between  genuine  and
degenerate or quasi-semiosis” (Nöth 2001, p. 15). That is all I have set out to
accomplish in this section.
The  panpsychist  says  that  reality  is,  in  some  way,  composed  of  mind.
Suppose  one  agrees  with  this  panpsychist  claim;  then  what?  What  sort  of
explanatory work can such an account do? Here, I have outlined a competitor
ontology that allows us to track ascending and descending levels of complexity.
Once we have a theoretical command of the conceptual machinery describing
semiosis, we see that Peirce’s flirtation with panpsychism was not “in striking
contrast to Peirce’s more famous work in logic” (Skrbina 2005, p. 155).
According to the metaphysical story given by the trinitarian, a lot of things
have  to  fall  into  place  before  semiosis  can  reach  a  level  that  can  support
language. While it may, at first, seem onerous to countenance a sign-vehicle not
accompanied  by  any  object(s)  or  interpretant(s),  Peirce  believed  such  a
commitment to be mandatory because, in virtue of modal logic, actual semiosis
must subsume possible semiosis. Nöth once proposed the term “protosemiosis”
to capture “a process that barely fulfils the minimum requirements of semiosis
and is hence just above the semiotic threshold between the semiotic and the
nonsemiotic world, if such a threshold exists at all” (2001, p. 13).
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Countenancing the rheme is a particularly radical move, because it means
that  qualities,  events,  and  regularities  that  are  not  actually  interpreted
nevertheless count, in their own way,  as signs. The world, being intelligible,
starts  to look like  a giant  jigsaw puzzle where  interpreants  supply the final
pieces  to  pre-existing outlines that  fit:  “It  seems a  strange  thing,  when  one
comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part
of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the
entire universe [...] is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of
signs” (Peirce 1998, p. 394).
This view, now referred to as “pansemiotism” (for an early use of the term,
see Nöth 1995, p. 81), is arguably one of Peirce’s most challenging ideas. It is,
as John Deely (1994b) puts it,  a “grand” vision.  Historically,  the sign-based
metaphysics intimated by Peirce is not unprecedented. Pansemiotist worldviews
were  found,  for  example,  during the Renaissance  (Westerhoff  2001).  When
Galileo said that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics,
he was, implicitly, making the world into a landscape of signs to be interpreted.
The major  difference with the Galilean view is that,  on a Peircean semiotic
account,  nature  is  a  picture-book  that  also  includes  qualities  alongside
mathematical patterns (Resnik 1982).
Admittedly, “[t]he idea that semiosis should be possible in the inorganic
world  is  a  contradiction  in  terms  to  all  those  who  postulate  that  human
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intentionality or at least life is the essential semiotic threshold” (Nöth 2001, pp.
15–16).  As  far  as  Deely  is  concerned,  the  controversy  surrounding
pansemiotism is  misplaced,  and “[t]he  only question  outstanding is  in  what
exactly does this perfusion [of signs] consist?” (2009b, p. 184). Now, there may
be good objections to this idea but, at present, one finds mostly bad objections
in the literature.
The worst reason for rejecting an ontology of signs is to provide no reason
at  all.  Guido  Ipsen  is  unfortunately  correct  when  he  reports  that
“[p]ansemiotism  has  […]  almost  become  an  accusation  close  to  an  insult”
(2008, p. 21). The biologist Marcello Barbieri, for example, routinely makes a
caricature  of  the  pansemiotist  worldview.  In  Champagne  (2009a),  I  took
Barbieri to task for simply deriding the suggestion (made by Taborsky 1999, p.
601) that the specific relation we find in a function like “f(x)=y” might make it
a semiotic triad. Barbieri, despite being aware of my criticism (see his 2009),
continues to repeat the same undefended dismissal, almost word for word. He
thinks that, if we endorse a Peircean worldview, “it’s interpretation all the way
down” (Barbieri 2013, p. 283; see the discussion in Deely 2010, pp. 40–41). I
am not sure what that even means. At any rate, the fact that two thirds of the
Peircean categories are devoted to  uninterpreted phenomena should suffice to
establish that interpretation does not go “all the way down.”  Semiotics is not
hermeneutics.
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I take trinitarianism to be a commitment to the reality of the three semiotic
categories, and pansemiotism to be a commitment to the reality and ubiquity of
those three  categories.  Pansemiotism thus  represents  a  stronger  commitment
than trinitarianism. I think Firstness is ubiquitous, and perhaps Secondness too.
However,  because  I  do  not  think  I  can  defend  or  prove  the  ubiquity  of
Thirdness, I endorse only trinitarianism.
My presentation of Peirce’s ten-fold classification does not exhaust all that
could be said on the subject; it leaves room for disagreements about this or that
particular  way  of  rendering  things.  However,  I  will  be  satisfied  if  those
disagreements  take  place  on  a  semiotic  terrain  open  to  the  idea  of
countenancing three stuffs.
IV.V Classifying the Classification
Trinitarianism is an unfamiliar word because countenancing three stuffs is an
unfamiliar move. Even so, it might improve our understanding if we tried to
situate trinitarianism in the popular classification devised by Chalmers (2010,
pp. 111–137). Chalmers divides views into six types. The first trio of views (A
to  C)  shares  a  commitment  to  materialism,  albeit  with  varying  degrees  of
strength:  “A type-A materialist  denies  the  existence  of  the  relevant  sort  of
epistemic  gap.  A  type-B materialist  accepts  the  existence  of  an  unclosable
epistemic gap but denies that there is an ontological gap. A type-C materialist
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accepts the existence of a deep epistemic gap but holds that it will eventually be
closed” (2010, pp. 110–111). Daniel Dennett (1991a) would be an advocate of
type-A, Brian Loar (1997) of type-B, and Paul Churchland (1981) of type-C.
The stances of the second trio (D to F) are, by contrast, prepared to augment
the materialist ontology as it is standardly understood. Type-D dualism holds
that  consciousness  not  only  exists  but  is  causally  efficacious  as  well.  The
historical exemplar of this view would be the interactionist substance dualism
of Descartes, but there have been more recent variants (e.g., Popper and Eccles
1981).  Type-E  dualism  grants  the  separate  existence  of  consciousness  but
denies its causal  efficacy,  thus resulting in some form of epiphenomenalism.
Although Chalmers does not mention Leibniz, pre-established harmony would
make  Leibniz  a  good  historical  flag-bearer  of  this  view.  The  early  Frank
Jackson (1982) also defended a type-E stance. Finally, a type-F theorist admits
that consciousness has to be countenanced as a fundamental ingredient different
from anything discussed by physics, but she locates phenomenal properties at
such a basic level that anything which exists can be said to have some sort of
phenomenality  (or  “protophenomenality”).  Chalmers  credits  Russell  (1927)
with introducing this  view.  Although I  will  look at  Russell’s  arguments  (in
section IV.VI), Galen Strawson (2006) is perhaps the most widely read present-
day advocate of a type-F view.
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Despite the fact that one can arrange the six views on a spectrum such that
type-F views stand diametrically opposed to the conservative materialism of
type-A views, there is a sense in which type-F is not as overtly dualist as type-
D and type-E:
In  its  protophenomenal  form,  the  view can  be  seen  as  a  sort  of  neutral
monism [...].  In  its  phenomenal  form, the view can be seen as a sort  of
idealism [...]. One could also characterize this form of the view as a sort of
panpsychism,  with  phenomenal  properties  ubiquitous  at  the  fundamental
level.  One  could  give  the  view  in  its  most  general  form  the  name
panprotopsychism, with either protophenomenal or phenomenal properties
underlying all of physical reality. (Chalmers 2010, p. 134)
As the subtitle to his book The Conscious Mind attests, Chalmers is in search of
a “fundamental” theory of consciousness, where fundamental features are those
that “cannot be explained in terms of more basic features” (1996, p. 126). In his
sequel,  The  Character  of  Consciousness,  Chalmers  becomes  even  more
convinced that consciousness must be a fundamental ingredient  of reality:  “I
think that in some ways the type-F view is the most appealing, but this sense is
largely grounded in aesthetic considerations whose force is unclear” (2010, p.
138).  This fourth chapter  seeks to corroborate Chalmers’ aesthetic intuitions
with a more developed (and, I would argue, more tenable) account.
A position falls under the “panpsychist” genus when it attempts to side-step
the  problem  of  emergence  by  making  consciousness  or  mind  a  basic
metaphysical ingredient. Peirce once wrote that “[t]he one intelligible theory of
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the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate
habits becoming laws” (1992, p. 293). Peirce was certainly not the first (or the
last) to entertain that idea since, “[f]rom Leibniz and Spinoza to Berkeley and
Schopenhauer,  the  history  of  philosophical  approaches  to  mind  included
numerous (although perhaps unpopular) panpsychist approaches” (Beever and
Cisney 2013, p. 353).
To the extent that trinitarianism makes quality a basic ingredient, it counts
as a type-F view. Since there is  nothing in the notion of tone that  specifies
whether it is mental, it would be more appropriate to call  the commitment to
Firstness “panqualityism”  (Chalmers  2013,  pp.  27–31).  However,  I  want  to
forgo that  label, because panqualityism would constitute only one third of a
trinitarian universe. I countenance qualitative Firstness and a great deal besides.
Given  that  a  trinitarian  ontology  includes  events  and  qualities  that  are
untouched by any mind, we may conclude that, “[h]owever tempted Peirce may
have  been  by  a  panpsychist  approach  to  semiotic,  [...]  such  a  position  is
rendered impossible by his own principles of semiosis” (Kruse 1990, p. 222). 
Despite  the  recent  focus  on  qualia  in  the  philosophical  literature,
consciousness  is  more  than  just  p-consciousness,  so  I  think  we  need  three
ingredients to construct a plausible account of the mind.  This ensures that we
never  lose sight  of the fact  that  the stream of consciousness  is an incessant
process of interpretant-generation spurred by (and responsive to) causal forces.
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Because trinitarianism also countenances Secondness and Thirdness, it does
not fit well in Chalmers’ classification. In philosophy of mind textbooks, we
find the terms “monism” and “dualism,” but rarely is any attention given to
views  that  countenance  three  stuffs.  The  term  “pluralism”  is  sometimes
mentioned, but that is not what I am after.  Some have suggested that Peirce
resorted to “panpsychism as a ploy for introducing thirdness into the realm of
inorganic matter” (Deely 2009a, p. 123fn23). It might therefore be more fruitful
to use a classification devised by Peirce with the express intent of situating his
metaphysical view among others.
Peirce (1998, pp.  179–195) divides positions depending on which of his
three  categories  they  are  ontologically  committed  to.  Exhausting  the
combinations, we are left with seven options. The -isms below are those which,
in  Peirce’s  estimate,  best  exemplify  a  given  ontology  (I  will  not  evaluate
whether the labels have been properly attributed, since this would take me too
far afield):
- Nihilism or Idealistic Sensualism
  (which grants the reality of Firstness only)
- Strict individualism (which grants the reality of Secondness only)
- Hegelianism (which grants the reality of Thirdness only)
- Cartesianism (which grants the reality of Secondness and Thirdness)
- Berkeleyanism (which grants the reality of Firstness and Thirdness)
- Ordinary Nominalism
  (which grants the reality of Firstness and Secondness)
And, finally,
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- “The metaphysics that recognizes all the categories” (Peirce 1998, p. 180)
I have chosen the word “trinitarianism” for this final view. One might also call
it “semiotic trinitarianism,” to distinguish it from religious trinitarianism. As I
stated at the start of the chapter, my use of the word denotes only a commitment
to  three  stuffs,  not  any theological  doctrine. If  a  better  label  were  to  come
along, I would adopt it. I must say, though, that I like how the word connotes
the Christian doctrine of the Trinity (with an upper-case “T”), since that serves
to remind us that, like the three divine Persons, the three parts of the sign can
never really be pried apart.
A semiotic trinitarian believes that everything that the universe has to offer
can be captured somewhere in figure 9. Peirce did not always have this layered
metaphysical  outlook at  his disposal. His intellectual journey began with the
realization that “[w]e have no power of thinking without signs” (Peirce 1992, p.
30). This can have idealistic implications, but according to Peirce:
Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our
own ideas.  That  is  indeed  without  exaggeration  the  very epitome of  all
falsity. Our knowledge of things in themselves is entirely relative, it is true;
but  all  experience  and  all  knowledge  is  knowledge  of  that  which  is,
independently of being represented. (Peirce 1931–58, vol. 6, para. 95)
Of course, heartfelt professions of realism are not by themselves sufficient to
show why/how realism holds. So, in order to accommodate the apparently self-
defeating notion of “that which is, independently of being represented,” Peirce
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struggled to elaborate a general taxonomy of consciousness (Houser 1983) that
could acknowledge both the reality of our interpretations  and of a world that
exists  apart  from  those  interpretations.  It  is  an  open  question  whether  he
succeeded. A lot depends, I suppose, on which version we choose to consider as
his  “mature”  theory.  Such  exegetic  matters  aside,  I  think  the  triadic  model
allows us to grant  the reality of Firstness and Secondness, assigning them a
proper place inside Thirdness (Peirce 1998, pp. 179–195).
I  have insisted throughout  this dissertation that,  since experience is  shot
through with interpretations, we glean Firstness and Secondness only by using
prescission.  However,  calling  into  question  the  soundness  of  Peircean
trinitarianism, James Johnston (2012, p. 18) recently expressed doubts that a
reality accessed through Thirdness would be truly real. In the same vein, Petre
Petrov  (2013)  has  argued  that,  if  mind-independent  facts  did  exist,  our
knowledge  of  them  would  immediately  turn  them  into  human  constructs.
Excluding  human  interpretation  from the  natural  order  is  questionable  (see
Markoš 2002). At any rate, I think that, if one truly understands what it means
to be a “Third,” then this worry that semiotics will support anti-realist views
should not arise. After all, how can one believe in the existence of the number 3
yet  doubt  the  existence  of  the  number  2  or  1?  On  pain  of  contradiction,
commitment to 3 seems to imply commitment to 2 and 1.
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We should nevertheless heed “one of idealism’s most basic cautions: if one
is to insist that there is existence  outside of knowledge, then one should have
the intellectual rigour of not attributing intelligibility to that existence, for this
is, after all, what ‘outside of knowledge’ implies” (Petrov 2013, p. 413). That is
why  I  have  consistently  stressed  the  inarticulate  character  of  Firstness  and
Secondness. Qualities are real but ineffable. If we want to be consistent in our
removal  of  all  relations,  we  have  no  choice  but  to  concede  that  describing
Firstness is, by definition, an impossible task:
Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the
day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had
become conscious of his own existence,—that is first, present, immediate,
fresh,  new,  initiative,  original,  spontaneous,  free,  vivid,  conscious,  and
evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it.
(Peirce 1992, p. 248)
If symbolic descriptions could allow us to bypass direct experience, life on
earth would be very different. As things stand, anyone wishing to appreciate a
given  quality  must,  like  Mary  the  neuroscientist,  set  their  books  aside.
Phenomenology is not  optional.  “The verbal  argument is at  most  only stage
setting; the heart of the drama is the invocation of experience and, indeed, the
attempt to register accurately the felt force of relevant experience” (Colapietro
2010,  p.  11).  Semiotic  theory  complements  phenomenology  by  giving  a
technical breakdown of the full spectrum of possible experiences, from inchoate
qualities  to  systems  of  notations  regimented  with  military  precision.
267
Accordingly,  I have been using signs of the lower-right corner of figure 9 to
call attention to the upper-left corner. The rest I cannot do.
When it  comes time for Chalmers  to produce a positive account in  The
Conscious Mind,  he turns to information theory for inspiration.  In  a chapter
titled  “Consciousness  and  Information:  Some  Speculation”  (1996,  pp.  276–
310), Chalmers assembles “a skeleton around which a theory might be built”
(ibid., p. 277).  In the remaining sections, I want to add flesh to those bones.  I
will defend two fairly straightforward claims: a) the world is made of complex
patterns and b) such complexity must subsume simplicity. I will use insights
from information theory to articulate (a) and insights from the early analytic
tradition  to  articulate  (b).  I  believe  that,  if  we  restate  the  conjunction  of
complexity and simplicity in the vocabulary of semiotics,  we can locate the
qualitative dimension of consciousness without accepting panpsychism.
IV.VI A World of Complex Patterns
The trinitarian  view I  endorse  is  not  reductionist.  Reductionism claims that
facts about psychology can be reduced to facts about physics, which alone are
“real.” Don Ross (2000) has argued, however, that such reduction would not be
feasible,  because physicists  and psychologists  are essentially doing the same
thing—abstracting patterns—while directing their attention to different sets of
regularities. Ross uses the philosophy of Daniel Dennett to articulate this.
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In  a  remarkable  paper  titled  “Real  Patterns,”  Dennett  (1991b)  used  the
Game of Life setting to illustrate  how predictions  employing the intentional
stance are grounded in facts. The Game of Life is not a “game” at all, but rather
a  self-organizing  system  invented  in  the  1960s  by  the  mathematician  John
Conway (for the cybernetic origins of this game design, see Poundstone 1985,
p. 24). It consists of a primitive set of axioms or “rules” successively deployed
on a  two-dimensional  grid  of  cells.  This  in  turn  gives  rise  to  more  or  less
cohesive patterns which we can categorize with some regularity.  As Dennett
emphasizes, these morphological types command some measure of predictive
power. If one has ascended to a level of description sufficiently abstract for a
pattern to be salient, then one can tell, for instance, that a “glider” is about to
fall prey to an incoming “eater”:
Figure 13   Real patterns in the Game of Life
(Taken from Poundstone 1985, p. 40; reprinted in Dennett 1991b, p. 40)
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Looking at the Game of Life depicted in figure 13, we can make the following
observations:
- It is complex.
- There is no such thing as a neighbourless cell pixel.
Now, consider what happens when we add the following philosophical claim:
- Complexity subsumes simplicity.
I  hold these  three  claims  to  be  true.  Yet,  if  one  does  not  have  recourse  to
prescission, their conjunction can create a tension because, in principle, the first
and third claim allow for the supposition of a neighbourless cell pixel—even
though the second claim states that, factually,  there is no such thing. Unlike
Ross,  I  do not  think the  world  should be  understood  only as  a  network  of
relations. Still,  I think that the patterns discussed by Ross account for a lot of
what happens in the universe. Let me therefore examine the idea that the world
is made up of relations.
Despite its patterned complexity, the world of the Game of Life “derives,
ultimately, from simple arithmetic: count the neighbors” (Poundstone 1985, p.
32). In the grid, any given cell will have eight neighbouring cells. Depending
on how many of those neighbouring cells are “on” or “off,” the cell at the center
will be either on or off. If, for example, there are exactly two neighbours that
are on, the center cell will maintain its status (as either on or off) in the next
generation or time-slice (ibid., p. 26).  Other rules apply to other states. The
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Game  of  Life  thus  illustrates  how  “[s]imple  rules  can  have  complex
consequences” (Poundstone 1985, p. 31).
Are  those  complex  consequences  “reducible”  to  the  handful  of  basic
principles that spawn them? According to Ross (2000, p. 161), a pattern may be
considered real when it meets the following conditions:
(i) it is projectable under at least one physically possible perspective
and 
(ii) it encodes information about at least one structure of events or entities S
where that encoding is more efficient, in information-theoretic terms, than
the bit-map encoding of  S, and where  for  at  least  one of  the physically
possible perspectives under which the pattern is projectable, there exists an
aspect of S that cannot be tracked unless the encoding is recovered from the
perspective in question.
Some of  the real  patterns gleaned  by a generalized intentional  stance  might
reproduce themselves in a tenacious manner that is “autopoietic” (if they meet
the three criteria described in Thompson 2007, pp.  101–103).  A semiotician
like Brier (2008) appeals heavily to such autopoiesis, but I do not want to make
my  conception  so  demanding  that  it  excludes  fuzzy  patterns  that  rapidly
degrade. I am setting the bar much lower. Even so, compared to a materialism
that admits only “ultimate little things and collisions amongst them” (Ladyman
et al. 2007, p. 23), making patterns a genuine part of reality is a huge step.
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Looking at the behaviour of humans, Dennett argued that ascribing motives
and beliefs is an objective strategy,  in that we can robustly gauge whether it
renders  its  predictive  service.  As  he  put  it:  “The  decision  to  adopt  the
intentional stance is free, but the facts about the success or failure of the stance,
were  one  to  adopt  it,  are  perfectly  objective”  (Dennett  1987,  p.  24).
Metaphysically,  one implication of this is that the world must be the kind of
place that makes the claims of psychology and physics true or false. Predicting
the behaviour of a stone is easier than predicting the behaviour of a toddler, but
Ross argues that the epistemology is the same: in either case, we endeavour to
uncover  patterns.  Ross  therefore  proposes  that  “the  utility of  the intentional
stance is a special case of the utility of scale-relative perspectives in general in
science,  and  expresses  a  fact  about  the  way in  which  reality  is  organized”
(Ladyman et al. 2007, p. 199).
A shift clearly occurs when one changes perspective. There is, on the one
hand, a base level where all one countenances are the cell pixels themselves,
considered as immanent particulars. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence
between a viewer’s representations and the discrete cells that are either on or
off,  the  information-theoretic  depiction  is  appropriately  called  a  “bit-map”
(literally, a “map of binary digits”). This robustly charts an area with a degree
of  accuracy  proportionate  to  the  number  of  divided  squares.  Given  an
exhaustive  statement  of  the  initial  conditions  of  the  game—that  is,  of  the
(finite) rules and starting positions of the (finite) pieces on the grid—one could
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in principle deduce (in Laplace-like fashion) the various positions these will
occupy on the board as the discrete volleys of moves or “ticks” are repeatedly
implemented. The inferential process underwriting such a systematic forecast
would be completely monotonic or truth-preserving: working with a bit-map is
informationally onerous, but assuming that the governing laws do not change
midway, it yields a predictive output that is as secure as its input.
The inferential dynamic at work is radically different, however, when one
adopts the intentional stance.  Indeed, if one ascends to a higher level where
creature-like actors can be discerned on the playing field, one does so at the
price of turning to an inductive rationale of a far  less mechanical  character.
Dennett is forthright about the fact that a concession along these lines needs to
be  made  in  order  to  have  access  to  intentional  explanation.  Whereas  an
exhaustive  account  of  the  pixels’  dispersion  on  the  grid  is  a  robust  affair,
moving away from a bit-map and limning “abstracta” (Dennett 1991b, p. 28)
like “eaters” involves a generalization from particulars which effectively soils
the  truth-preservation  with  informational  noise.  This  allows  one  to  draw
predictions only “sketchily and riskily” (Dennett 1991b, p. 40). A considerable
boon  of  yielding  to  such  induction,  however,  is  that  it  provides  one  with
assorted heuristics that are unavailable when one countenances only the pixels
themselves.
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To bring out  the difference,  we might  imagine  having to  “text” another
person’s demeanour and location at a given instant with a mobile phone. If one
were to take the bit-map route and catalogue the position and velocity of all the
person’s constituent particles, this would make for a lengthy message (and run a
costly bill). In information-theoretic parlance, the message would have greater
“entropy.” But, if one were to type something along the lines of “So and so is
sitting in such and such a room doing this or that,” one would thereby spare
oneself a lot of bits (not to mention a lot of money). The configuration of all the
relevant neurons in a given brain state need not be exhaustively recounted to get
a sense of what the subject is thinking/feeling. Neuroscientific explanation is
not impotent, but it takes a long detour.
In  principle,  the informational  compressibility involved in the intentional
stance—no  matter  how cognitively  cost-effective—should  be  insufficient  to
sway a materialist into countenancing things (like “eaters” or “angry people”)
whose  ontology  is,  at  root,  “more”  than  merely  material.  An  eliminative
materialist might try to enumerate the individual pixels of the Game of Life
which a third party espousing the intentional stance has the liberty to coalesce
and taxonomize. True, “posing fanciful interpretations” (Dennett 1991b, p. 41)
spares one the tedious task of having to describe the domain in question one
atomic unit at a time, but a materialist might reply that a token-only approach is
the surest way to ensure that one’s theoretical account hugs the metaphysical
makeup of the world as closely as possible. The strict one-to-one ratio between
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explanans and explanandum involved in a bit-map account is impractical. But,
this reproach—and the intentional realism concomitantly offered as a remedy—
have traction only if one makes cognitive economy a desideratum capable of
overruling the commitment to materialism. What sets eliminative materialism
apart  from the intentional stance is  that it  does not give any weight  to such
considerations.
Informational compression is asymmetrical in that it can result in a loss of
data (especially  if  the domain represented  is  disorderly).  Going back to  the
example just  used,  from an exhaustive account  of  another  person’s  material
makeup and spatial location, one can infer “who” and “where” (colloquially)
they are; but from simply being told that “So and so is sitting in such and such a
room  doing  this  or  that,”  one  cannot  determine  the  person’s  exact  spatial
coordinates. That is the price to pay for engaging in intentional ascription: we
save time precisely because we cut corners. The downside is that there is just no
way  to  unpack  all  the  observational  consequences  of  a  given  intentional
statement, so in this respect the idiom will always fall short of a “complete”
scientific  account.  Such  explanatory  completeness  is  what  a  materialist  like
Churchland (1988) is after.
Now, if the  materialist  ontology  holds  water,  then the  eliminativist
grievance just canvassed is cogent. It  is not at all obvious, however, that the
antecedent of this conditional deserves to be affirmed. Ross and his colleagues
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(Ladyman et al. 2007, pp. 20–21) argue that the “microbangings” we discussed
earlier  (in  section  IV.II)  belong  to  antiquated  conceptions  of  matter  and
causation.  Since  I  agree,  I  now  want  to  argue with  Ross  (2000)  that  the
informational compression alluded to by Dennett is something  no science can
do without, such that a thoroughgoing bit-map account is nothing but a chimera
of  armchair  reflection—a relic  of  early-Modern  metaphysics  that  should  be
discarded.
While  most  materialists  in  philosophy  see  themselves  (like  Locke)  as
“defending the hegemony of  modern matter  against  the mysteries  of  mental
substance and of mind/matter interaction,” the fact is “physics has shown this
conception of matter to be wrong in almost every respect” (Crane and Mellor
1990,  p.  186).  However,  one  does  not  need  a  full  command  of  the  latest
discoveries in physics to realize that most of the promissory notes issued by
philosophers  have  not  been  fulfiled.  The  sort  of  reduction  advocated  by
Oppenheim  and  Putnam  (1958),  for  example,  can  be  deemed  untenable
“because  over  more  than  forty  years  since  its  publication,  the  specific
extrapolations  offered  by its  authors  seem to have  been,  without  exception,
mistaken” (Ross 2005, p. 168).
The ultimate aim of  scientific  enquiry is  admittedly to  arrive  at  general
laws.  There  are  good  reasons,  however,  to  think  that  even  this  prized
achievement is beholden to the pattern discernment previously canvassed. To
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take an untendentious example from astronomy, we do not exhaustively chart
the path and constitution of celestial bodies, pile up the ensuing records in some
museum vault, and call that knowledge. Rather, “[t]he positions of the planets
in  the  solar  system  over  some  interval  constitute  a  compressible  data  set,
because  Newton’s  laws  [...]  supply  the  necessary  algorithm  to  achieve  the
compression” (Davies 1990, p. 63). To be sure, there has to be a sufficiently
high  degree  of  worldly  regularity  for  this  feat  of  massive  informational
compression  to  be  feasible.  Yet,  the  nomological  end-product  is  so  crisp
precisely because it leaves out many concrete details and is hedged with ceteris
paribus qualifications (Cartwright 1983). A thoroughgoing ban on noise would
therefore halt scientific activity altogether, neurological or otherwise.
Once  we  grant  that  bit-map  explanations  are  impossible  even  for  basic
material  objects,  we  are  in  a  position  to  ask:  what  makes  the  layperson’s
observation that the sun regularly traces an arc across the sky less legitimate
than the scientific observation that, when seen from afar,  the earth regularly
traces  an  ellipse  around  the  sun? Natural  science  having  amply  proven  its
worth, the time has come to return the pendulum to a less adversarial resting
place  and  accept  that  it  is  no  concession  whatsoever  to  geocentrism  to
acknowledge  that  the  sun  does set  in  the  West  daily.  Clearly,  to  hold  that
predictions mobilized on the basis of either theory enjoy a privileged status is to
express  a  lingering  dogma  since,  despite  their  different  perspectives,  each
abstracts out a real pattern. As far as contingent explanations go, the antics of
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one’s  conspecifics  are  no  different.  Nevertheless,  there  is  an  ingrained
philosophical bias against accepting this:
It  may  strike  you  as  odd  that,  whereas  instrumentalists  hold  that
belief/desire psychology works so well that we can’t do anything without it,
eliminativists hold that it works so badly (“stagnant science” and all that)
that we can’t do anything with it. […] In fact—and here’s the point I want
to  stress  just  now—what  largely  motivates  Anti-Realism  is  something
deeper than the empirical speculation that belief/desire explanations won’t
pan out as science; it’s the sense that there is something intrinsically wrong
with the intentional. (Fodor 1990, p. 11)
With this prejudice removed, explanations of psychological facts are no longer
suspect (Floridi 2008, pp. 248–249). Their only difference lies in the varying
degrees of informational compression.
If no science, physical or otherwise, can desist from the demand to abstract,
there would no longer seem to be anything “optional” about the adoption of a
perspective:  to  miss  a  pattern  that  is  potentially  visible  from an  intentional
vantage is surely to miss relations that truly exist in the world. Even so, we
should retain Dennett’s general contention that “adopting a stance” toward the
world  is  essential.  This  is  because  pattern  discernment—which  can  be
understood  as  privileging  one  proper  subset  among  a  myriad  of  others—
necessitates that an observer bring her aims, queries, and practical interests to
bear on the cognitive transaction. Building on an example from Henry James,
we can say that making out a complex figure in a Persian carpet is a joint effort,
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the  subject  selecting  one  shape  among others,  the  object  ensuring  that  that
selection is not confabulated, such that “any act of interpretation is a dialectic
between [...] initiative on the part of the interpreter and contextual pressure”
(Eco 1990, p. 21).
If,  out  of  some  overdone  fear  of  relativism,  we  hastily  cast  aside  the
participatory  component  at  work  in  this  interplay—which  enters  most
prominently  as  the  surmise  that  renders  further  inference  possible,  literally
determining what to look for (Peschard 2010)—we run the risk of lapsing into a
naive epistemological account that lacks the resources needed to ascertain what
constitutes  an  appropriate  degree  of  informational  compression  in  a  given
instance. Indeed, it is worth stressing that we witness the denizens of the Game
of Life very much “from within” that game, so any player that “develops an
interest  in  conserving  its  own  structure”  (Brier  2008,  p.  259) will  have  a
tangible stake in the outcomes of  the intentional  forecasts  marshaled in this
aptly-named setting (Champagne 2011).
Like Chalmers, I too am drawn to the “strangely beautiful conception” of
the world “as pure informational flux, [...] a world of primitive differences, and
of causal and dynamic relations among those differences” (1996, p. 303). Fred
Dretske (1981) has done a great job showing how information theory can be
used to craft a persuasive account of the mind. I think semiotics can contribute
by construing the flow of information as a relay race where A stands for B to C
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(although, in icons, A stands for A to A, as we saw in figure 10). Unfortunately,
Dretske (1995) also thinks we should try to “naturalize” the mind in a way that
makes the idea of qualitative experience dubious (see Bailey 2005). I do not see
why this incredulity should follow. On the contrary, the argument I am making
is that,  if  patterns  are  real  and if  complexity subsumes simplicity,  then real
patterns subsume real qualities.
IV.VII Complexity Subsumes Simplicity
In  the  second  chapter,  I  looked  at  how Peirce  and  Russell  both  apply  the
Leibnizian thesis that whatever is complex is composed of simples (Blamauer
2011). This thesis is so plausible that even an eliminativist like Paul Churchland
must grant it:
[T]he bulk of one’s sensational life is characterized, not by simplicity, but
by  an  extraordinary  and  ever-changing  complexity.  Listening  to  a
conversation, looking around a flower garden, tasting a braised-lamb stew,
smelling the aromas in a wood-working shop—our sensations in such cases
display intricacies that are amazing. And not always obvious. A young child
may not  appreciate  that  the  distinctive  taste  of  her  first  ice-cream cone
resolves  itself  into  sensations  of  sweetness,  creaminess,  and  strawberry.
And it  may take  her  awhile  to  learn  that  such  decompositions  are  both
common and useful to keep track of. For the complexities we encounter are
indeed  composed,  quite  often,  of  simpler  elements  or  constituting
dimensions.  In  time,  we do  learn  many of  those  simpler  dimensions.  A
dinner-table  conversation  contains  my  brother’s  unique  voice  as  an
identifiable  element;  the  complex  flower-garden  displays  the  striking
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orange of a typical poppy blossom; the lamb stew displays the distinctive
taste of thyme, sprinkled into the mix at the outset; and the smell of yellow
cedar  stands  out  from the  other  smells  in  the  wood shop,  at  least  to  a
seasoned carpenter.  Each of these particular  qualitative features  of  one’s
inner  phenomenological  life  is  certainly  a  simpler  dimension  of  a  more
complex whole. (Churchland 2011, pp. 32–33)
If we begin (as I believe we must) with a premise of complexity and grant (as I
believe  we  should)  that  anything  involved  in  complex  relations  can  be
prescissively decomposed, then we are led to conclude that, in principle, such
decomposition  would  have  to  bottom  out  at  simple  qualities.  This  is  so
regardless of whether the complex strand we prescind is construed as external
or internal to the mind. As long as that object of study demonstrates relational
complexity,  a  thoroughgoing  analysis  will  arrive  at  Firstness.  Hence,
“[q]ualitative  characters  that  are  at  least  apparent  simples  are  thus  utterly
inevitable  on  both approaches  to  understanding  the  mind,  dualist  and
materialist” (Churchland 2011, pp. 33–34). Churchland thinks he can avoid the
“gathering consensus that the qualitative dimension of our conscious experience
is something that the physical sciences […] will never explain” (2011, p. 17) by
merely annexing the adjective “apparent simples,” but I think the inference at
hand is more formidable.
Infering  qualia  from  relational  complexity  certainly  has  major  backers.
Russell,  Schlick, Carnap, and (the early)  Wittgenstein all agreed with Peirce
that, when  analysis digs low enough,  it  eventually reaches  a simple quality.
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There  were,  of  course,  important  differences  in  how  each  dealt  with  the
qualitative  simplicity  thus  obtained.  Russell  did  not  seem  troubled  by  the
prospect of a primitive that “eludes words and baffles description” since, “for
that very reason,” such a state “is irrelevant to science” (Russell [1919] 1950, p.
61).  Schlick held that “the inexpressible greenness  of green” (1979, p.  322)
would have  to  be  included  in  a  full  account  because,  “if  we are  to  have  a
science  of  some domain of  reality  instead of  a  mere hypothetical-deductive
system, then our symbols must stand for real content” and not “mere structure”
(ibid., p. 331). Carnap ([1928] 2003, pp. 235–237) tried to achieve this result by
making “foundedness” a primitive.  Carnap acknowledged that we begin with
lived experience (“Erlebnis”), but (quoting Poincaré approvingly) he held that
“only the relations  between the sensations  have an objective value” ([1928]
2003, p. 30). To track things, Carnap allowed for the use of “indicator signs”
(“Kennzeichungen”), but the question of “what” qualitative contents ground a
symbolic system did not concern him. Consistent with this idea that we cannot
convey  intrinsic  qualities  in  any  articulate  way,  Wittgenstein  ([1921]  2002,
section 7, p. 189) urged us all to shut up when we get to that point. In so doing,
he allied himself  with “numerous arguments  for  humility about  the intrinsic
nature of our world” (Majeed 2013, p. 259)—although, by intimating iconicity,
“the  early  Wittgenstein  saw further  than  many of  his  contemporaries  here,
drawing his famous distinction between what can be ‘said’ and what can only
be ‘shown’” (Legg 2008, p. 214).
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Thus, with varying degrees of success and confidence, the founders of the
early analytic tradition engaged with the same issues that captivated Peirce’s
semiotic investigations (for a more detailed survey, see Livingston 2004). It is
bizarre, then, to see Churchland dismissing arguments that decompose complex
relations  as  “lack[ing]  integrity  even  by  the  standards  of  purely  analytic
philosophy” (2011 p. 18). Churchland may not be happy with the way debates
are going, but the exegetical accuracy of his dismisal is questionable. In fact,
Bertrand Russell—who surely counts as an analytic philosopher—devoted an
entire  book to  showing that  matter,  not  consciousness,  is  what  we ought  to
eliminate.
In The Analysis of Matter ([1927] 1954), Russell argued that ordinary things
(like tables and frogs) should be thought of as networks of relations. On this
view, everything is a pattern like those found in the Game of Life (figure 13).
Since bigger things (e.g., frogs) are made up of smaller things (e.g., cells), we
can infer that more complex patterns are composed of simpler patterns. Yet, in
contrast with Ross, who thinks that “reality is composed of real patterns all the
way down” (Ross 2000, p. 160; emphasis in original), Russell held that when
we take a pattern and decompose it into ever simpler states, “[o]bviously there
must be a limit to this process, or else all the things in the world will merely be
each other’s washing” ([1927] 1954, p. 325; see the discussion in Holman 2008,
p. 55). I side with Russell on this issue.
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I follow Peirce in holding that Firstness is as low as one can go. Firstness is
not mind, but it is not matter either (scale is irrelevant here, because the absence
of comparisons prevents one from assessing size). It is simply a quality, robbed
of  any  relation(s)  with  anything  else.  This  suggests  a  “neutral”  stuff.  That
neutrality may seem contentious, but I think it can be verified using any nearby
quality, like the colour of a blank sheet of white paper (see section II.III).  As
Levine  notes,  when  studying  the  instrinsic  character  of  one  of  the  many
qualities  that  make  up  consciousness,  “[w]ho  can  tell  whether  its  ultimate
ontological  status  is  material  or  immaterial  merely by means of  having it?”
(2001, p. 128). So, whereas Ross and his structuralist colleagues (Ladyman et
al. 2007, pp. 39–40) liken qualia to “ectoplasm” (for another mention of that
unfortunate  word,  Majeed  2013,  pp.  254–255), I  do not  think the idea of  a
purely qualitative dimension is beyond the pale.
Russell  may  have  been  blind  to  the  possibility  of  using  qualities  for
semiotic purposes (as I discussed in chapter two), but there is a lot in Russell
that can be used to assemble a plausible trinitarian metaphysics. Russell argued
that physics is impotent to capture qualities (Holman 2008, pp. 50–51) because
that science deals only with networks of relations. In order to show this, Russell
implicitly relied on an uncontroversial premise which, following Stathis Psillos
(2009, p. 126), we may call the “Helmholtz-Weyl” principle. It states that “we
are justified, when different perceptions offer themselves to us, to infer that the
underlying real conditions are different” (quoted by Weyl  1963, p. 26). This
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principle grafts itself nicely onto well-known Russellian tenets. As we saw (in
section II.IV), Russell ([1918] 1998, p. 59) thought that observational episodes
conveyed by nondescript  demonstratives like “This is white” supply us with
“knowledge by acquaintance.” Although we can wave our index fingers around
and attempt to ostensively convey what is happening when we enjoy such first-
person episodes, these empirical  points of contact,  Russell held, are by their
nature private and ineffable.
Since  Russell  did  not  have  any  icons  in  his  semiotic  repertoire,  this
limitation of indices does not bode well for objective third-person knowledge.
Not to worry, one does not have to wait long to depart from this, since “[t]he
next simplest [facts] would be those in which you have a relation between two
facts, such as: ‘This is to the left of that’” ([1918] 1998, p. 59). The moment we
bring two or more relata into relation, we leave the domain of intrinsic qualities
and effectively enter that of intelligibility (and, by extension, science).
This  is  where  the  aforementioned  move  from  different  perceptions  to
different  causes  does  its  work.  On  this  view,  a  three-part  sequence  like
lemon/apple/lemon will bear the same relational configuration as a three-part
sequence avocado/banana/avocado—even if one person tastes avocado flavours
where another tastes lemon. “Two relations P, Q are said to be ‘similar’ if there
is  a  one-one  relation  between  the  terms of  their  fields,  which  is  such  that,
whenever two terms have the relation  P, their correlates have the relation  Q,
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and  vice  versa”  (Russell  [1927]  1954,  p.  249).  In  the  previous  example,
avocado-tastes mapped onto lemon-tastes, and apple-tastes onto banana-tastes.
Likewise, “[a] book spelt phonetically is similar to the sounds produced when it
is read aloud” (Russell  [1927] 1954, p. 249), since the structure binding the
printed characters can be monotonically correlated with the structure binding
the spoken sounds (ibid., p. 400). Hence, so long as variations in experience
attest  to  variations  in  whatever  is  impinging  on  the  sense  organs,  the
“Helmholtz-Weyl” principle licenses the inference of a common structure. “In
this  mathematical  view,  structure  is  a  domain  of  similarity  and  difference,
which, like color for the blind, has no substance of its own” (Lidov 1999, p.
128).
Paul Livingston has argued, quite persuasively I find, that the early analytic
tradition  struggled  with  some of  the  same themes  and  issues  that  now grip
current philosophy of consciousness. The leader of the Vienna Circle, Moritz
Schlick, was particularly influenced by Russell’s analysis of matter:
In  1932, Moritz Schlick delivered three lectures under the collective  title
“Form and Content: An Introduction to Philosophical Thinking” [reprinted
in  Schlick  1979, pp. 285–369]. In  the lectures, he sought to describe the
condition for any possibility of communicating thought linguistically. Such
communication,  he  held,  always  amounts  to  the  communication  of
structure.  In  each  case,  however,  in  order  for  understanding  actually  to
occur, it would be necessary for the “structure” or “form” of linguistic signs
to be “filled in” with “content” drawn from individual experience [Schlick
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1979, p.  296].  With  respect  to  verification,  Schlick  held  that  it  is  the
possibility  of  such  direct  “filling  in”  that  allows  empirical  propositions
ultimately  to be justified by experience. In actually verifying an empirical
proposition, Schlick thought, we must in each case perform a subjective act
of “comparing” the proposition to reality by “filling in” the content of the
proposition from experience itself. This claim about verification led him to
propose his theory of “affirmations” or Konstatierungen as lying ultimately
at the epistemic basis of empirical knowledge. (Livingston 2013, pp. 81–82)
Science gets its empirical credentials from suitably structured observations.  If
Schlick is right, then the project of obtaining an explanation of consciousness in
terms  of  physics  (or  any other  science)  is  problematic,  since  our  conscious
awareness is primordial.
As the British astronomer Sir Arthur Eddington noted, the knowledge we
have of a particle comes from, “like everything else in physics, a schedule of
pointer readings [on instrument dials]. The schedule is, we agree, attached to
some unknown background” (quoted in Strawson 2006, p. 10). This pattern of
pointer readings permits, as the name attests, an indexical tracking of whatever
causally  interacts  with  a  given  instrument.  This  can  in  turn  give  a  robust
structural  account  of  how that  object  behaves.  However,  what  the  object  is
remains unaddressed. Since indexical relations give no insight into the relatum
they track, the structures of natural scientific explanation seem hollow.
This structuralism has become prominent in philosophy of science because
it is believed that focusing solely on what a thing “does” and staying mum on
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what  it  “is”  allows  us  to  find  theoretical  continuities  that  have  survived
paradigm  shifts  (see  Worrall  1989).  In  philosophy  of  mind,  structuralist
ontologies seem to limit one to functionalist explanations. Some semioticians,
like Bains (2006), are currently trying to build ontologies using only relations
that are “in between” their relata, but I think we should take advantage of the
fact that the Peircean account also countenances qualitative relata themselves.
This, to my mind, is one of the many advantages semioticians have gained by
migrating from a Saussurean to a Peircean framework. Indeed, if we look at
history  as  a  laboratory  where  ideas  get  tested,  it  is  instructive  to  note  that
French structuralism, which followed Saussure ([1916] 2011) in countenancing
only relations (see Holdcroft 1991, pp. 88–106, 119–130), eventually collapsed
under the weight of its own contradictions (Dosse 1997b).
According  to  Chalmers  (2013,  p.  18),  the  Russellian  world  “consists  in
quiddities  connected  by  laws  of  nature,”  and  “these  quiddities  along  with
structure ground all conscious experience.” I am unsure Russell would have put
things so confidently, since he seems to incline more toward agnosticism than
realism  when  discussing  qualities.  Russell  conceded  that  the  qualitative
contents  which  hang  together  in  a  given  structure  fall  outside  the  ambit  of
testability and inter-subjective verification, such that “the only difference must
lie in just that essence of individuality which always eludes words and baffles
description, but which, for that very reason, is irrelevant to science” (Russell
[1919]  1950,  p.  61).  Qualities  may be  irrelevant  to  physics,  but  they  seem
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crucial to a full account of consciousness—or anything else that is not solely
relational. I thus take it as a desideratum that a theory should leave us able to
distinguish lemon/apple/lemon from avocado/banana/avocado.
For  Galen  Strawson  (2006),  the  limitation  of  science  to  structural
elucidation  is  decisive.  Recall  Eddington’s  observation  that  scientific
instruments track what a thing does but they give no positive characterization of
“what” a thing “is” apart from those behaviours and dispositions. Whether we
are dealing with an animal or a rock, we use what a thing “does” to anticipate
what  it  will  do  next.  However,  the  recent  philosophical  preoccupation  with
intrinsic  qualities,  which  can  be  seen  as  a  struggle  to  (re)discover  Peircean
Firstness, stems from the realization that,  even when dealing with inanimate
matter, a functional description does not give the whole story.
Seager,  for instance,  asks  us to “consider  the proposition that  individual
electrons  generate  a  gravitational  field.  It  is  obviously true  that  the  kind of
behaviour  which large  objects  engage  in gives  us  evidence  for  attributing a
gravitational field to them. But the question is does having a gravitational field
entail producing such overt effects. Clearly,  it does not” (2012, p.  25).  Block
makes a similar point. As he explains, particles are individuated in physics by
“having  certain  lawlike  relations  to  certain  other  physical  properties  (Block
1978, p. 302). However, it turns out that the functional relations which allow us
to  pick  out  “dual”  particles  like  protons  and  anti-protons  are  identical.
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Physicists nevertheless distinguish between the two kinds of particles because,
when combined, they annihilate each other. Even though “physics characterizes
its basic entities only extrinsically, in terms of their relations to other entities”
(Chalmers  2010,  p.  27),  the  suggestion  here  is  that,  unless  we  grant  that
particles possess intrinsic natures, we have no reason to think that what we call
protons are not in fact anti-protons and vice versa (Block 1978, p. 302).
If all of this is right, then how should we understand the intrinsic qualities
of  things  apart  from  the  sundry  structural  relations  they  entertain?  For
Eddington, the answer rests on an inference to the best explanation. Manifestly,
our conscious experiences  let  us appreciate what qualities are,  and since we
seem to have no other way to apprehend the intrinsic character of a thing, “it
seems  rather  silly  to  prefer  to  attach  [a  schedule  of  pointer  readings]  to
something of a so-called ‘concrete’ nature inconsistent with thought, and then
to wonder where the thought comes from” (quoted in Strawson 2006, p. 10).
This is not far from Schlick, who said that we must fill-in structure with qualia.
True, if we consider a quality in a way that abstracts away all relations, we are
left with something that “eludes words and baffles description, but which, for
that very reason, is irrelevant to science” (Russell [1919] 1950, p. 61). It takes
an  additional  assumption  of  scientism,  however,  to  infer  metaphysical
inexistence  from  scientific  irrelevance.  Strawson  does  not  make  that
assumption, so he thinks our experience of qualitative contents gives us good
grounds to endorse panpsychism.
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In contrast with Strawson, I do not think the qualities we obtain when we
prescind relations can support the label “psyche” or any of its cognates.  The
shared assumption of the analytic tradition has been (and continues to be) that
“whatever  does  not  belong  to  the  structure  [...]  is,  in  the  final  analysis,
subjective” (Carnap [1928] 2003, p. 29). That is the Lockean view I am trying
hard to subvert. Like Peirce, I believe that if we arrive at a quality by stripping
away relations (e.g., patterns, structures, etc.), then we are no longer entitled to
confidently locate that quality in the “subjective” mind. If, when prescinding,
one consistently abides by the terms one has set, there should be no way to tell.
I  agree,  though,  that  we should countenance  qualities  as  primitives  (see
section IV.II). I want the individual cells in the Game of Life to have qualities.
This strikes me as more sensible than compounding pattern upon pattern in the
hope that qualitative experience will eventually emerge. “In Peirce’s semiotics,
everything  in  nature  is  a  potential  sign.  [...]  The  implication  of  this  is  that
qualia, and  ‘the inner life’  are potentially there from the beginning. [...] The
point  is  that  organisms  and  their  nervous  systems  do  not  create  mind  and
qualia” (Brier 2008, p. 99; see also Parker 1994).
The panpsychist proposals of Eddington and Strawson exploit the fact that
“physical theory does not tell us what the intrinsic properties are in virtue of
which physical objects and their causal or dispositional or functional properties
have  the  causal  powers  they  do.  It  thus  allows  that  among  such  intrinsic
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properties could be phenomenal properties” (Holman 2008, p. 53). I agree with
some of this.  Eddington is  right  that  we can have direct  appreciation of the
qualities related by “schedules” of indices. However, I see no reason to assume
that this somehow involves introspection. Why is it that every time we label a
quality “phenomenal,” we have to yank it out of the external world and toss it
into  a  skull?  As I  argued  in  the  second  chapter,  the transparency  of  iconic
experience blurs this inner/outer distinction. Since direct realism (e.g., Kelley
1988) remains a genuine possibility, there is no obvious philosophical blunder
in reporting that “The beer is bitter.”
The trinitarian view I am developing thus tells a very different story about
where  the  qualitative  dimension  is  located.  I  believe  a  trinitarian  ontology
inspired  by  Peirce,  coupled  with  a  recognition  that  we  alone  have  the
prescissive powers required to draw up a table like figure 9 and conceive of a
neighbourless cell pixel, supplies an account well-suited for those (like Psillos
2009) suspicious of the claim that there exists something non-structural.  True,
we will never be able to give a scientific description of the basic qualities that
fall  under  Firstness.  However,  that  is  not  because  qualia  are  mysterious
ectoplasm, but simply because, in the Game of Life, “[n]othing can happen in a
cellular array with just one state for cells” (Poundstone 1985, p. 195) or just one
cell not bound by any neighbours (pace figure 4).
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Some  complex  patterns  are  themselves  pattern-grasping.  When  these
pattern-grasping  patterns  are  human  creatures,  what  “emerges”  is  not  a
qualitative dimension that other things lack, but a unique power to prescind the
individual cell pixels that comprise patterns. Hence, despite the fundamentality
of Firstness, trinitarianism still sees us as the rarest creatures, albeit not for the
usual reasons.
IV.VIII Trinitarianism Does Not Face a Combination Problem
I want to close this chapter with a relevant selling-point for trinitarianism. In
the current literature, it  is generally assumed that panpsychism faces what is
known as the “combination problem” (expressed by Seager 1995; but with roots
in James [1890] 2007a, pp. 158–162). The worry is that, having put experiential
properties in the world, we now have to explain how and why the conscious
mind is unified. That is, we have to somehow “combine” the basic mind-stuff
countenanced  by  panpsychism  in  a  way  that  yields  a  phenomenologically
plausible self. Recent proposals on how to solve this “problem” (e.g., Coleman
2012; Cunningham 2013; Seager 2010) have gotten really bizarre. Fortunately,
I  want  to  argue  that  my  account  does  not  need  these  solutions,  because
trinitarianism does not face a combination problem to begin with.
Galen Strawson suggests that “there are many short-lived and successive
selves  (if  there  are  selves  at  all),  in  the  case  of  ordinary individual  human
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beings” (1999, p. 100). If he is right, then, as a panpsychist, he may face many
small combination problems. I would have thought that the goal of a successful
“combination” would be to reach something truly unified (Champagne 2013a).
Luckily,  I  do not have much to  do to re-assemble myself.  I  have described
trinitarianism as a commitment to the reality, not just of p-consciousness, but to
the  triadic  action  of  signs.  Indeed,  I  have  been  insisting  throughout  this
dissertation  that  we  never  actually  split  the  stream  of  semiosis  into  parts.
Rather,  we prescind. This requires us, at each step, to keep in mind that the
signs  we  analyze  are  in  fact  bound.  I  can  thus  capitalize  on  my  repeated
warnings against reification.
As an adult who has learned much about the world, I know that I am not the
hub  of  all  semioses.  In  philosophical  parlance,  this  makes  me  a  realist.
However,  my rejection  of  solipsism does  nothing to  alter  my status  as  this
particular  node in  the  vast  network  of  signs.  I  am,  for  better  or  for  worse,
condemned  to  my  own  vantage  (see  Thompson  2007,  pp.  81–87).  Now,
semiotics  can  certainly  tell  a  story  about  how humans  construct  their  self-
concept and personal identity (for a promising outline, see  Colapietro 1989).
But,  whatever  shape that  story takes,  it  will  have to countenance  more than
disparate  qualities.  I  think  that,  if  we  properly  and  consistently  apply
prescission, we are not burdened with combining qualities into something that
looks psychologically plausible, because plausible human experience—the sort
294
I am intimately familiar with and ardently care to enrich and extend—has been
there all along.
Panpsychism faces a combination problem because,  as a monist  view,  it
must assume that filling-in the cell pixels of the Game of Life (figure 13) with
colours,  tastes,  and other  qualities flattens  all  patterns  out  of  existence.  The
whole advantage of trinitarianism’s triple commitment is  that  one gets these
fundamental qualities, their impacts with each other, and the plethora of more
or less cohesive patterns that result from the commotion.
IV.IX Chapter Conclusion
I have argued throughout this dissertation that prescission allows us to consider
any quality “in its own suchness, while we disregard the connections” to other
qualities (Peirce 1931–58, vol. 1, para.  424).  Are the qualities thus obtained
real? That depends on how we define “real.” Usually, something is considered
real when it is mind-independent. As a result, it can be problematic to conjoin
the reality of Firstness with the acknowledgement that prescission needs minds
to do it. Since “it is natural to seek a general understanding of reality, including
ourselves, which does not depend on the fact  that we  are ourselves” (Nagel
1986, p. 25), the very fact that humans alone can count three ingredients can be
taken as evidence that there are not three ingredients.
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We may not live in a world that permits us to encounter a quality in total
isolation, but we do live in a world that permits us to consider what cannot
factually  obtain—and that  power,  I  argue,  needs  to  be  accounted  for  in  a
metaphysics.  It would of course simplify matters if the interpretation of signs
could really be (i.e., not just be supposed) absent. I think, though, that we have
much to gain from getting used to the nuance.
An ontology devoid of qualities “implies that our perceptual experience is
incurably infected with illusion” (Shoemaker 1994, p. 296). Churchland (1996,
p. 207) thinks instruction in natural science can cure one of this illusion. If one
truly  understands  physics,  he  says,  one  will  see  that  a  quality  like  heat  is
actually motion. Alas, my feeling of heat persists—despite the science courses I
have taken. It is not that I fail to understand what naturalists aspire to; it is just
that what they aspire to is flatly contradicted by everything I experience. Like
Peirce, I believe that “the scientific spirit requires a man to be at all times ready
to dump his whole cart-load of beliefs, the moment experience is against them”
(1931–58, vol. 1, para. 55).  I have thus tried to tell a metaphysical story  that
does not require me to turn a blind eye on my most proximate certainties.
The most direct objections to panpsychism are the “no sign” objection and
the  “not  mental”  objection.  The  “no  sign”  objection  says  that  “there  is  no
evidence  whatsoever  of  a  nonphysical  dimension  to  the  elemental  units  of
nature;”  whereas  the  “not  mental”  objection  says  that, “if  there  was  some
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feature of these units we chose to label as ‘mental,’ what possible ground could
one provide to justify this label” (Seager 1995, p. 282). I take it that patterns are
all around us, so there are plenty of signs. As for the “not mental” objection, I




The elements  of  every concept  enter  into  logical  thought  at  the  gate  of
perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever
cannot  show its  passports  at  both  those  two  gates  is  to  be  arrested  as
unauthorized by reason.
Charles Sanders Peirce, “Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction”
Lecture delivered at Harvard on May 14, 1903
(Reprinted in Peirce 1998, p. 241)
Each quale is in itself what it is for itself, without reference to any other. It
is absurd to say that one quale in itself considered is like or unlike another.
Nevertheless, comparing consciousness does pronounce them to be alike.
Charles Sanders Peirce, “Quale-Consciousness”
Unpublished notes, circa 1898
(Reprinted in Peirce 1931–58, vol. 6, para. 224)
I began with two epigraphs from Peirce, reprised above, and stated that, if we
could see  how those  quotes  are  consistent,  progress  in  philosophy of  mind
would have been made. Ideally, we should leave a dissertation a bit smarter and
better informed than we were when we came in. So, now that we have a better
understanding of semiotic theory, let us see if the two claims interlock.
The first quote is, in essence, a slogan for a strong functionalist program. It
demands that every explanation start with an input that enters “at the gate of
perception” and end with an output that exists “at the gate of purposive action”
(Peirce 1998, p. 241). The goal of cognitive science is to construct plausible
theories of what happens in between. Yet, no matter what those theories look
like,  they  seem  destined  to  relate states.  This  involvement  of  relations  in
scientific theories  would be benign,  were  it  not  for the fact  that  a prevalent
construal glosses consciousness as having a non-relational element to it. Raw
feels are supposed to have an intrinsic quality, irrespective of what objects or
behaviours they are associated with. This construal is expressed by the second
epigraph, which says that each basic qualitative state or quale “is in itself what
it is for itself, without reference to any other” (Peirce 1931–58, vol. 6, para.
224). A tension thus ensues: The functional program calls for an explanation of
psychological  facts  in  terms  of  relations,  but  at  least  one  dimension of  our
psychological  lives  seems to  involve  simple experiential  qualities  conceived
apart from any relation(s). Hence, if one accepts both of my opening quotes,
one will run into trouble.
David Chalmers speaks of “the double life of mental terms” (1996, p. 16)
and  emphasizes  that  while  “[o]ur  everyday  concept  of  pain  presumably
combines the two [concepts  of phenomenal  pain and psychological  pain]  in
some subtle weighed combination, [...] for philosophical discussion things are
clearer  if  we keep  them separate”  (ibid.,  p.  17).  What  might  this  “keeping
separate” mean? Clearly, it is not a matter of physically isolating one from the
other, like severing the corpus callosum. Is it then just mere word-play? On a
superficial level, “feeling” and “doing” are certainly different words. However,
the  suggestion  by  Chalmers  is  that  those  words  also  “cover  different
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phenomena, both of which are quite real” (ibid., p. 11). Since we are dealing
with something more substantive than a plurality of words (Block 2000, p. 133)
yet  less  palpable  than  a  physical  separation,  I  have  argued  that  we  are
confronted with what Scotus called a “formal distinction.”
A “formal distinction” lies  between a “distinction of reason” and a “real
distinction.” A distinction of reason “is completely dependent upon the mind”
(Jordan 1984, p. 44), whereas “things are really distinct if they are separable,
that is, if they can exist one without the other” (ibid., p. 45).  Peirce used this
distinction of distinctions to tease apart the ordinal steps involved in the action
of signs, and I think we can do the same to profitably disambiguate important
puzzles about phenomenal consciousness.
Shoemaker  provides  a  nice  illustration:  “If  I  perceive  French  tricolor,  I
perceive a rectangle made of three horizontal stripes, of red, white, and blue.
This involves experiences of those individual stripes. There seems a good sense
in which I could have had the experience I had of any of those stripes without
having the experiences  of  the others” (2003,  p.  65).  Using scissors,  we can
tamper with the flag and make all the colours except one absent. That would be
a real distinction in Scotus’ sense. But, when we leave our experience of the
tricolour  intact  and suppose those  present  stripes  absent,  we make a formal
distinction.  As  Peirce  explains,  “prescission  is  always  accomplished  by
imagining ourselves in situations in which certain elements of fact cannot be
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ascertained” (1931–58, vol. 2, para. 428). So, when prescissively considering
only the white stripe of the French tricolour, there is no telling which flag it is
part of.
If we want to separate qualities from the functional responses they elicit, a
real distinction is not opened to us. Although the world does not permit us to
encounter a quality in total  isolation,  prescission does permit  us to consider
what cannot obtain factually.  Acknowledging this requires us to conjoin two
seemingly contradictory theses: 1) prescission is something we (humans) do,
and 2) it is not up to us (humans) what results when prescission is properly
carried out. Since the first thesis speaks to mind-dependence while the second
thesis speaks to mind-independence, their conjunction can seem unstable.
One response  is  to  see  fascination  with  qualia  as  an  understandable  but
misguided by-product of our conceptual faculties. This is the view adopted by
David Papineau. As we saw in the second chapter,  Papineau grasps that the
“characteristic feature [of phenomenal thoughts] is that the conscious  referent
itself is involved in the vehicle of thought. [...] [P]henomenal thoughts use the
very states that they mention” (2006, p. 104). For Papineau, the chief virtue of
grasping this qualitative participation is that  it  allows the philosopher to see
how “this use-mention feature carries much potential for confusion” (Papineau
2006, p. 104). Thus, in Papineau’s hands, the icon becomes a way to explain
away our tendency to consider qualia real.
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Yet,  when  Papineau  uncovers  this  peculiar  form  of  reference,  he
presumably takes stock of a mind-independent fact. It is not up to the thinking
subject how icons work. Hence, it is questionable whether semiotic notions like
iconicity can be used to explain “away”  qualia.  I  believe that,  at  minimum,
philosophy of signs does justice to a fundamental truth:  the idea of a relatum
without a relation makes sense, but the idea of a relation without relata does
not. So long as humans are capable of realizing this—and of performing the
prescissive deletion which this asymmetry permits—the worries that generate
the “hard” problem of consciousness will persist. Joseph Levine mentions how
Locke thought that even if “simple ideas go with their respective corpuscular
configurations because God chose to so attach them [...] imagination will pry
them apart” (Levine 1983, p. 359). If one drops the allusion to God, this begins
to look like my account: We can pry apart features that are always found bound
together.  I  therefore  think  that  philosophers  who  believe  in  qualia  are  not
discussing a groundless posit.
Dennett (1991a) believes our idea of qualia is nothing more than a “meme”
that went viral after Descartes. Of course, some memes are more useful than
others. So, for a time, Dennett (1987) sought to recuperate the instrumentalist
benefits of discourse about “minded” creatures. However, given that the simple
construal  of phenomenality championed by Chalmers and Block could never
lead  to  increased  predictive  success  of  another  creature’s  behaviour  (Ross
2005), Dennett (2006) became a vocal opponent of qualia. If, like Dennett, one
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expects “use” to meet Darwinian standards of increased procreation rates, then
folding  semiosis  onto  itself  so  as  to  inspect  its  substructure  may well  be  a
useless ability. I do not want to go on record as saying this, because I suspect
that the same abilities which generate the hard problem of consciousness also
allow for  diagrammatic  reasoning,  which  is  surely  a  useful  tool  (my  post-
doctoral research will be devoted to exploring that hunch). In any event, since
only  sapient  creatures  notice  their  sentience,  the  main  boon  of  prescissive
abstraction may be that it satisfies a sense of curiosity and wonder. The three
Peircean  taxonomies  (shown in figure  9) certainly  do not have any obvious
technological applications. I am thus comfortable with the idea that my account
of consciousness “leaves everything as it is” (Wittgenstein [1953] 2001, p. 42).
Although the action of signs is always triadic, humans can conceive—and
so  request  an  account  of—the intrinsic,  non-relational,  nature  of  any  thing,
because we are the sorts of beings for whom that idea makes sense. It makes
sense because complexity implies simplicity. Thus, triadic signs subsumes brute
collisions and simple qualities that are not articulate (and cannot be articulated)
linguistically.  However,  given  that  qualitative  simplicity  does  not  entail
complexity  (or  any kind of  relation),  this  asymmetry can  act  like  fishhook,
letting us reach ineffable Firstness but preventing us going back to Thirdness,
where cognition,  discourse,  and  science  are  possible.  If  this  dissertation has
succeeded in showing how/why philosophical reflection on consciousness can
sometimes get caught by that hook, then I count that as progress.
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